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1ABSTRACT
This thesis set out to investigate the relation between 
hostels and the political violence on the Reef between July 
1990 and December 1993 which claimed 4756 lives. This 
relation is anchored in a broader discussion of firstly, 
political violence in South Africa generally, and secondly of 
the hostel system. This contextualisation frames the 
investigation of two Sowetan hostels Meadowlands and Merafe. 
These two hostels were among those that became focal points 
of political violence on the Reef during the period under 
review. The thesis argues that the political violence and 
conflict on the Reef between 1990 and 1993 constituted a 'war/ 
in which these and other hostels played a crucial part. The 
Inkatha Freedom Party colonised these institutions, ejected 
non-Zulu and ANC supporters and transformed the hostels from 
migrants camps into "fortresses of fear" from which many 
attacks on township residents were launched. The thesis 
attempts to understand this process through an in-depth 
investigation of Meadowlands and Merafe hostels as case 
studies. It attempts to draw a sociological profile of these 
two hostels. This has involved examining these hostels as 
social institutions, the social relations and culture 
operating within them, and their place in the social structure 
of the surrounding community. The thesis has included an 
investigation of the social characteristics of hostel 
residents such as their ethnic identity, age, gender identity,
marital, employment status, political affiliation and work 
history. These multiple identities are components in 
attempting to explain the participation of many hostel 
residents in political violence. Through a series of in-depth 
interviews the thesis has attempted to map their different 
experiences and understandings of political violence in 
relation to their broader aspirations, beliefs and world 
views. It is asserted that any investigation of the relation 
between hostels and political violence requires this attempt 
to map a 'view from below' which goes deeper than official 
statistics and media accounts.
Ill
"I have walked that long road to freedom. I have tried not 
to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have 
discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one 
only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have 
taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious 
vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have 
come. But I can rest only for a moment, for with freedom 
comes responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long 
walk is not yet ended."
- Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela
IV
DECLARATION
I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It 
is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not 
been submitted before for any degree or examination to any 
other university.
BABYLON MGCINA KA XEKETWANE
(Name of Candidate)
day
VACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I will for ever be grateful to my supervisor Jacklyn Cock, for 
her supervision and inspiration. It was her guidance and 
motivation that sustained mine in this long and sometimes 
tedious road. Professor Cock to you I would like to say: 
"KWANDE NAL'UTHATHEKHONA, UKHULE UNGAKHOKHOBI NTOMBAZANE! I 
thank you and I salute you for my life.
I would also like to thank "Bra Boy" Mchunu who undertook to 
join the likes of the late Lefty Mthembu, Zola Mahobe and many 
others in adopting a black child and making sure that the 
flame of education is kept burning. Bra Boy, I will always 
value your sound advice and financial assistance. I also 
pledge to ensure that the flame is kept burning.
I am also grateful to a dearest friend and an intellectual 
mentor, Avril Joffe, for a solid foundation upon which I have 
begun to build a tall tower of light that I hope will benefit 
all South Africans. I would also like to acknowledge Prof. 
Drew Archibold for his interest in, and intellectual 
contribution to this thesis. Finally I would like to thank 
Maud Msimango who always worked beside me during my hours of 
need.
Finally, my family was, as always, most gracious during the 
period of my engagement with this thesis. May their 
generosity and patience yield fruit for eternity.
VI
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my family Boitomelo, 
Nonkululeko, and Rolihlahla who throughout my 
studies have lived the lives of a migrant family. 
They have grown to understand the pain of growing 
up as strangers.
*vii
ANC -
LIST OP ABBREVIATIONS
African National Congress
AZAPO - Azanian People Organisation
CASE - Community Agency for Social Enquiry
CIIR - Catholic Institute for International Relations
COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions
DBS A - Development Bank of South Africa
ECC - End Conscription Campaign
HRC - Human Research Council
IBIIR - Independent Board of Inquiry
ICJ - International Commission of Jurists
IDAF •- International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa
IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party
JCC - Johannesburg City Council
JMC - Joint Management Council
LIC - Low Intensity Conflict
MDM - Mass Democratic Movement
MK - Umkhonto We Sizwe
NHRA ■- National Hostel Residence Association
PAC - Pan Africanist Congress
RDP - Reconstruction and Development Programme
SCA - Soweto Civic Association
SACCWU - South African Commercial Catering Workers Unions
SADF -- South African Defence Force
SAIRR - South African Institute of Race Relations
SAMWU - South African Municipal Workers Union
SAP - South African Police
V l l l
SSRC - Soweto Student Representative Council
THRA - Transvaal Hostel Residents Association
TV - Television
UDF - United Democratic Front
UWUSA - United Workers Union of South Africa
WRAB - West Rand Administration Board
1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This thesis aims to analyze the role hostels played in the 
political violence on the Reef from the time political 
violence erupted in July 1990 until December 1993. It does
f -
so through two case studies of the Merafe and Meadowlands 
hostels in Soweto.
The thesis will analyze what is new and distinctive in this
r
pattern of political violence and the role played by hostel 
residents in this pattern^ The thesis will argue that while 
"war" is a contested notion, the political violence that 
engulfed the Reef constituted a war. It will further argue 
that the hostel system played an indispensable role in this 
conflict since it frequently provided bases and launch pads 
for the agents of political violence.
This thesis explores the relation between hostels and 
Political violence on the Reef between 1990 and 1993 largely 
by attempting to draw a sociological profile of both the 
Merafe and Meadowlands hostels in Soweto. This has involved 
examining these hostels as social institutions, the social 
relations and culture operating within them, and their place 
in the social structure of the surrounding township. The 
thesis has included an investigation of the social composition
2of the hostels which has focused on the social characteristics 
of the hostel residents, such as ethnic identity, age, gender 
identity, marital status, employment status and work history. 
Through a series of interviews the thesis has attempted to map 
the different experiences and understandings of political 
violence of hostel residents in relation to their differing 
political beliefs and broader world views.
The thesis will present these arguments in five chapters. The 
first chapter analyses political violence in South Africa. It 
is argued that the destabilisation policies of the apartheid 
government which were initially aimed at neighbouring 
countries, were later turned inwards, into South Africa, in 
order to weaken the anti-apartheid forces and prevent South 
Africa's move towards democracy. These destabilisation 
methods introduced South Africa to a type of political 
violence that had never been seen in the country before, and 
brought "war" to the Reef.
The next chapter focuses on the hostels. It traces the 
changing nature of hostels on the Reef from their inception 
in 1913 as migrant labour hostels built to house single males 
in the inner cities. The following chapter attempts to 
understand the role which Meadowlands hostel played in 
political violence. It traces its historical origins, the 
social characteristics of its inhabitants and their relation­
ship with neighbouring communities. The next chapter examines 
similar themes and describes the role which the Merafe hostel
3played in the political violence and how both provided 
sanctuary for "warlords" imported from Natal. In both these 
chapters it is shown that violent conflict connected to fears, 
insecurities, values, beliefs and aspirations which were 
deeply embedded in the socialidentity of the hostel 
residents. Their multiple identities as Zulus, men, migrants, 
Inkatha supporters, and hostel residents are crucial ingre­
dients in attempting to explain why many of them participated 
in political violence.
The chapters which focus on the Merafe and Meadowlands hostels
describe and analyze the changing relationships between the
hostel dwellers and the residents of the surrounding townships
from the time these hostels were built in the 1960's until the
1990's . It will be shown how the 1990's brought enmity and
antagonism between the hostel inmates and residents of
neighbouring townships. These two chapter suggest that these
relationships could not have changed so drastically in the
1990's without the aid of a well organised "hidden hand"or 
1 t
'third force'. The final chapter raises some questions on the 
role of hostels in the new dispensation and maps different 
accounts of how hostel residents may be integrated into a 
peaceful and democratic future.
2. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Political violence engulfed South Africa to an unprecedented 
degree between 1990 and 1993. Significant characteristics of
4this pattern of violence compared with the past are its 
geographical- spread, intensity, source and duration.
Between 1990 and 1993 political violence appeared to follow 
a pattern. It intensified at moments of political consensus, 
for example, as soon as the African National Congress (ANC) 
was tied to the negotiation process by signing the Pretoria 
Minute, suspended their armed struggle in August 1990 and 
committed themselves to the peace accord signed in September 
1991, the numbers of deaths and injuries rose to an all-time 
high between July 1990 and August 1991 (Everatt, 1991).
Another significant characteristic of the political violence 
was that it seemed to decline at times when it could embarrass 
the government. When the then state president of South Africa 
F.W de Klerk went on his diplomatic mission in October 1990, 
the violence declined a great deal; the same thing occurred 
when parliament opened in January 1991, and again when Inkatha 
and the ANC signed their ineffective peace accord on the 29th 
January 1991. Once again the violence decreased when the 
government sponsored a peace conference in June, which was 
boycotted by all the liberation movements but was attended by 
Inkatha. At all of these times a significant downturn of 
violence was experienced (Everatt, 1991).
It appeared that the level of violence declined when it could 
damage de Klerk's government, and it peaked when it could 
obstruct and weaken the government's rivals. The initiators
5of this violence were obviously against any "genuine and 
workable moves toward creating a peaceful climate and 
normalising political life in South Africa" (Everatt, 1991: 
5).
This thesis suggests that the political violence on the Reef 
was deliberately imported from Natal where it had been raging 
since the 1980's. The youth/comrades, the "warlords" and the 
hostel residents were central antagonists in this political 
violence on the Reef. Many South Africans both inside and 
outside the hostels who have experienced this violence defined 
it as a "war".
3. METHODOLOGY: RESEARCHING THE "WAR1*
In researching political violence on the Reef generally, this 
thesis has employed the triangulation method of research. 
Triangulation refers to the use of a number of different and 
distinct research methods to gather data (Babbie, 1989; 
Bailey, 1987;). The study has mainly used qualitative 
investigative methods of research. Mouton claims that this 
approach "concentrates on qualities of human behaviour, i.e. 
on the qualitative aspects as against the quantitatively 
measurable aspects of human behaviour" (Mouton, 1988: 1). He 
continues by arguing that "the aim of such research is not to 
explain human behaviour in terms of universally valid laws or 
generalisations, but rather to understand and interpret the 
meanings and intentions that underlie everyday human action"
6(Ibid). Qualitative research methodology thus seeks to 
explore social relations which are not always observable and 
measurable. The emphasis of qualitative research is insight 
into the social world of social actors. It is primarily aimed 
at exploring the meaning of social situations from the 
participants' point of view. It has been argued that 
qualitative variables are broadly used by sociological 
researchers in "observational studies" (Bailey, 1987: 60-61). 
Schwartz and Jacobs have further added that an advantage of 
qualitative methods is the "use of natural language because 
it is best at gaining access to the life-world of individuals" 
(Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979: 5).
This thesis also follows a case-study approach. As Rose 
(1991) points out, one of the advantages of the case study is 
that it allows flexibility in the choice of methods of data 
collection. Case studies provide one of the man arenas in 
which quantitative and qualitative research material can be 
combined. The aim of case studies is not to infer the 
findings from a sample to a population but rather to identify 
patterns of theoretical importance (Bryman, 1989).
McNeill claims that "a case-study involves the in-depth study 
of a single example of whatever it is that the sociologist 
wishes to investigate. It may prompt further, more wide- 
ranging research, providing ideas to be followed up later, or 
it may be that some broad generalization is brought to life 
fay a case-study" (McNeill, 1990: 87-88). The case-study
7method of research is appropriate for an individual researcher 
because it enables him/her to study one aspect of a problem 
in some depth within a limited time (Bell, 1992).
The main methods employed in the research were:
(1 ) A survey of both primary and secondary sources.
Bryman emphasises that the examination of documents 
such as policy statements, speeches, minutes, reports 
and so on is an integral element in qualitative 
research.
(ii) 82 interviews with male hostel inmates. This 
included:
- 51 interviews with Merafe hostel inmates
- 31 interviews with Meadowlands hostel inmates. 
These were in-depth, semi-structured interviews using 
a questionnaire (see Appendix 1 ) . These included 
closed-ended questions to obtain background 
information as well as open-ended questions which 
allowed for elaboration on key issues (Phillips, 
1985) . They are referred to in the text as 
"respondents".
(iii) 28 interviews with women connected to male hostel 
inmates.
(iv) 18 Interviews with key informants:
These were people who had particular expertise on the 
topic under investigation such as:
- Sanku Molaudi: PAC chairperson, Mapetla
- Zwelethu Mseleku: PAC vice-secretary Meadowlands
8- Godfrey Xgowa: AZAPO spokesperson Mapetla
- Peku Libuxnba: AZAPO secretary, Meadowlands
- Dr Golimolimo Mokae: AZAPO national spokesperson
- Mgungulu Ngwenya: ANC spokesperson Meadowlands
- Absolom Mogwera: ANC spokesperson Mapetla
- Sakie Macozoma: ANC national spokesperson
- Themba Khoza: IFP national leader
- Humphrey Ndlovu: IFP Transvaal leader
- Nkohlakalo Hlongwane: IFP spokesperson Mapetla
- Skhumbuzo Zuma: IFP spokesperson Meadowlands
- Ndabandaba Dube: Merafe hostel induna
- Sizwe Mkhize: Merafe hostel induna
- Dr R. Taylor: Wits academic
- Rev. P.K Ngcosi: Priest involved with peace 
initiatives
- Thembinkosi Ngcobo: sociologist
- Ndoda Mthiyane: Transvaal Hostel Association
- Ntethelelo Nxumalo: Transvaal Hostel Association
- Mojalefa Moseleki: Soweto Council spokesperson.
(v) 15 interviews with township residents in Merafe and 
Meadowlands using a questionnaire. (See Appendix 2) . 
These were randomly selected from the houses 
adjoining the two hostels.
(vi) Participant observation. This was probably the most 
important research method employed. It involved 
spending time in the hostels in order to obtain a 
more nuanced understanding and "insiders'* experience 
of hostel life including leisure patterns, social
9networks, political and cultural practices. Further­
more, the information gleaned through participant 
observation "allows the observer into the everyday 
social worlds of the people under study" helped to 
provide a more complete picture of the working 
environments of the respondents" (van der Burgh, 
1988: 63). In addition, this method built and 
strengthened the relationships between myself and the 
respondents, which enhanced the quality of the 
interviews conducted and the information obtained.
"It is the task of the social scientist to interpret the 
meanings and experiences of social actors, a task that can 
only be achieved through participation with the individuals 
involved" (Burgess, 1984: 78). The participant observer 
gathers data by participating in the daily life of the group 
or organisation studied, and then by watching the people 
he/she is studying to see how they behave in the situations 
in which they find themselves (Becker, 1958: 652). The 
central value of participant observation "lies in the 
opportunity that is available to collect rich detailed data 
based on observations in natural settings" (Burgess, 1984: 
79) . Schatzman and Strauss (1973) state that the participant 
observer must avoid creating a disturbance through their 
presence. Rather, they should aim to integrate themselves 
into the life and work of the people in the setting under 
observation (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973).
10
Distinctions are made between active and passive roles, open 
and closed roles and known and unknown participant observers. 
Gold distinguished four ideal typical roles: "the complete 
participant, the participant as observer, the observer as 
participant, and the complete observer" (Burgess, 1984: 80).
In this study I adopted the role of "observer as participant" 
whereby the researcher is a participant in ongoing activities 
while his/her identity as a researcher is known (Schatzman and 
Strauss, 1973: 61). The role of "participant as observer", 
requires a more active role in the work and practice of the 
respondents, was not possible in this study as the respondents 
were all permanent inmates of the hostel and I was not. The 
scope for active participation was therefore limited.
Burgess, however, points out that in practice the role of 
"participant observers" is often not so sharply distinguished. 
Rather, he says, that the participating field worker may well 
find his/her position and activities changing from time to 
time (Burgess, 1984). This point is echoed by Olsen and 
Whittaker who argue that roles are often not clear-cut in the 
research experience in that roles exist simultaneously, and 
that overlap occurs (Olsen and Whittaker, 1967).
4* INITIAL RESEARCH PREPARATION
Meadowlands and Merafe hostels are two of the biggest hostels 
in Soweto. They have an estimated population of 5 600 and
11
4 782 registered tenants respectively. However, unofficial 
figures of people residing in both these hostels far surpasses 
the official figures. Merafe hostel consists of fourteen 
blocks. Each block houses approximately 400 people. 
Meadowlands hostel on the other hand consists of sixteen 
blocks, each block also houses approximately the same number 
of people as Merafe hostel. The rapid changes in these 
hostels' population has introduced a new phenomenon in each 
hostel. Whereas hostels used to be occupied only by men, each 
hostel block now includes men, women and children.
The nature and the limited time given to this project allowed 
for only a small sample to be interviewed from each hostel. 
The large number of people required to make generalisations 
from a survey of the entire hostel of 5 600 and 7 000 people, 
would have been impossible to establish.
A pilot study of five respondents in each hostel was carried 
out in both hostels to establish social networks and to 
determine time considerations, ambiguity of questions, wording 
or language and whether questions were too intricate, and to 
ensure that they were simple and direct. In the pilot study 
I was always provided with an "escort" (a person to ensure 
that I did not ask any sensitive questions that would endanger 
the IFP or the hostel).
It was discovered in the pilot study that the questionnaire 
was too long. However, we were unable to omit any question
12
because all questions were geared to probe certain responses 
which were crucial to the study. The pilot phase further 
revealed that there were questions that were not liked by some 
hostel inmates. Those questions were subsequently rephrased.
This piloting phase provided a number of discoveries, some of 
which proved the significance of an intensive interview. I 
was able to probe a range of very important understandings 
some of which had not been included in the questionnaire. 
This type of interview generated a better environment for 
extracting information, since it involved direct participation 
by the respondents (Williamson et al., 1982: 163-173).
The co-operation of all respondents in the piloting interviews 
was far beyond my expectation, an incentive that motivated me 
to continue this research.
5. SAMPLING
There are two broad types of samples, namely, the probability 
and the non-probability sample. "A probability sample is one 
in which each person has an equal chance (or probability) of 
being selected" (de Vause, 1986: 52) . The principle of random 
selection is one in which equal probability of selection is 
ensured. Random sampling is possible when a sampling frame, 
i.e. a list of all members in the research population, is 
available. These methods are predominantly utilised in survey 
research where quantitative results are the aim and outcome
13
of the research. The issue of representivity and generalisa— 
bility are central within the context of this research method.
A non-probability sampling method was, however, the most 
appropriate sampling technique for this study. While non- 
random sampling generates difficulties with the representivity 
and generalisability of the results, it is useful where the 
researcher is interested in obtaining a range of responses and 
ideas people have, rather than establishing what proportion 
of the population gives what response (de Vause, 1986: 6 8 ). 
A snowballing technique which incorporated the use of quota 
sampling was employed. This technique makes use of set 
quotas, which cover particular characteristics, aimed to 
produce a more representative sample. Quota sampling is 
"usually defined by such criteria as social class, age and 
sex" (Shipman, 1988: 57) . Shipman goes on to say "quota
sampling has to be used [where] it is impossible to find lists 
from which a probability sample of the population can be 
drawn" (Ibid).
In this regard hostel residents from different age groups, 
employment status and work experiences were interviewed.
Interviews were conducted in both these hostels during the 
week and on weekends, in order to target the employed and the 
unemployed inhabitants of these hostels. All 82 interviewees 
in the hostels were randomly selected according to hostel 
blocks. Interviews were conducted during the day and in the
14
evenings. Interviewing inmates in the evening helped in 
gaining insight into life in the hostel after sunset.
6. INTERVIEW PROCEDURE
During the time the research was conducted in the two hostels, 
violence burst out from time to time and involved inmates from 
both hostels and their neighbouring communities. Because of 
this it was a great effort to reach a target of 51 
interviewees in Merafe hostel and 31 in Meadowlands hostel.
Conducting field work in the hostels was not an easy task, 
particularly because the field work was conducted at the peak 
of the political violence on the Reef. This required appro­
priately timing visits to the hostels as well as carefully 
explaining my mission to my contact persons and my inter­
viewees. Winning the confidence of both the contact person 
and the interviewees was found to be a key that opened the 
doors to successful field work. From the first days of my 
field work in the hostels, I was authorised to select a hostel 
block, a room number and a person to interview by the hostel 
induna.
My thorough knowledge of IsiZulu, the main language spoken in 
both of these hostels, was an added advantage. This helped 
minimise the problem of understanding and interpretation, 
Particularly since all the questions were asked in isiZulu.
15
This knowledge also helped a great deal in cases where 
respondents needed reassuring about fears they might have had.
7. OBSTACLES EXPERIENCED
It would have been absurd to expect that the whole inter­
viewing process could have been conducted without 
difficulties. The field work was loaded with problems and 
challenges. The problems encountered in the piloting phase 
were the tip of the iceberg. There were some occasions where 
the respondents had to leave in the middle of the interview, 
or worse still when the interview was nearly complete, 
presumably because the interview was too long.
At times the respondents insisted on seeing the completed 
questionnaire after the interview to ensure that only the 
correct information was recorded. They sometimes questioned 
why the responses were recorded in English and sometimes 
demanded that they be recorded in isiZulu, lest the inter­
viewer be accused of manipulating the answers.
An in-depth interview which extracted long answers made it 
difficult to record every word uttered by the respondent. The 
use of a tape-recorder would have been very helpful in this 
regard, but permission to use one was refused in both hostels.
The ever present fear of being discovered as a member of the 
Xhosa ethnic group dominated my mind until the last interview
16
was completed in Meadowlands hostel. This was coupled with 
a fear of being seen entering the hostel by the township youth 
who might have accused me of fraternising with their enemy.
Another problem in conducting research in violence-infested 
areas such as Meadowlands and Merafe hostels, was that of 
raising people's expectations. A sizable number of inmates 
in both hostels, particularly older men, women and children, 
expressed a longing for peace and the hope that I could assist 
them. My most frustrating moments during my fieldwork in 
these two hostels, arose from the realisation that I was as 
helpless as they were in the matter of coming up with 
solutions.
I was further frustrated by the fact that the respondents who 
helped me personally in my academic project will not benefit 
in terms of the solutions to the violence, and worse 
still, because of their high levels of illiteracy, they will 
not be able to read the thesis they helped to shape.
17
CHAPTER TWO 
THE WAR ON THE REEF
1. INTRODUCTION
...for decades apartheid inflicted suffering on its 
victims. It is stupid to think the suffering 
inflicted by apartheid on the victims will end 
without apartheid putting up a strong fight to 
perpetuate this suffering. You see, apartheid 
presented white South Africans with a false sense 
of superiority for many years. The apartheid army 
and sinister forces created by apartheid cross 
borders to maim and kill anyone who dare challenge 
the status quo. It is unthinkable to believe that 
the regime will allow this to be lost at the 
negotiation table. It had to put on a strong fight 
under the guise of "black on black" violence. (Key 
informant no. 1, PAC Executive member)
During the three year period of July 1990 to June 1993 the 
Human Rights Commission (HRC) recorded a total of 9325 deaths 
in the political violence which engulfed the country, a death 
rate of 259 per month or 8,5 per day. The PWV region alone 
accounted for 4756 or 52% of these deaths. HRC records show 
a link with hostels in the case of 483 deaths or 44% of the 
Soweto total of 1106 deaths in the three year period. Among 
the problem hostels in Soweto which have been identified as 
sites of violence are Merafe, Meadowlands, Diepkloof, 
Dobsonville, Dube, Jabulani, Nancefield and Mzimhlope.
This thesis set out to investigate the relation between this 
pattern of political violence and hostels on the Reef between 
1990 and 1993. This relation must be located in a broader 
discussion of political violence in South Africa generally in 
this period. Political violence is defined as deliberate acts
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of destruction that impact on power relations in society. The 
chapter will firstly discuss the relation between political 
violence and war and show the difficulties encountered in the 
concept of "war". The chapter will then examine political 
violence that engulfed the Reef from 1990, and argue that the 
scale of violence seen on the Reef constituted a particular 
type of civil war termed 'low intensity conflict'. It is 
shown that this term is also used to describe a repressive 
military strategy that involves the use of surrogate forces. 
The chapter will argue that the political violence which broke 
out on the Reef from mid 1990 formed part of a programme of 
destabilisation that shows strong continuities with the 
destabilisation methods that left most of the neighbouring 
countries in a state of economic and social dislocation. The 
chapter compares the destabilisation violence in the Reef to 
the violence in Natal, the types of violence on the Reef and 
the agencies involved. Finally it examines key themes such 
as ethnicity which have been posited as explanations of the 
political violence in South Africa.
The political violence that enveloped many parts of the Reef 
was part of the apartheid state's strategy to maintain 
political control. During the period 1976 - 1990 the South 
African government carried out a complex combination of 
economic and political manoeuvres, which were largely 
accompanied by military interventions, to destabilise its 
neighbours (Hanlon, 1986; Barrell, 1990; DuPre, 1992; Johnson 
and Martin, 1989; Britain, 1990; Herbstein and Evenson, 1989).
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These destabilisation policies wrought havoc in neighbouring 
countries, destroyed social life, disrupted economies and 
infrastructures, and directly or indirectly caused the death 
and social dislocation of thousands of people. This art of
I destabilisation was later turned inwards against progressive forces inside the country and was perfected by the security agencies of the apartheid state.
Political violence in South Africa increased dramatically 
after the unbanning of the liberation movements and Nelson 
Mandela's release from prison in February 1990. The numbers 
of those who died in political violence almost doubled from 
2 166 in the 12 months between July 1990 to June 1991, to 
almost 4 200 in the comparable period ending July 1993 (HRC 
Report, 1993). However this pattern of political violence has 
deep historical roots in South Africa and has often been 
described as a 'war'.
2. THEORISING SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE AS "WAR"
Frederikse emphasizes that "war" is not a new phenomenon in 
South Africa. She claims that South Africa has been at war 
since the arrival of settlers in 1652 (Frederikse, 1985: 7). 
Other scholars believe it was in the 1970's, when the Soweto 
uprisings of 1976 took place, that the origin of war in South 
Africa can be seen (Davies, 1987: 35). Others identify the 
1980's, particularly between 1984 and 1986, as the period that 
identifies the emergence of war in South Africa (Cock, 1990:
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47 50; Evans and Phillips, 1988: 140). Other writers point 
to the period preceding the 1990's as marking the 
intensification of "civil war" in South Africa (Simpson, et 
al., 1990; Kentridge, 1990: 14-18; Mpheto, 1990: 5 -8 ; 
Hindson and Morris, 1990: 21-23). This thesis argues that the 
political violence that engulfed most of the Reef from August 
1990 marked South Africa as a country at war.
At first glance the concept of "war" has a simple meaning but 
it is a politically contested notion. A number of key actors 
have referred to political conflict in South Africa as a war. 
In a speech made by Nelson Mandela at a rally in King's Park 
Stadium (Durban) attended by an estimated 100 000 people in 
February 1990, he said "We recognise that in order to bring 
the "war" to an end, we must learn to talk to each other as 
South Africans" (Copper et al., 1990: 257). Dirk Coetzee 
referred to the violent conflict in South Africa in the 1980's 
as "a twilight war". This implies that much of the violence 
that took place in South Africa from the mid-1980's was 
hidden. It is further suggested that "twilight war" meant 
that much of the violence was performed in secret by anonymous 
agents (Cock, 1991). This secrecy has a double meaning; in 
the sense that Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) was operating as an 
underground guerrilla army in a clandestine fashion. On the 
other hand, state violence was also executed in secret by 
agents of the state.
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In South Africa, in particular, the concept of "war" is 
contested because there were very serious political 
repercussions, not only in terms of legitimising action, but 
in terms of the consequences for opponents of apartheid who 
were captured. Their classification as prisoners of war 
should have meant better treatment. According to a protocol 
of the Geneva Convention signed by the ANC president Oliver 
Tambo, all guerrillas captured in South Africa should have 
been treated as prisoners of war (Cock, 1990: 46)
The notion that South Africa was at war was denied at various 
historical moments by agents of the apartheid state. An 
example is Brigadier Hermanus Stadler, who maintained that the 
African National Congress ’(ANC) could not be regarded as being 
at war with the South African government. He said, the South 
African government was facing a "revolutionary onslaught". 
He said this in order to deny legitimacy to the ANC which 
claimed to be fighting a 'people's war'. In another treason 
trial Brigadier Stadler described the resistance as "acts of 
terror"; which should be regarded as illegitimate, criminal 
actions far removed from the actions of war. He urged people 
to distinguish between actions of terror and actions of war 
(cited by Cock, 1990: 46). The apartheid state generally 
defined acts of violent resistance as "terrorism", another 
contested notion that is usually used to mean " political 
violence exercised by one's opponents" (Cock, 1991: 4) .
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On the other hand, when the South African government was faced 
with the problem of defending itself against a court action 
filed by the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), it ironically 
described itself as a country at war. In that case the SADF 
was involved in a Supreme Court action filed by the ECC to 
restrain it from illegally undermining the organisation. 
Lieutenant-General Jan Loggerenberg, who was the chief of 
staff, asserted in an affidavit that the SADF was on a war 
footing (Cock, 1990: 46-70).
'War' is contested in theoretical as well as political terms. 
Cock (1990) contends that Hannah Arendt's 1970's definition 
of war as a "massification of violence" far from explains the 
South African situation, as this definition suggests a simple 
relationship between war and violence. The definition of war 
in terms of casualty figures of over 1,000 deaths a year is 
also overly simplistic. Scruton defines war as "a forcible 
contention between states with the purpose of overpowering 
each other by armed force in order to secure certain demands 
or claims" (Scruton, 1982: 489). This definition does not 
explain the South African situation because the main 
protagonists, MK and the SADF, did not belong to separate 
states.
Another definition that is inadequate in explaining the South 
African conflict is that of Kidron and Smith; according to 
them, "war" is an open armed conflict in which "regular, 
uniformed forces are engaged, on at least one side; the
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fighters and the fighting are organised centrally to some 
extent, and there is continuity between clashes" (Kidron and 
Smith, 1983: 6). This definition is much broader than the 
previous two definitions. However the problem with this 
definition lies in the fact that MK and the SADF were not 
similarly socially organised and there was no continuity 
between armed clashes of the two forces. Most of the violent 
clashes were episodic (Cock, 1990: 47).
In reality most of these definitions are flawed because the 
nature of war has changed from its conventional interstate 
character. Almost all of the wars in the world during 1993 
were civil wars. Virtually all of the violent conflict now 
under way in the world involves violence between internal 
groups, often ethnically defined, rather than states. Klare 
cites one estimate that "only four of the eighty two armed 
conflicts recorded in 1989 - 1992 were of a classic interstate 
character, while all of the remainder entailed some degree of 
internal warfare, usually along ethnic and religious lines" 
(Klare, 1994: 38). Increased intergroup violence is a major 
characteristic of the contemporary world, and South Africa's 
past and present is no exception.
The violent conflict in South Africa both during the 1976 - 
1990 period and the 1990 - 1993 period may best be described 
as a particular type of civil war, namely a "low intensity 
conflict" (LIC). The concept of "low intensity-conflict" 
(LIC) or "low level civil war"has been used by a number of
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scholars who have written about the conflict in South Africa
particularly since the mid 1970's to date (See Cock, 1989: 3;
Evans and Phillips, 1988: 136; Kentridge, 1990: 15; Coleman,
1990: 3; Haysom, 1989: 188).
Low intensity conflict is one point along a 
spectrum which includes conventional war through to 
nuclear or high intensity war. War in this sense 
is viewed along a continuum of violent conflict 
(Cock, 1990: 47).
This type of conflict is linked to the process of militarisa­
tion. By militarisation is meant a "social process that 
involves a mobilisation of resources for war at political, 
economical and ideological levels (Cock, 1990: 87) . This 
process has emerged as a result of heightened challenge to the 
apartheid state.
The term "low intensity conflict" refers not only to a type 
of civil war but also to a state strategy. After 1976, South 
Africa entered a period of intense conflict termed "total 
onslaught" in government circles. The government argued that 
South Africa was facing a "total onslaught" from the 
revolutionary forces, and this "total onslaught" was highly 
integrated and multifaceted in nature (Swilling and Phillip, 
1989) . The only way it could be countered, the government 
argued, was by a counter revolutionary method called "total 
strategy". Part of this strategy was a counter-insurgency 
method called the low-intensity conflict (LIC). This is an 
approach to defeat progressive forces without engaging in a 
full-scale conventional war (Cock, 1989; Marishane, 1992).
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As noted above LIC not only describes a type of conflict, but 
it is describes a particular military strategy which was 
extensively used by Americans (Klare, 1988: 62) . The hallmark 
of this strategy is that it operates through surrogate forces 
who execute similar functions to those of the state agencies. 
In South Africa the principal agencies of violence were the 
SADF and the SAP whose operations were indistinguishable to 
many township inhabitants as they were fused in a pattern of 
indiscriminate violence (Cock, 1990: 5). Important actors in 
the political violence were also the death squads, the 
"kitskonstabels", the "askaris", the Internal Stability Units 
(ISU), and the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) (Coleman, 
1990). It will be shown below that during the 1980's their 
role was extended to include surrogate forces in the shape of 
vigilantes and members of Inkatha (Hayman, 1989; Cock, 1990: 
51-57; Coleman, 1990: 5-7; Lawrence, 1990: 63). They were 
active in the escalating scale of political violence that 
engulfed the Reef after mid-1990.
3. POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON THE REEF FROM 1990
The mid-1990's signalled the start of a new pattern of 
political violence on the Reef. Oscar Dhlomo warned in August 
1990 that there was a deliberate policy of 'ethnicising 
political differences' on the part of political leaders. 
During the 1990 - 1993 period there was a process of using 
hostel-dwellers, many of whom were Zulu migrant workers from 
Natal who supported Inkatha, in violent conflict with
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township residents. This new pattern was signalled by an 
incident on 22 July, 1990 when 27 people were killed at 
Sebokeng in a clash between Inkatha supporters and the ANC. 
The hostels were implicated in this clash. "Sebokeng residents 
reported seeing bus loadsof ruralZulus arrive in their 
township and seize control of migrant workers' hostels, 
expelling the occupants" (Sparks, 1994: 138). The emergence 
of this Reef violence coincided with the launch by Inkatha of 
a national political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). 
It is significant that this launch took place at Sebokeng on 
14 July 1990 and marked the full advent of Inkatha onto the 
national arena from its previous base of Natal/KwaZulu (CASE 
Report, 1991).
Inkatha was a formerly tribal organisation formed in 1975 as 
an exclusively Zulu movement. Since its formation Inkatha was 
faced with a major contradiction: that of characterising 
itself as a national liberation movement while at the same 
time functioning within apartheid structures. This contradic­
tion worsened over the years as Inkatha increasingly became 
dependent on the apartheid organs - mainly in the form of the 
KwaZulu bantustan and the apartheid security forces in order 
to fortify its own political position. Any attempts by 
Inkatha leader, Dr Buthelezi, to resolve these contradictions 
/led to Inkatha becoming a surrogate of, and totally allied to 
the apartheid state (Mare, 1987; Mzala, 1988; Forsyth, 1990; 
Mare, 1992).
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From its formation in 1975, Inkatha was simply a cultural 
movement committed to black liberation and mirrored the exiled 
ANC. When mass protest intensified in the 1980's through 
organisations like the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) and the biggest labour federation 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), Inkatha's 
existence was threatened. It subsequently founded a rival 
labour federation, United Workers' Union of South Africa 
(UWUSA) and opposed any actions taken by progressive organisa­
tions such as strikes, school boycotts, a move that presented 
Inkatha with a serious political problem (Kentridge, 1992) .
After the launch of Inkatha and the clash at Sebokeng a number (\ 
of similar clashes followed. There were many local reports 
of "Zulus being bussed in and taking over the migrant workers' 
hostels, then using them as bases from which to launch attacks 
on residents. This provoked reprisals against the hostels, 
starting a cycle of violence that raged up and down the urban 
belt of the Witwatersrand..." (Sparks, 1994: 138).
The political violence on the Reef between 1990 and 1993 
involved actions such as arson, bomb attacks on the homes of 
particular individuals targeted for their political 
connections as well as armed attacks involving hostels and 
shootings of various kinds. The conflict on the Reef and in 
the rest of the country has taken different forms to that in 
Natal, both in scope and intensity.
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One distinctive feature of the violence on the Reef was that 
attacks were increasingly directed against gatherings of black 
people engaged in their daily routines. Funeral vigils, ! 
trains, buses, taxis, stokvels, parties and taxi ranks I 
increasingly became sites of political violence. In September 
1990 random attacks on commuter trains began, with armed men 
stabbing and shooting passengers. This was followed by 
attacks on taxis used by black commuters. Attacks on black 
commuters on their way to work became common (see Appendix C) . 
According to a Goldstone Commission Report between 1990 and 
1993, 600 people have died in nearly 500 train, bus and taxi 
attacks. Attacks on people travelling in township trains 
also increased dramatically. Reef trains in the past were 
important sites for peaceful social activities that involved 
religious and political organising (Shubane, 1991). This 
pattern was disrupted as random attacks on trains travellers 
increased. From 1990 to 1992 more than 300 train commuters 
lost their lives, while 850 were injured in train attacks 
(SAIRR, 1992). These attacks could be described as a form of 
terrorism as they involved "systematic acts of destruction 
aimed at altering or maintaining power relations through 
spreading extreme fear" (Cock, 1990: 85).
Hostels have been specifically linked to these attacks. For 
example in 1992 two Zulu-speaking residents of Merafe hostel 
were arrested on the grounds of suspected involvement in two 
attacks on Johannesburg trains.
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The larger scale and different types of political violence on 
the Reef required "logistical support, transport and 
planning". (Innes and Kentridge, 1992: 87). The weaponry 
involved was of a different order to home-made guns and 
pangas; sophisticated automatic weapons and hand guns became 
more widely available and consequently the death rate 
increased. Many hostels were used to store arms caches, 
including AK- 47's, revolvers, pistols, ammunition, knives and 
spears. In the planning and execution of attacks the killers 
began to show a higher degree of professionalism.
August 1990 witnessed the suspension of the armed struggle by 
the ANC in the Pretoria Minute of 6th August. However in that 
month alone over 700 people lost their lives in political 
violence, 570 of these people dying in the PWV area alone. 
During the remaining months of 1990, national deaths remained 
at high levels of an average of 366 per month (Simpson et al. , 
1991: 1 1 ) . Altogether 38 major killings or massacres occurred 
on the Reef (HRC Report, 1992).
In Swanieville, on 12 May 1992 twenty-eight squatters were 
killed, thirty injured and eighty-two shacks burnt down in an 
attack by more than 900 Inkatha supporters wielding rifles, 
guns, pangas and spears. it was alleged by residents that 
police arrived during the attack, but stood by and then 
escorted the Inkatha supporters back to their hostel. Inkatha 
actually claimed responsibility for the massacre, claiming it
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was a revenge attack for the deaths of two Inkatha supporters 
j.n the nearby hostel on the previous night.
This pattern of police_assistance for hostel attackers
occurred again at Boipatong, when on the night of 17 June 1991 
more than 300 armed men from KwaMadala hostel carrying AK 47 
rifles, pangas, knobkerries, and spears, attacked and 
shot,stabbed and hacked thirty - eight people to death in 
their homes. Some residents claimed that police had escorted 
the attackers into the township and out again. "Whatever the 
truth of the residents' allegations, there was an absolute 
conviction in the minds of nearly the entire black community 
that the police were involved in the attack by Inkatha 
supporters, and that this was part of a government plot to 
weaken the ANC and its supporters" (Sparks, 1994: 141).
As the death toll from political violence mounted many accused
the government of conducting a systematic campaign of
destabilization. Many people believed that a "third force"
within the military -security establishment was instigating
and directing the violence to weaken the ANC. This was
described as an internal version of the destabilisation
strategy practice by the apartheid state in neighbouring
countries such as Zambia, Namibia and Angola among others.
As the formal apparatus of South African repression 
has been dismantled, its function - to hamstring 
and cripple political opposition - has been carried 
out by violence. It has proved far more
internationally palatable: economic sanctions have 
been widely lifted, diplomatic, sporting and other 
links have been established. At the same time, the
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liberation movements and their allies seek to 
undertake normal political activity in a community 
that is destabilised by horrific levels of 
brutality and bloodshed (Everatt and Sadek, 1992: 
4) •
This escalating political violence must be related to the 
increasing opposition to apartheid. The 1990's were not the 
first time there had been violent confrontation in South 
Africa between forces opposed to apartheid and pro-apartheid 
forces. The 1980's marked the intensification of internal 
political opposition against the apartheid regime. It was 
during this period that the agencies of the state undertook 
the most harsh and extensive clampdown on students, labour and 
political activists since the 1960's (Mzala, 1988). Members 
of unregistered labour movements survived against all odds, 
when the state detained hundreds of its members and leaders, 
while others disappeared without trace. The 1980's were 
characterised by the proliferation of strike actions as 
"unregistered, unrecognised, and newly-registered trade unions 
began flexing their muscles" (Du Pre, 1992: 119). This was 
a clear indication that forces opposed to apartheid were 
prepared to withstand any repression in their fight. Their 
mood was aptly captured by the songs which were sung during 
those times: "asikhathali noma siyafa, noma siboshwa, kodwa 
sobe silwela inkululeko" (we do not care whether we are 
detained or die, we will be fighting for our freedom). This 
culminated in the formation of the Congress of South Africa 
Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985, which represented almost half 
a million South African workers.
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The eighties also saw the emergence of the non-racial United 
Democratic Front (UDF) which specialised in mobilising an 
aggressive youthful constituency (CIIR, 1987; Seeking, 1991; 
Marks, 1992). The government imposed a State of Emergency in 
an attempt to crush the UDF challenge to its political hege­
mony. "Vigilantes” were deployed in the townships to erode 
the power of anti-apartheid forces.
This marked a shift away from an exclusive reliance on the 
SADF and the SAP to quell black opposition. This strategy was 
operative on a large scale in Natal prior to the unbanning of 
the ANC and other opposition forces.
4. INKATHA AND THE CONFLICT IN NATAL
In Natal a Zulu civil war raged with considerable involvement 
of the security forces of the apartheid state. When the 
violence was restricted to Natal there was an overwhelming 
demonstration of police bias towards Inkatha in its "war" with 
the UDF (Kentridge, 1992). "The bias reflected a policy arti­
culated at the highest level of government. Cabinet ministers 
approved security police funding of the activities of Inkatha 
and its trade union wing, the United Workers Union of South 
Africa (UWUSA), from 1986" (Amnesty International, 1992: 40). 
While the conflict was confined to Natal,the strife was not 
perceived as ethnic because the Natal region is predominately 
inhabited by the Zulu-speaking ethnic group (Shubane, 1990).
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As it is well known the political violence in Natal went on 
to claim the lives of more than thousand people a year in that 
region during the 1980's and the 1990's (Minnaar, 1992).
So-called 'faction fighting' was been part of the Natal region 
for many years. Reasons for these feuds ranged from family 
quarrels, theft of cattle, brawls after beer drinking, fights 
over girls or marriage ceremonies, or traditionalstreet 
fighting that was won by a non-dominant clan. One reason that 
became pivotal among many was the outstanding conflict in 
retaliation or wrong done to the tribe's honour (Minnaar, 
1992). These violent confrontations were between different 
tribal or clan groupings within certain "Izigodi" 
(magistracies) in the region. These faction fights were 
largely between members of illiterate rural populations. 
Combatants were only armed with traditional weapons, such as 
assegais (spears), axes, knobkerries, sword-sticks 
(intsumentshu) and any other instrument that could kill an 
opponent. The only sophisticated weapons were home made guns 
dubbed "Qwashas", though these were as deadly as any modern 
weaponry (Ainslie, 1992) .
With colonization these faction fights took a different 
direction. The cause "lay in the increasing pressures on the 
reserves set up in the 19th century by Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone. The acute land shortage experienced in these areas 
often provided the catalyst. Disputed boundaries between 
tribes or clans resulted eventually in an entrenched cycle of
33
AS it is well known the political violence in Natal went on 
to claim the lives of more than thousand people a year in that 
region during the 1980's and the 1990's (Minnaar, 1992).
So-called 'faction fighting' was been part of the Natal region 
for many years. Reasons for these feuds ranged from family 
quarrels, theft of cattle, brawls after beer drinking, fights 
over girls or marriage ceremonies, or traditionaJL street 
fighting that was won by a non—dominant clan. One reason that 
became pivotal among many was the outstanding conflict in 
retaliation or wrong done to the tribe's honour (Minnaar, 
1992). These violent confrontations were between different 
tribal or clan groupings within certain "Izigodi" 
(magistracies) in the region. These faction fights were 
largely between members of illiterate rural populations. 
Combatants were only armed with traditional weapons, such as 
assegais (spears), axes, knobkerries, sword-sticks 
(intsumentshu) and any other instrument that could kill an 
opponent. The only sophisticated weapons were home made guns 
dubbed "Qwashas", though these were as deadly as any modern 
weaponry (Ainslie, 1992).
With colonization these faction fights took a different 
direction. The cause "lay in the increasing pressures on the 
reserves set up in the 19th century by Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone. The acute land shortage experienced in these areas 
often provided the catalyst. Disputed boundaries between 
tribes or clans resulted eventually in an entrenched cycle of
34
revenge and retaliation" (Minnaar, 1992: 1). This background 
is crucial to understanding the current relation between 
political violence and hostel residents on the Reef. It will 
be shown below that more than 50% of people interviewed inji 
both the Meadowlands and Merafe Hostels hailed from areas 
where faction fighting had become endemic. However one key 
informant, Thembinkosi Ngcobo, a sociologist, believes that 
these faction fights had nothing to do with political 
competition or scarce resources as many writers have 
suggested. He points to the lack of commitment from the 
apartheid authorities in stopping these feuds, possibly 
because they played right into the 'divide and rule' strategy 
of the apartheid state. Faction fights never presented a 
threat to maintenance of apartheid rule in the region.
It was only in the 1980's when this factional violence moved 
from the rural to the urban areas of Natal that it took on an 
overtly political shape. The first violent confrontation in 
Natal occurred in the 1980's under the State of Emergency, 
when the apartheid government sought to erode or destroy all 
democratic formations allied to the UDF and became committed 
to strengthening Inkatha.
In the 1970's, Inkatha was a relatively a new organisation 
which was largely perceived as an internal black liberation 
movement acting as an extension of the ANC (Aitcheson, 1989; 
Mzala, 1988) . Its aims and objectives were expressed with the 
purpose of capturing and arousing the political feelings of
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the black majority. In one of its proclamations Inkatha 
asserted:
The business of black liberation is our business 
.... The important thing I want to stress here is 
that it is absolutely vital in our struggle for 
liberation for every organisation which emerges 
among blacks to make possible that unity with other 
black organisations is achieved. Division and the 
chewing of the end of mutual recrimination have 
been the bane that has thwarted our struggle for 
too long. ...We must organise now as effectively as 
we can... I have always known that we need 
structures which spurn rural and urban and which 
spurn provinces. This kind of structure now exists 
in the form of Inkatha (Mzala, 1988: 119-120).
At this time anything which challenged the repressive rule of 
the South African government was viewed positively by the 
majority of black people. This challenge was enough to make 
thousands believe that Ifikatha was an instrument of black 
liberation and an extension of the ANC. This is well captured 
by Mare who claimed that:
The hand of Buthelezi and Inkatha was strengthened 
during this period through African National 
Congress support for their political agenda. One 
(powerful set of political symbols of mobilisation 
(arouse out of identification of Inkatha with the 
revived ANC. Inkatha colours, its political myth 
(of origin and some leadership figures were drawn 
from aspects of ANC tradition, especially its 
conservative branch in Natal prior to its unbanning 
(Mare, 1992: 57-58).
All of this boosted the membership of Inkatha. Various surveys 
conducted around the late 1970's and the early 1980's put 
Inkatha's support at well above 50% of all black South 
Africans (Mzala, 1988). Mzala for instance claimed that 
Inkatha membership increased from 3 0 000 in 1976 to well above
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250 000 members in 1979. The Arnold Bergstresse Institute 
found that 50% of Inkatha members also supported the ANC 
(Mzala, 1988). By contrast, Orkin maintains that Inkatha's 
support both in rural and urban areas never went beyond a 30% 
mark of all people living in rural and urban Natal since its 
inception in 1972 (Orkin, 1988). On 22 June 1990 more than 
a thousand Inkatha supporters marched through Central 
Johannesburg armed with assegais and knobkerries.
In the 1980's, there was a clear sign that Inkatha was 
beginning to lose its hegemony particularly among the urban 
inhabitants of Natal (Mzala, 1988; Ainslie, 1992). Political 
formations opposed to the apartheid regime and Inkatha began 
to intensify their opposition. The resistance took the form 
of actions attached to national strategies, such as consumer 
boycotts, rent boycotts, education boycotts as well as other 
forms of boycotts that involved local issues (Seeking, 1991; 
Aitcheson, 1989; Hindson and Morris, 1990).
An event that marked a high point of the resistance in Natal 
was the Kwa-Mashu school boycott of 1980, which, although 
linked to nation-wide action that was geared to making 
apartheid unworkable, included protests against the 
introduction of the Inkatha syllabus dubbed "ubuntu-botho" in 
most schools under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu government. 
This resistance was brutally repressed by Inkatha-linked 
vigilantes (Mzala, 1988). Furthermore, the Natal resistance
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also involved organised opposition to the proposed incorpora­
tion of certain townships into KwaZulu.
people engaged in boycott actions generally belonged to 
groupings affiliated to the UDF or the growing labour movement 
which was strengthened with the formation of Cosatu in the mid 
1980's (Charney, 1992; Aitcheson, 1989; Seeking, 1991).
This opposition against the apartheid government came to be
viewed as directly targeting Ihkatha, since it was the KwaZulu
arm of the organisation which was responsible for the general
administration of apartheid in schools and in the townships.
This meant that Inkatha had the ability to distribute
patronage to its followers through the KwaZulu government.
This is best captured by Mare who states that:
Allegiance to the "Zulu nation" - measured through 
membership of Inkatha - could determine access to 
resources. Inkatha claimed total representation of 
"Zuluness" in the first years after its formation 
in 1975. It was also a sole party in the apartheid 
government. Those who sought to politicise and 
mobilise Zulu ethnicity also controlled pensions; 
land allocation and education; signed work-seekers' 
permits; and approved bottle store licences. There 
were and are, therefore, both "positive" and 
"negative" inducements to accept the specific 
version of ethnic identity into which Buthelezi 
organised people, and ... it is given form in 
Inkatha. The former are found in the pride, self- 
worth, solidarity, and discovery of what an 
illustrious past can offer; the latter lie in the 
instrumental acceptance of the specific Inkatha 
version of that identity due to the material and 
political pressures (sometime extremely violent) 
applied to a large sections of the regional 
population (Mare, 1992: 67-68).
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The apartheid state's response to increasing township turmoil 
was harsh and repressive. Apartheid activists were banned 
while some were detained. Some of those who were viewed as 
dangerous by the state were assassinated; Griffiths Mxhenge 
and Dr Rick Turner are examples. People who had associated 
themselves with township resistance were also targeted for 
attack by vigilantes, and slowly the violence spread to most 
parts of Natal (Kentridge, 1992).
In 1990 782 people died in Natal and 352 in KwaZulu (Hansard 
21 March 1991, cols. 729 - 730).
The apartheid state, with its sophisticated power failed to 
put an end to the carnage- The number of political killings 
grew dramatically; over 6000 people were killed in this region 
from the time the strife began in the 1980's until 1992 
(Kentridge, 1992; Marks, 1992).
Evidence is still emerging of collusion between Inkatha and 
certain members of the security forces in Natal during this 
period. Integral to creating and maintaining peace in Natal 
was the government's unwillingness to order expeditious, 
credible and public investigations into allegations of human 
rights violations by security officers. For example, the 
evidence which emerged in the Trust Feed case indicated the 
involvement of the police in the violence and a cover-up that 
involved senior officers (Amnesty International).
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The agencies of this political violence included state 
agencies such as the SADF and SAP, members of political 
organisations such as the ANC and PAC, MK cadres, members of 
self defence units, criminal elements, hostel dwellers, 
Inkatha vigilantes and the township youth. According to the 
preliminary report of the International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ), "many hostels in the Transvaal are today used as 
Inkatha barracks" (ICJ, 1992: 21). This view was further 
supported by the Goldstone Commission interim report on train 
violence, which claimed that whenever a group of attackers 
were identified, they were identified as hostel dwellers (The 
Star, 29.7.1992). These hostel residents were widely assumed 
to be Inkatha vigilantes. This social category is thus 
particularly relevant to understanding the relation between 
hostels and political violence.
Vigilante groups emerged in several parts of the country in 
the mid-eighties, the most prominent and sustained of these 
groups were mainly "war-lords" from within Inkatha. Vigilantes 
who supported Inkatha have been said to be responsible for the 
spread of political violence in Natal during the 1980's and 
in the Transvaal during the 1990's (CASE Report, 1991; HRC 
Report, 1992).
Inkatha vigilantes were part of a phenomenon which dominated 
the South African political scene in the 1980's (Kentridge, 
1990). The Human Rights Commission identified Inkatha and the 
security forces as the primary culprits in the 50 attacks in
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which 10 or more people were killed (HRC Report, July 1992; 
The Star, 3.7.1992). Vigilantes were members of private 
"armies" that are drawn from traditional and conservative 
elements, from the unemployed and even from criminal gangs 
(Lawrence, 1990; Evarett, 1991; HRC Report, 1991). They have 
been defined as "violent, organised and conservative groupings 
operating within black communities, which, although they 
receive no official recognition, are politically directed in 
the sense that they act to neutralise individuals and grouping 
opposed to the apartheid state and its institutions" (Haysom, 
1989: 188). The question of official recognition and state 
support is controversial. The vigilantes in most cases acted 
either in collusion with the police or on their own, with the 
police apparently turning a blind eye to their actions 
(Haysom, 1989) .
Revelations first appeared in July 1991 of government funding 
of the Inkatha Freedom Party and its activities. Evidence has 
now emerged of links between the covert operations of the SADF 
and the training and arming of Inkatha vigilantes (Marks, 
1992; Shepherd, 1992). The Goldstone Commission was told that 
Inkatha leaders on the Reef urged their supporters at Soweto's 
Nancefield hostel to attack ANC members and community 
residents (The Weekly Mail. 22.5.1992). Overall "there is 
little doubt that the violence in the townships of Natal and 
the Rand is being and has been fomented by elements in the 
army and the police" (Marks, 1992: 123). As Everatt argued 
"the aim seems to be to destabilise black South African life
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and to prevent the establishment of a normalised political 
climate" (1991: 2).
The Community Agency for Social Inquiry (CASE) analyzed 
responsibility in 257 acts of violence covering the first year 
of the Reef violence. "Of these Inkatha had been reported as 
responsible in 51%, the SAP in 23% and the ANC in 4% of cases, 
while the SAP was recorded in 46 reports as "actively 
colluding" with IFP supporters in acts of violence and 
aggression (CASE, 1990: l) .
The HRC recorded a total of 2 786 deaths that involved 
vigilantes between 1990 and 1992. 884 of these occurred 
during the first year of this carnage, while 1 898 people died 
during the second year of the Reef violence. This is a clear 
indication of the upward trend of vigilante-related violence 
(HRC Report, 1992).
However the views of CASE and the Human Rights Commission have 
been disputed. The South African Institute of Race Relations, 
while admitting a steady increase of fatal and non-fatal 
incidents of political violence between 1990 and 1992 argued 
that it was not possible to identify aggressors and agents of 
attack in 87% of cases. The Institute identified 14.5% of 
incidents as directed against members of the police and the 
security forces (SAIRR, 1992).
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The Human Rights Commission claims that "vigilantism in South 
African context is a phenomenon born directly out of the 
creation of apartheid—motivated structures of government and 
administration". The structures concerned are the homelands 
(both the "independent" and "self-governing" varieties) and 
the black urban councils. Both structures are strongly rejec­
ted by the vast majority of the black population and strong 
pressures have built up for their dismantling. In response 
to these pressures, private "armies" of vigilantes were 
developed to support and defend these unpopular structures, 
and came to receive the tacit and the active encouragement of 
‘-he state as a strategy which fitted well with their "total
... \ j \ V  .
strategy". It was this strategy that helped promote the image 
of "black on black violence" at no political cost to the 
government (HRC, 1990/91).
The initial objective of the vigilantes was to break the 
strength of all the progressive organisations and individuals 
who opposed the apartheid-created homelands and the 
discredited Black Councils. Since the government focused its 
attention on new forms of the destabilisation strategy after 
February 2 1990, the vigilante targets also changed, they 
became less selective, and switched their tactics to random 
terrorising of township residents (HRC, 1990/92; Shubane, 
1990).
The State decided to use the vigilantes in its dirty work 
because the vigilantes were capable:
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of destabilising communities far more effectively 
than the official organs of the state and a far 
more chilling level of violence can be used than 
that which the state could ever bring to bear 
without suffering immense damage, both locally and 
internationally (Pauw, 1991: 117).
A reliance on vigilantes is part of the reliance on surrogate 
forces which defines the strategy of low intensity conflict 
described above.
In the past these forms and agencies of political violence 
were perceived as part of "a marginal conflict, confined to 
the narrow provincial boundaries" of Natal (Innes and 
Kentridge, 1992: 74). The new pattern of political violence 
which emerged on the Reef from 1990 to 1993 demands different 
explanations. Many explanations - all fraught with deficien­
cies - have emerged. Each explanation emphasises different 
factors such as ethnic antagonisms, socio-economic conditions, 
ideological differences, criminal elements, and tensions 
generated by the disintegration of apartheid. It will be 
shown that several of these are important themes in exploring 
the relation between political violence and hostels on the 
Reef.
5. EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
(a) Ethnic Antagonism
Shula Marks attests that "it seems clear that Inkatha 
supporters mobilised around a specific Zulu ethnic identity,
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have been the source of most of the aggression. This is true 
in Natal ... and on the Reef" (Marks, 1992: 122). There is 
no doubt that ethnicity is an important source of identity — 
in South Africa and elsewhere. Elements of language, kinship 
and custom are often deeply embedded in individual identities 
and strongly felt. What is controversial is the extent to 
which the political violence on the Reef can be explained in 
terms of ethnic antagonism. A crucial distinction is that 
between ethnic identity and ethnic antagonism.
Ethnic identities are social constructs, constantly shaped and 
reshaped and negotiated in a process of social interaction. 
As Sitas has written, "'Zulu-ness' must be viewed as a 
negotiated identity between ordinary people's attempts to 
create effective and reciprocal social bonds (or functioning 
cultural formations) out of their social and material 
conditions of life..." (Sitas, 1987: 53).
Ethnicity is not inherently conflictual with a national 
identity. It is politicised ethnicity - the mobilisation of 
ethnicity to secure economic and political goals - that is 
divisive. Ethnic antagonism is a principal component even if 
it does not provide a sole and satisfactory explanation in 
interpreting the violence on the Reef (Mkhize, 1990).
Political violence in South Africa is often explained by 
journalists in terms of "black on black" violence or in terms 
of an atavistic tribal conflict between a Zulu Inkatha and an
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allegedly Xhosa ANC. Time magazine for instance maintained 
that the strife emanated from "tribal-based animosities that 
dated back centuries (Time, 17 August 1990). Giliomee 
perceives Inkatha as epitomizing the forces of Zulu 
nationalism whilst the ANC was identified as a Xhosa 
organisation whose Xhosa leadership sought power on behalf of 
the Xhosa nation (The Star. 24 August 1990). Johnson 
evaluates the Reef conflict in terms of the war between the 
Xhosa and the Zulus. He also perceives the adverse 
relationship between the two ethnic groups as emanating from 
the past, particularly in the "proud" warrior history of the 
Zulu nation that continues to find expression through Inkatha 
(Sunday Star. 21.10.1992). Horowitz emphasises the "Zulu- 
Xhosa" ingredient in much violent conflict and stresses that 
the ANC is dominated by Xhosas in its leadership. This is 
construed as indicating "an unspoken undercurrent of Xhosa 
nationalism in some echelons of the ANC" (Horowitz, 1990: 30; 
cited by Taylor, 1991: 4) .
The explanation of the conflict in terms of ethnic antagonism 
has been rejected by a number of other analysts. Taylor 
maintains that this explanation does not accurately describe 
or account for the dynamics of the conflict. He claims that 
the ANC is not a Xhosa organisation and has never made special 
claims for the Xhosa "nation". Nor are its campaigns targeted 
against the Zulu people. There are many Zulus who support the 
ANC, and not all Zulus support Inkatha (Taylor, 1992). 
Shubane argues that ethnic identity "has not been in and of
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itself a variable which has structured politics. It has 
always needed to be primed by an external agent" (Shubane, 
1990: 6).
The explanation of the Reef violence in terms of ethnic 
antagonism has other major limitations. The advocates of this 
argument have failed to take into account the fact that the 
attacks on the townships by the hostel dwellers included 
attacks on Zulu-speaking members of the community. Secondly, 
ja number of areas that have been involved in political 
^violence were predominately non-Xhosa speaking areas. 
Thirdly, the advocates of the ethnic argument assume hostels 
to be homogeneous entities that house only Zulu-speaking 
"impis" that are embroiled in violent activities. The thesis 
will provide a more nuanced and differentiated account. As 
Shula Marks has written, "...the reality is far more complex 
and historically specific than these simple [ethnic] 
stereotypes allow ... in South Africa . . . ethnic explanations 
by themselves have only limited value" (Marks, 1992: 122).
(b) Gender and Violence
Gender identities are negotiated in similar terms to ethnic 
identities, and often involve linkages between masculinity and 
violence (Cock, 1991). For many South Africans violence is 
a legitimate solution to conflict and violent behaviour is 
proper and appropriate to manliness. In Natal, according to 
Kentridge, "war is a male affair" (Kentridge, 1990: 2). Much
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of the political violence both on the Reef and in Natal is
gender specific. With a few exceptions the violence is
perpetrated by men, both white and black. Understanding this
requires an investigation of the gender ideologies operating
in different cultural contexts. The link between masculinity
and militarism in Zulu history has frequently been used by
Buthelezi to mobilise his constituency. The conception of men
as warriors is often invoked to justify the carrying of
traditional or "cultural weapons". A statement made by king
of the Zulus at a rally in Soweto illustrates this point:
The call to ban the bearing of cultural weapons is 
an insult to my manhood. It is an insult to the 
manhood of every Zulu man (Cited by Cock, 1994:
52) .
This is further supported by Mare who claimed that the:
Inkatha version of the Zulu ethnic group sanctions 
male-dominated gender relations, and hierarchy of 
authority in which chiefs stand anointed by 
tradition (Mare, 1993: 72).
(c) Socio-economic Conditions
Other explanations have given priority to poor socio-economic 
conditions to account for the political violence. Woods and 
Kotze, for instance, argue that in most poverty stricken 
residential areas of South Africa violence is endemic because 
people struggle to survive and they scramble for scarce 
resources. They maintain that in most violence-infested 
areas, unemployment is common and living conditions are 
depressing (Kotze, 1991; Woods, 1992).
j
/
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Socio-economic issues are obviously pivotal in any explanation 
of social events. However, poverty does not automatically/ 
induce violence. There are large numbers of communities in 
black society that have been trapped in a milieu of 
deprivation for decades, without engaging in violence. The 
socio-economic analysis is too general and cannot demonstrate 
why political violence emerged on the Reef and not in other 
areas of the country with similar or worse "social 
pathologies". Furthermore, this explanation does not explain 
why socio-economic deprivation resulted in increased political 
violence after February 2, 1990.
(d) Apartheid Created Social Divisions
Other analysts have emphasized the social division created by 
years of apartheid as causes of political violence. Taylor, 
for instance, claims that decades of apartheid have created 
pervasive destitution and social cleavages within townships, 
resulting in endemic structural conflict. Many migrants form 
part of the forced labourers from the "homelands" who live in 
the hostels. This group of men provide a secondary labour 
market where the cost of production of the labour power is the 
lowest (Taylor, 1991). Taylor argues that the Reef also 
contains the most debased section of the community dubbed the 
"underclass". This section of the Reef population consists 
largely of the unemployable and those working in the lowest 
segment of the labour market. They are the hostel dwellers
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or the squatter-camp communities, the social groups that are 
most implicated in the Reef violence (Taylor, 1991).
Taylor's argument is also limited in a number of ways. 
Apartheid engineers were experts in exploiting social 
divisions for their own ulterior motives. The political 
violence between 1990 and 1993 was not exclusively between the 
hostel dwellers and the unemployed or "underclasses". The 
violence was between the hostel dwellers and the rest of the 
non-hostel population, particularly on the Reef. J •
(e) Migrancy
Migrancy is clearly an impbrtant factor in any explanation of 
the current violence on the Reef. Schlemmer has argued that 
recent arrivals of Zulu-speaking migrant workers are 
characterised by "solidarity and a shared sense of 
deprivation" which make them "predisposed to violent 
reactions" (Schlemmer, 1991: 5) .
The reasons for migrancy, the collapse of the rural economy, 
and the ways in which migrant workers have been deprived of 
family life particularly, have been well documented (Wilson, 
1979; Segal, 1991; Delius, 1989; Ramphele, 1989, 1992). Since 
the abolition of influx control in 1986 the number of migrant 
workers on the Reef has increased (Jooma, 1991; Mabin, 1991). 
Schlemmer argued that migration to the cities increased 
dramatically in the mid 1980's because of the mini-boom of the
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1986-1989 that expanded work opportunities. However, this 
phenomenon was short-lived because it resulted in declining 
opportunities in late 1989. Large numbers of people who 
flocked to the urban areas arrived in a situation of increased 
destitution with few alternatives available to them 
(Schlemmer, 1991).
The category of "migrants" in most of these accounts is far 
too generalised. There are distinctive differences between 
Xhosa-speaking and Zulu-speaking migrants living in the 
hostels. For example the pattern among the Xhosa-speaking. 
migrants was either to bring their wives with them or to leave 
the hostel to live with women they had met on the Reef 
(Minnaar, 1992). Zulu-speaking migrants, however, remained 
in the hostels and did not bring their wives with them. 
According to Hindson and Morris, this was because the land in 
KwaZulu was still able to sustain its population - albeit on 
minimal levels. Hence the Zulu-speaking hostel residents from 
Natal left their wives and children in the rural areas to 
maintain their land rights through effective physical occupa­
tion. Bringing their wives to the Reef would have meant the 
loss of the land rights (Hindson and Morris, 1992) . (see insert 50 a - d)
(f) Social Tensions Generated by the Demise of Apartheid
Another explanation of the Reef conflict, places the blame for 
the increase in violence primarily on the social tensions 
generated by the disintegration of apartheid instead of its
Insert 50(a)
The closed nature of the hostel system, as indicated in the 
next chapter, and the existence of a large concentration of 
unemployed single men, created the perfect environment for 
coercion and forced recruitment. This situation also 
presented the opportunity for rapid mobilisation, instant 
meetings, and the preparation for the launching of attacks on 
the neighbouring townships. Unemployment, migrancy and 
hostels are among the pivotal elements in the explanation of 
the violence that has racked the Reef since 1990.
The availability of a large number of unemployed people in the 
rural areas of KwaZulu/Natal for instance has led to a belief 
that the Inkatha Freedom Party has mobilised, trained and then 
deployed these people in the hostels around the Reef to fan 
violence. On the other hand, a large number of unemployed 
people in the hostel could mean that there was a large 
reservoir of people who were themselves the victims of 
violence and harboured feeling of revenge against the township 
residents. On the other hand the presence of a large pool of 
unemployed personnel in the hostel may be an indication that 
the hostels were infiltrated by "impis" who entered the 
hostels under the guise of job-seekers.
Woods asserts that hostel unemployment has long been part of 
the South African situation. But he maintains believe that 
the levels of unemployed hostel residents had 
risen by approximately 26 percent over the period 1990-1993.
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He blames the problem of unemployment on two phenomena: (i) 
large scale retrenchments and (ii) an increase in hostel 
populations due to new migrants being allowed to move into the 
hostels (Woods, 1993). He denies the suggestion that these 
people were deliberately bused in to cause havoc.
Thomas perceived the underlying cause of unemployment in the 
1990's as greatly influenced by South Africa's demographic 
transition. He believe that:
During the last two decades the African 
birth rate has remained high, whereas 
mortality rates have declined signifi­
cantly. Because of this high drop out 
rate at school, African youngsters are 
able and willing to enter the labour 
market at a relatively early age, and 
since there are few jobs available for 
young and poorly educated, most either 
remain unemployed for a lengthy period, 
or are drawn into the informal sector, or 
acquire skills. For older Africans, 
changing lifestyles requires longer 
periods of employment. While many 
migrant workers previously abandoned 
active employment after twenty years of 
migrant involvement up to normal 
retirement age - thus remaining almost 
twenty years longer in the labour force 
(Thomas, 1990: 254).
Since the mid eighties the rate of urbanisa lion has increased 
threefold. Work opportunities never expanded extensively to 
match this rate. Alternatives to formal employment were 
limited and informal activity was increasingly "over-traded" 
during the beginning of the 1990's. This set urban youth and
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unemployed adults, Zulu migrants, other migrants and Xhosa - 
speaking shackdwellers in heightened competition for very 
fixed and limited opportunities.
This situation of raised expectations and falling opportunity 
which bred a situation of turmoil, particularly since some of 
the competing categories of migrants are "cohesive" groups. 
It is this group of migrants particularly those of Zulu 
nationality according to Gurr, who are regarded as 
additionally predisposed to violent reactions, because of 
solidarity and a shared sense of deprivation (Gurr, 1970).
Zulu migrant workers often originate from districts where a 
long and established tradition of "feuds" exists. The Msinga 
areas of KwaZulu/Natal where most of the people interviewed 
originate from, is merely one of the better-known examples. 
It is known that in the seventies some of the rural feud 
fighting spilled over into places as remote as Diepkloof 
hostel, Inhlazane hostel, Johannesburg Central Business 
Districts (CBD) and Hillbrow among others.
Migrant workers from other ethnic groups in the mining 
employment and the hostels had also been exposed to this 
phenomenon. McNamara argued that between 1974 and 1986, at 
least 141 inter-factional or inter-ethnic clashes occurs in 
the mining employment. Over 300 migrants from different
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ethnic groups died and more than 2000 were injured in these 
violent clashes (McNamara, 1987).
It must be noted that McNamara's analysis points to the 
salience of competition between communal groups of workers for 
recruitment and employment advantages and anxiety over the 
possibility of other groups augmenting their relative 
advantages, as more critical cause of violence.
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practice. This position, postulated by Hindson and Morris, 
argues that "racial, ethnic and class antagonism held in check 
under classical apartheid have re-surfaced in the climate of 
liberalisation and deracialisation" (Hindson and Morris, 1992: 
155) . They further argued that contrary to the belief that 
the gradual erosion of apartheid would create a more stable 
African society conducive to economic growth and prosperity, 
the opposite has occurred. They argue that the demise of 
apartheid has culminated in the intensification of social 
hostilities and heightened bloodshed throughout the country.
Hindson and Morris point out that the birth of a post­
apartheid era has resulted in declining urban economic 
development, accelerated urbanisation and the proliferation 
of squatter communities. These developments resulted in 
mammoth "social dislocation and general heightening of 
political conflict within urban metropolitan areas" (Hindson 
and Morris, 1991: 32).
Hindson and Morris (1991) explained the current political 
violence in terms of violent confrontation between squatter 
communities and their neighbouring inhabitants, as well as 
clashes between a unionised working class, the developing 
black middle class and the fast growing black underclass.
However the violence on the Reef was not exclusively practised 
by the squatter-camp communities or the hostel dwellers. Nor 
did it occur exclusively between squatter-camp residents and
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their neighbouring communities, or exclusively between a 
unionised working class, the developing black middle class and 
the underclass communities. Secondly, the demise of apartheid 
has affected the whole of South Africa, and as a result all 
the major cities have experienced intense urbanisation with 
the proliferation of sguatter communities. However, not all 
major cities have experienced the endemic violence seen on the 
Reef in the 1990's.
(g) Criminal Violence.
Other accounts such as those of Nel (1991) and Nell (1992) 
maintain that all South African violence is criminal in 
nature. Their main argument is that South Africa was not at 
war, and the difference between ordinary violence and 
political violence is obscured. They charge that "in today's 
South Africa political violence is not a helpful category for 
either politician or ordinary people" (Nell, 1992: 3). Nell 
and Nel's account does not explain why the hostels are a key 
element in political violence. While criminal and political 
violence shade into each other both in terms of actors and 
effects, criminality does not constitute a sufficient 
explanation. Criminal violence does not always manifest the 
same level of organisation and is not d~---■
power^_relations in ^ society. This thesis maintains that 
political violence is a distinct analytical category.
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(h) Ideological Antagonism
Other explanations of political violence focus on antagonism 
between different ideological groupings. The advocates of 
this argument maintain that the violence that was tearing 
black townships on the Reef apart was mainly caused by 
political rivalry and competition. According to this 
perspective Inkatha used violence to make political inroads 
particularly on the Reef where its support was reported to be 
less than 3% of a sample population (CASE, 1991; Schlemmer, 
1991). The argument is that since July 1990, Inkatha institu­
ted violence as a means of strengthening its declining support 
base and as a way to contest the ideological hegemony of the 
ANC over the black population (Mavibuve. 1991; Hindson and 
Morris, 1992).
At one level the political violence has been between members 
of Inkatha and members of the non-racial democratic organisa­
tions, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 
the UDF and since 1990, the ANC. Yet in both Natal and on the 
Rand as Segal reminds us that
such explanations may be imposing an official 
sounding order on overwhelming confusion and horror 
of the violence where in fact there is no such 
coherence: only a shifting assortment, a 
"kaleidoscope" of explanations ... the human face 
of violence is far more diffuse and complex than 
most media and political accounts portray (Segal,
1991 : 19).
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(x) Third Force Activities
At the time of writing new evidence is emerging on the 
involvement of elements of the apartheid state in political 
violence which was aimed at the destabilisation of black South 
African life and the preservation of white minority rule. 
Shu la Marks writes, "There is little doubt, ... that the
T -  ”  “  — --------------- — —
violence in the townships of Natal and the Rand is being and 
has been fermented by elements in the army and the police" 
(Marks, 1992: 123). "The evidence is now overwhelming that 
there was indeed a third force, consisting of elements of 
Inkatha, the police force and Military Intelligence. Thabo 
Mbeki believes its aim was to sponsor sufficient chaos to 
justify the armed forces taking over the county to restore 
order - and halt the transition to democracy" (Sparks, 1994: 
157) . The methods they used were similar to those of the 
destabilisation strategies launched against neighbouring 
states after 1976.
While this thesis gives some weight to this "third force" it 
must be acknowledged that "the security forces are watering 
a ready-made field. The field was ploughed and the seeds of 
the violence were sown by the apartheid state..." (Marks, 
1992: 124). Marks points to the destruction of communities 
and social supports through the migrant labour system, as well 
as the dislocations caused by industrialization and urbaniza­
tion. The outcome is that "Apartheid has created a veritable 
laboratory for violent behaviour" (Marks, 1992: 125).
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g. CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that the political violence on the 
Reef between 1990 and 1993 is best conceptualised as a 
particular type of war described as low intensity conflict. 
It was shown that LIC does not only describe a type of 
conflict, but is also used to describe a type of military 
strategy which relies heavily on the use of surrogate forces. 
This chapters has described the use of Inkatha vigilantes in 
these terms. They were crucial agents in the shift from the 
external to the internal destabilisation strategy of the 
apartheid state. Thus this thesis suggests that the apartheid 
state was directly involved in instigating and permitting the 
violence to continue.
The chapter has outlined various explanations of political 
violence which appear to be incomplete in themselves. The 
intensification of rural poverty, migrancy, unemployment and 
urban overcrowding, criminal elements and ethnic and gender 
identities are clearly crucial factors in any explanation of 
political violence and highly relevant to understanding the 
relation between political violence and hostels on the Reef. 
All of these themes will appear in the sociological profiles 
of Meadowlands and Merafe hostels presented below.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE HOSTELS
...hostels are places that nobody wants. The 
people who live in the bleak and forbidding 
buildings never wanted to go there. For many of 
them hostels are places to lay down their weary 
heads, and shelters from the dust or rain. Lots of 
people who live in hostels are Johannesburg workers 
who were uprooted from their rooms in the city by 
the "location in the sky" act. Their employers did 
not like these hostels either. They say that 
things worked much more smoothly when the workers 
were nearby and didn't have long journeys to make 
every day (Can Themba, 1985: 116).
1. INTRODUCTION
"Violent encounters between hostel dwellers and township 
residents, and among hostel dwellers themselves, have become 
a major feature of the violence accompanying political transi­
tion in South Africa. Of particular concern has been the 
brutal nature of the attacks on township residents, their 
apparent randomness and senselessness" (Ramphele, 1993: 1). 
This chapter traces the development of hostels from compounds 
to "fortresses of fear". The chapter argues that there have 
been five main changes in hostels on the Reef since their 
inception in 1913. These changes involved firstly, the shift 
in the location of hostels from the inner city to the 
townships. The second main change concerned the gender 
composition of the hostels. While hostels were originally 
built to house and control exclusively male migrants workers, 
they recently came to accommodate increasing numbers of women
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and children who have moved into urban areas. The third main 
change involved the ethnic composition of the hostel. When 
hostels were first built, they were multi-ethnic institutions 
that housed male migrants from different parts of South Africa 
and its neighbouring countries. In the beginning of the 
1 9 9 0 's hostels in the Reef began to house mainly Zulu—speaking 
migrants bused in from rural Natal and sympathetic towards 
Inkatha. The fourth change involved an increase in the 
numbers of people inhabiting these hostels, as the mechanism 
of influx control collapsed. The fifth change involved the 
relationships between township residents and hostel inmates. 
After the unbanning of the political parties and the release 
of Nelson Mandela in 1990, these relationships changed from 
peaceful social and commercial interactions to relations of 
violent conflict.
These changes were both transformative and negative. They 
were not advantageous either to the people who lived in 
hostels or to the residents of the surrounding communities. 
The concept "metamorphosis" is used here in an attempt to 
capture the transformative nature of changes in hostels. It 
is a biological concept used to describe an evolutionary 
transition in form and structure as it occurs in insects, it 
describes the transition from egg to larva to pupa to adult.
This chapter will first document the number and the social 
characteristics of hostels. Secondly, the chapter will 
examine hostels as forms of total institutions and critically
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evaluate the Goffman thesis as applied to hostels. Thirdly, 
the chapter will discuss the social processes whereby hostels 
have changed and become "fortresses of fear". Since the 
beginning of the 1990's, hostels have been used as a base to 
try to derail the process of peaceful transition.
2. HOSTELS AS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Despite their significance in the lives of millions of South 
Africans, hostels have not been subjected to extensive 
sociological investigation apart from Sitas's pioneering 
study. Sitas has pointed out that "the hostel system is 
largely unexplored, if not opaque in the social sciences" 
(Sitas, 1983: 249). According to Ramphle "migrant -labour 
hostels dwellers have over the years since industrialisation 
began in South Africa lived in anonymity. They have been 
largely invisible, particularly to those living outside 
African townships, hidden, as their hostels often are, from 
the white public in divided South Africa" (Ramphele, 1993: 1) .
Hostels are characterised by a number of defining elements:
(i) Firstly, they are closely linked to the migrant labour 
system, a system that was introduced by the mining 
industry and fortified by the pass laws, thus becoming 
"a central feature of the South African economy from 
the very beginning of the country's industrial 
revolution" (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989: 197). This
industrial revolution brought with it powerful forces
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of urbanisation and proletarianisation mainly from 
indigenous black community which until the early 
1900's was largely part of rural society. Black 
labour was essential in developing industries in South 
Africa, but their permanent presence was viewed by 
white authorities as a threat. Control had to be 
exerted on their influx into the urban areas, and 
hence the hostel system was created to control cheap, 
black labour with the aid of the pass law system 
(Wessels and Wentzel, 1989: 6-7). In terms of section 
2 of the Bantu Areas Act no 25, of 1945, hostels were 
proclaimed as "Bantu Areas" for the housing of single 
men or women, working in town on a migrant basis.
(ii) Secondly, while originally built by mining companies, 
hostels came to be the responsibility of the apartheid 
state. It was the state that assumed the responsibi­
lity of providing for the management of the 
reproduction of migrant workers through hostels in the 
urban areas.
(iii) Hostels are extensive throughout South Africa and are 
notorious for their deplorable social conditions. 
These social conditions created dangerous social 
elements. These hostels are isolated and often 
prison-like.
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The conditions are a source of considerable depri­
vation and frustration to the inmates (Segal et al., 
1991). Hostel residents have little privacy. They 
sleep in over-crowded rooms, and lack adequate bathing 
and sanitary facilities. Person-to-toilet ratio is 
usually over 100:1 (West, 1991; Smith, 1991). 
Overallr hostels are characterized by overcrowding, 
bad living conditions, squalor, and poor administra­
tion. Single—sex hostels act "as breeding grounds for 
aggressive and machismo culture, unconstrained by the 
stabilising presence of families" (Segal et al., 1 9 9 1 : 
3). These social conditions are themselves a form of 
structural violence.
(iv) Hostels became linked to violence. In the period 
1990-1993 whenever there was extensive violence on the 
Reef, hostels and hostel inmates were involved. Areas 
that were ravaged by violence were areas that had a 
high concentration of hostels.
In 1991 there were 220 hostels in South Africa housing more 
than one million people (Race Relations Survey, 1991/92: 354) . 
As many as half a million hostel dwellers were accommodated 
on the Reef where most of these hostels are located and where 
much of the political violence has been centred (IBIIR, 1992) 
Soweto, for example, now has eight hostels, Alexandra has 
three and there are four in the inner city of Johannesburg. 
The East Rand too has a number of hostels: Vosloorus alone
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has eight, Katlehong seven, Thembisa five and Thokoza four. 
The only area that has few hostels is the West Rand where 
there are only three. During the period of investigation the 
West Rand was characterised by relative peace as compared to 
other areas on the Reef where most of the hostels are located. 
The question arises as to whether they are "total 
institutions" in Goffman's sense.
3. HOSTELS AS A FORM OF TOTAL INSTITUTION
According to Goffman, compounds, asylums, prisons and other
structures differ profoundly from other institutions because
of their "totally closed" attributes (Goffman, 1961).
The total institutions is a social hybrid, part 
residential community, part formal organisation; 
therein lies their sociological interest. There 
are other reasons for being interested in these 
establishments too. In our society they are the 
forcing houses for changing persons; each is a 
natural experiment on what can be done to the self 
(Goffman, 1961: 22).
Hostels have been perceived as "total institutions" whose 
control by bureaucrats is capable of creating a situation 
whereby inmates become completely submissive and are subject 
to orders from authority.
. . . the inmates' life is penetrated by constant 
sanctioning interaction from above, especially 
during initial periods of stay before, the inmates 
accept the regulation unthinkingly (Goffman, 1961:
43) .
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Foucault has also analyzed institutions in which individuals 
are physically separated for long periods from the outside 
world. Foucault claims that in such institutions, people are 
"incarcerated"; they are concealed from the external social 
milieu. He goes further to argue that "carceral institutions" 
are pioneers of surveillance and discipline because they seek 
to maximize hegemony over their inmates' behaviour (Foucault, 
1979: 228) .
Fanon has provided a vivid description of the degree of social 
control experienced by migrant workers living in hostels in 
a different context.
Typically, the black migrant workers sign a 
contract for a specified period, usually a year, 
without any choice of job assignment or negotiating 
power on salary. They are strictly prohibited from 
bringing their families to the environs of their 
employment and thus are forced to leave them 
behind. These migrant workers are usually cut off 
from their families for a good part of their adult 
working life. The institution of the family is 
thereby disrupted with significant consequences for 
the labourers, their spouses and children and 
ultimately, their community. The circumstances 
under which they work only deepens their aliena­
tion. At the end of each day's labour, they go 
"home" to hostels fenced with barbed wire. These 
barren hostels are invariably crowded and control 
is absolute. They have few amenities, no visitors' 
rooms, no recreation facilities, and no privacy. 
Visitors particularly the opposite sex, are not 
permitted. The labourers are also grouped to 
prevent the development of class or national 
consciousness (Fanon, 1985: 168).
In South Africa, however, hostels cannot be viewed as total 
institutions in the sense of places where inmates sleep, play,
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and work together under stringent surveillance, separated from
the wider social world. As Ramphele suggests,
The blurring boundaries between working space and 
living space, as well as the nature of these 
spaces, raises the guestion of the extent to which 
hostels can be conceived as total institutions 
(Ramphele, 1993: 8).
She suggests that hostels "can be seen as a special type of 
*total institution' for the purpose of ensuring a compliant 
labour force" (Ramphele, 1993: 30).
Prior to the abolition of the Influx Control Act in June 1986, 
hostels were mainly inhabited by employed adult males, who 
qualified to live in the hostel only if they produced proof 
of a job contract and corrfect papers in the form of passbooks 
which detailed their residence status in terms of the Bantu 
Urban Areas Consolidation Act.
The abolition of influx control in 1986 was the crucial event 
in the changing development of the hostels as social institu­
tions. The abolishing of influx control released processes 
of social, economic and political disruption in both the rural 
and urban areas. This process not only increased the number 
of people wanting to stay in hostels because of the shortage 
of cheap accommodation in the townships, it also spawned a 
huge influx of people into the urban areas and the 
proliferation of the squatter communities around the Reef 
(Jooma, 1991; Mabin, 1991). Men and women increasingly 
flocked to the urban areas in search of jobs and opportunities
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that did not exist in the rural areas. Once in town these 
people were not only faced with the problem of finding a job, 
finding accommodation was another challenge.
The abolition of influx control relates to the Goffman thesis 
concerning total institutions in that it involved the 
weakening of the form_of ^ control over hostel inmates employed 
by apartheid bureaucrats. Municipal administrators lost the 
legislative power to search hostels for "illegals", which 
opened the hostels to an unhindered flood of migrants. Among 
the new arrivals were woitien and children who were previously 
prohibited from entering the hostels.
An interview with the Soweto City Council's spokesperson, Mr. 
Mojalefa Moseki, revealed that by 1992 women and children made 
up about 30% of the hostel population on the Reef (Key 
informant no. 4, Soweto Council spokesperson). The presence 
of this group challenges the Goffman theory of total 
institutions. According to Goffman, total institutions are 
incompatible with the central social institution of our 
society, the family (Goffman, 1961). With the abolition of 
influx control, hostels, in general became neither exclusively 
migrant labourers' hostels nor single sex hostels, but came 
to house a large number of men, women and children as family 
units (Segal, 1991).
Both Goffman and Foucault argue that in these total or 
carceral institutions, inmates are "incarcerated", kept hidden
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from the external social environment because of the "totally 
closed" nature of the institutions (Foucault, 1979; Goffman, 
1961). In spite of their isolating features, hostels are more 
open than "incarcerating". It will be demonstrated below that 
prior to the advent of the violence on the Reef many hostel 
inmates participated actively in township life through 
Individual social networks composed of relatives and friends, 
or through associational membership in churches, sports clubs, 
stokvels and "magotlas". There was also a great deal of 
social interaction and movement between hostel inmates and 
township residents. Hostel inmates could move in and out of 
the hostel at will. Hostel dwellers could quite easily 
venture into neighbouring townships in search of women, 
alcohol and leisure activities. Likewise the township
residents would visit the hostels in search of various types 
of African beverages brewed and sold there.
Another feature distinguishing hostels from total institutions 
is that hostel inmates, like township residents worked in 
industries that were located up to twenty kilometres away,
 ^which compelled them to journey side by side to and from work 
/with township residents in the same taxis, buses or trains. 
The mini-bus taxis, buses and the trains were (and still are) 
the most important means of transport to and from the city. 
It will be shown below that during the last metamorphosis of 
the hostels, all three modes of transport became the target 
of attacks by hostel inmates.
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Another factor in contrast to the view of hostels as total 
institutions in Goffman's sense is that there was a high 
degree of integration between the hostel inmates and the 
township residents on the factory floors. In his sociological 
investigation of metal workers on the East Rand, Sitas (1983) 
found that it was the migrants in the hostels who played a 
Jpivotal role in providing an organisational base for the 
| unions in the early 1980's. Sitas' argument is that the 
introduction of trade unionism into the social and the 
economic life of the migrant workers demolished barriers that 
fostered an "us and them" mentality that made hostel inmates 
antagonistic to the surrounding community. Hostel dwellers 
became organised both at the site of production and 
reproduction (Sitas, 1983) Mavibuve. 1991).
Hostels in general did not totally separate their inhabitants
from associating with the outside environment and its people.
Though geographically separate from the township, there were
a number of activities that bound the two communities
together. As Themba Mthethwa argued:
. . . there is a process of intermingling between 
some of the hostel residents and the broader 
outside environment of the township. To the extend 
that this intermingling occurs it remains contrary 
to the thesis of "total" exclusionist tendencies of 
total institutions (Mthethwa, 1990: 47).
The crucial point is that hostels, in common with other total 
institutions, involve a denial of individuality and a
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subjection to collective living in harsh conditions marked by 
a lack of privacy or respect for human dignity.
4. CHANGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOSTELS
The hostel system was constituted long before formal apartheid 
was introduced, but was reinforced and extended by the 
ideology and practices of "grand apartheid". However hostels 
and the migrant labour system have come to be understood 
essentially as artifacts of the apartheid generation (Smit, 
1991; Wentzel, 1993) .
(a) THE FIRST METAMORPHOSIS 1913 - 1948: The establishment 
of hostels in the inner city
During this period hostels were located in the inner city. 
The first hostel was built in 1913 as a solution to the 
chronic accommodation shortage experienced by black migrants. 
It was built on the south eastern side of the emerging central 
city of Johannesburg.
This hostel was built by the Johannesburg City Council in 1913 
after it received representations from the Johannesburg 
business community. Johannesburg Employers as they were 
called, protested against their workers being located with the 
rest of the black population in the segregated black township 
of Klipspruit. Employers feared that locating their workers 
in places far from the working environment would affect their
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work performance because most of these workers would arrive 
late to work using transport problems as the excuse (Carr, 
1990).
Hostels were intended to accommodate the entire emerging 
African working class in the city next to their places of 
employment. The theory behind this idea was that African 
workers would be "caged" in the hostels whilst in the service 
of the white masters in the white cities (Piere and da Silva, 
1986).
Eleven years later, in 1924, after the government promulgated 
the 1923 Urban Areas Act which forced the municipalities to 
provide housing for Africans, Wemmer hostel was built as a 
second hostel in the city's industrial area. The third and 
last set of hostels to be built in the inner city were built 
in 1932 and 1946 respectively. They were the Wolhuter or 
Jeppe hostel and the Denver hostel (Piere and da Silva, 1986).
At this time, in all, the inner city hostels accommodated 
about 1 400 legal,temporary sojourners. It is alleged that 
these hostels had more than 4 000 illegal occupants, which 
created a serious problem of overcrowding. The Johannesburg 
City Council (JCC) was constantly criticized by white 
residents for building hostels in the inner city. The JCC had 
compounded the problems by giving out permits to 10 000 
employees allowing workers to remain in the city in what would
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be later called the "location in the sky" (Piere and da 
Silva) .
The idea of hostels was not altogether a new one, it bore a 
resemblance to the compound system which first emerged in the 
1880's in the diamond mines of Kimberley (Callinicos, 1989; 
Mokwena, 1990). They were similar to the compounds in that 
they too were a more effective locus of control, that ensured 
a continuous supply and control of cheap labour. They 
differed from compounds in that compounds were more closed 
structures that resembled Goffman's "total institutions", 
created to cater specifically for mine workers. Migrants who 
entered those institutions "[found] themselves virtual 
prisoners in the compounds; for the compound system imposed 
almost total control..." (Callinicos, 1985: 43), over any 
migrant while he was an employee of a particular mine.
Other differences between the hostels and the compounds are 
their geographic location. Compounds were built in the mining 
environment which were usually located on the outskirts of the 
cities or outside the industrial areas; whereas hostels were 
located in the inner cities.
Another essential feature that differentiates the compounds 
from the hostels is that hostels were more open than 
compounds. Many hostel migrants participated actively in 
township life through individual social networks of relatives
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and friends, or through membership in churches, stokvels, 
magotlas and sports clubs.
Another notable difference between these two institutions is 
that the compounds were the mine owners' private buildings, 
which housed workers who were exclusively employed by the 
mines. Hostels on the other hand, were built by the City 
Council to house workers who worked for a variety of different 
employers.
Hostels were later removed from the inner city and located on 
the £eripfLeries_of townships, except for a tiny minority which 
were built inside the townships. They were built mainly to 
cater for the emerging proletarians, who moved in and out of 
the hostel as their work shift allowed them. Entry at the 
gate required a special permit as the guards were changed from 
time to time. Women and boys below the age of sixteen were 
not allowed in the hostel (Key informant, no. 14, Old Mapetla 
resident).
'’he construction of hostels was essential during the early 
1900's because of the migrant labour that was coming to the 
Reef (Pitt, 1981). Most of these migrants flooded the PWV 
areas without their families in search of employment opportu­
nities (Sitas, 1983). The local authority and the industries 
were compelled to provide accommodation for the migrants, as 
there was an upsurge in the economy that resulted in a large 
number of migrants coming into towns, securing work permits
71
and looking for some place to live (Pitt, 1981) . The 
evolution of black townships in and around the PWV areas could 
not absorb the huge migrant inflow.
The South African Parliament's first Native (Urban Areas) Act 
of 1913 permitted employers to provide their own accommodation 
for black workers if they so wished (Mandy, 1984). This 
resulted in many employers providing sleeping quarters on 
their premises in what was equivalent to a "small, private, 
unsupervised compound" (Piere and da Silva, 1986: 4). Some 
migrants provided their own shelters in proliferating inner 
city hovels. These were perceived by civic authorities and the 
white public as "menacing cesspools of degeneracy where 
prostitution and illicit liquor thrived" (Piere and da Silva, 
1986: 6). Their physical existence was vehemently challenged 
by white ratepayers' groups who lived in or next to where 
hostels were planned.
It must be remembered that before the advent of the Nation­
alist government to power, there was already an urgent need 
to accommodate African workers who were flocking to the urban 
areas in search of employment in the growing secondary sector 
of the economy. Most of these African workers were housed in 
the hostels or inner city compounds that were built in the 
city, a place which up to then had predominantly been reserved 
for whites (Carr, 1990).
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Soms the African workers were accommodated in private homes 
the city or in company hostels/compounds which were also 
situated in "white" areas. "The company compounds were 
overcrowded squalid places which had earned a reputation as 
breeding grounds for all sorts of social evils" (Mokwena, 
1990: 24). This provoked a dispute between the state and
representatives from the white communities.
The debate between the State and the ratepayers Association 
raged on for ten years, until the state promulgated Section 
2 of the Bantu Urban Areas Act, no. 25 of 1945, which pro­
claimed hostels as "Bantu areas" designed for accommodating 
single men or women working in town on a migrant basis (Sitas, 
1983; Mandy, 1984).
These protests continued throughout the 1940's gaining credi­
bility and intensity in the late 1940's when it became 
possible to argue that "racial segregation would be better 
served if hostels were situated in the townships" (Piere and 
da Silva, 1986), as opposed to in the inner city.
A resolution was taken in 1949 by the Sub-Committee of the 
city Council of Johannesburg that no further hostels should 
be built in the "white" areas (Mokwena, 1991). This was a 
clear indication of the perceived danger of situating hostels 
among established white communities. This marked the 
beginning of the second metamorphosis.
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(b) THE SECOND METAMORPHOSIS 1948 — 1976: Hostels moved to 
the townships
When the Nationalists took over power in 1948 many more 
hostels were planned and built in African townships. Almost 
all hostels, except for a very small number, were built on the 
| edges of the townships which ensured maximum geographical 
marginalisation.
<
This marked the second phase in the metamorphosis of the 
hostels. The fact that hostels were built long distances away 
from workplaces meant that hostels inmates had to travel far 
to work as opposed to the short journeys prior to this phase.
The first hostel to be built away from an industrial setting, 
was built in Soweto in 1955. It was built on the periphery 
of the Soweto's first "up-market" township, Dube, and was to 
house only male migrants who were moving to the city in 
increasing numbers.
Residents of Dube Township had been forcefully ejected from 
Sophiatown in 1945 (Mandy, 1984: 176). Both the residents of 
Dube and the prospective inmates of the hostel vehemently 
opposed the idea of the hostel and solicited employers' 
support as well as that of various Native Advisory Boards to 
no avail (Piere and da Silva, 1984; Mokwena, 1990; Carr, 
1990) .
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The two groupings opposed the idea of relocating the hostels 
to the townships far away from the work place for different 
reasons. They channelled their grievances through different 
structures. The residents of Dube channelled their opposition 
to the hostel through various community structures, 
particularly the vociferous Residents' Association. The 
hostel inmates objections were articulated through the Rand 
Daily Mail, the only progressive newspaper at that time 
(Mokwena, 1990).
The Dube Residents' Association felt that the concentration 
of large numbers of single men would lead to all kinds of 
^social evils and could be a serious threat to peace in the 
township (Key informant no. 4, chairman of the Dube Residents' 
Association in 1953-1957). Furthermore, the association 
believed that the hostel system would invariably lead to a 
deterioration in the living standards of the township 
populace. It was also argued that not only would the number 
of illegitimate babies increase, but there was a fear that 
many marriages would be put in a precarious position (Key 
informant no. 4) . At this time most black women were 
illiterate and unemployed. The fear from the male dominated 
residents' association was that these women would be easy prey 
for the single hostel migrants.
On the other hand the hostel inmates opposed the move for 
different reasons. Their main reason for opposing the move 
was more economic than social. They believed that it would
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cost them more in travelling expenses if hostels were located 
in the townships than it would cost them from town. According 
to Carr:
The Africans to be removed bitterly opposed the 
proposal and prevailed on their employers to make 
a special representation to the department on their 
behalf. Because of the inconvenience and expense 
of daily train trips to and from the austere Dube 
hostel 12 miles away, it was not really surprising 
that they resented the move and did all they could 
to thwart it (Carr, 1992: 70).
The protests of the hostel inmates were to no avail. Mokwena 
claimed that:
This was the last lap in the battle against 
hostels. The state had won. From then on the 
hostel became an integral part of the geography of 
the township and a normal part of the social make­
up of Soweto (Mokwena, 1990: 56).
The first inhabitants of Dube Men's Hostel moved in, in July
1956. The hostel came to accommodate approximately 3 0 000
migrants. The Local Municipal Authorities of Johannesburg did
not only aim to partition the hostel dwellers from the
township residents, but planned to divide the hostel^
population itself along ethnic and rural/urban lines. The
ethnic division of the hostel is well described by Can Themba:
There was a building for the Sotho group, a set of 
buildings for the Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa, and Swazi) 
groups, another for the Venda-Shangaan group (Can 
Themba, 1985: 117).
This enforced ethnic differentiation laid a seed for ethni­
cally motivated violence that occurred in 1957 (Carr, 1990; 
Mokwena, 1990; Themba, 1990).
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Dube hostel was located between the two townships, Dube and 
Meadowlands. It was not as isolated as had been envisaged by 
the architects; instead there was a degree of reciprocity and 
social interaction between the migrants and the township 
residents (Mokwena, 1990).
The government did not build recreational facilities for the
hostel inmates; a huge beer garden was the only amenity. This
resulted in people playing draughts or cards on their beds
during the week, while partaking in traditional dancing at
weekends (Themba, 1985: 90; Carr, 1990).
... [But] those who could not take part in either 
of these games resorted to alcohol, dagga and any 
mind twisting drugs. What else could they do?
Very few of us went to the townships where there 
was a variety of games where we could take part 
either as active participants or spectators" 
(Respondent no. 3, Dube hostel resident).
This lack of recreational facilities provided the impetus for 
new relationships between the hostel dwellers and the township 
residents. Township people, particularly women, flocked to 
the hostels under the guise of watching traditional dancing, 
though often their purpose was to look for men. Other 
spectators to traditional dancing games included grown-up 
township men, and children, but the best and the more 
energetic dancers would find themselves surrounded by a group 
of lady admirers from the townships.
The siting of hostels around the townships attracted other 
activities which cemented the relationships between the hostel
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inmates and the township residents. Second hand garments were 
displayed and sold by women from different parts of Soweto. 
Hostel inmates bought these garments even if they were going 
to end up hanging on the walls and roofs inside the hostel 
dormitories. This appetite for buying displayed by hostel 
dwellers led to a belief by township people that hostel 
dwellers were always "loaded with money" (Key informant no. 
17, Mapetla resident).
This impression led to the proliferation of informal sector 
activities in front of the hostel buildings. The type of food 
which was mostly sold to hostel inmates included meat of 
different quality such as offal, "skop" (sheep's head), 
"amanqina" (sheep and cow's legs), chicken feet, low-grade red 
meat as well as anything that would act as "izagila 
zephalishi" ("any thing that would help usher the porridge 
down the throat"). Traditional healing herbs were also sold 
to the hostel inmates who bought all these goods and in the 
process established close social relations with township 
residents.
Prostitution also flourished inside the hostels. Some women 
had "whistlestop" sexual relationships with their customers. 
These women would often be smuggled into the hostel, beating 
the "blackjacks" (municipal police), at their own system. 
Sometimes this was done through bribery because the system was 
open to abuse, but sometime it was due to the weariness and
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drunkenness of the "blackjacks" who often worked long, tedious 
hours (Key informant no. 6, Mapetla residents).
'his pattern of harmonious interaction between the two social 
groupings of township residents and hostel inmates 
predominated until the early stages of 1976.
(c) THE THIRD METAMORPHOSIS 1976 — 1990; Women and children 
come to inhabit the hostel
The third phase which occurred after the 1976 period, intro­
duced a different dimension to life in the hostels. The 
visiting women and children who had lingered around the 
hostels because they were attracted by the economic 
opportunities and inter-hostel traditional dancing, now became 
permanents residents. Women and children were seen roaming 
freely inside the hostels.
^[jcontrol over the hostels and townships began unravelling. The 
system of law and order governing the hostels completely 
collapsed after the 1976 Soweto uprising. Every building that 
had a government tag was targeted; many rent offices, beer- 
halls, bottle stores and post offices were burned down. The 
lives of many white officials were threatened, and the murder 
of a white man sent shivers down the spines of most white 
officials. Most of them operated from offices outside Soweto, 
leaving black employees who had never functioned without the 
vigilant eye of a white official, to look after themselves.
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This was the beginning of the end of the early morning 
township and hostel raids which had always been conducted by 
White officials, in search of the illegal hostel dwellers or 
their visitors. These developments changed the face of 
hostels in most South African townships forever.
Hostels completely ceased to accommodate single men exclu­
sively as more and more women found their way into them. 
Contrary to Zulu's (1993) assertion that most of the women 
found in the hostels were "loose women" or prostitutes, some 
of them were wives or girlfriends of the migrants.
r
Since the 1976 uprising more and more stable relationships 
were established between hostel dwellers and township women, 
particularly in the Mzimhlophe hostels because of the 
integration that occurred after the Kliptown floods (See 
below).J  There were women who vacillated between two or more 
men in search of a partner that would be willing to support 
them and their children.. This type of vacillation cannot be 
equated with prostitution because these were not commoditised 
relationships.
It cannot be denied that prostitution is often common in an 
environment where men outnumber women, however the townships 
were different because there were more women than men (Posel, 
1991: 203-204). This factor contributed to women flocking to 
the hostels in search of male partners. This development was 
further exacerbated by the decline of the rural economy and
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ie abolition of influx control in the 1980's, which sent 
aral women to the cities in droves. The type of women who 
frequented and inhabited the hostels therefore changed from 
fomen who were regarded as township "drunks" formerly dubbed 
#izibotho" to include rural women who were newcomers to the 
Icity.
These two groups of women were very different. Homeland or
rural women could be defined as those women originating from
the Bantustans, who had been living and working on white
farms, or in small, rural towns and villages. Because of the
poverty of these areas, women moved into the cities in
increasing numbers. Posel notes they were:
leaving the rural area permanently, fleeing the 
rigours of patriarchy and the stresses inflicted by 
the migrant labour system and the violence that ha^ 
engulfed the rural areas particularly those in 
Natal [Emphasis added] (Posel, 1991: 28).
The migrant labour system, poverty and violence propelled many
rural women to the hostels in the urban areas. The plight of
women in the rural areas is best articulated by Phyllis
Ntantala who attested that:
... it struck me every time I went home that girls 
I had been in school and had known in these 
villages, many of them my age and younger, were 
living the lives of widows as their menfolk were 
working in urban areas. In some cases the men had 
not been back for years and girls were left alone 
in the countryside, raising their children, 
scraping the bare soil for a living. . . . today 
most of the rural areas are places of women without 
men (Ntantala, 1992: 3).
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It is therefore not surprising to see these women moving to 
•the cities in huge numbers, in search of work and a peaceful 
environment in which to raise and educate their children. Many 
children came to the urban areas with their mothers. On
* their arrival in the urban areas they were confronted with a 
scarcity of space and accommodation and found themselves 
compelled to beg for a place to stay anywhere, even in the 
hostels.
These women who came to the hostels from the rural areas were 
often despised by township women, who belonged either to the 
working class or to the emerging black middle class,and had 
mainly grown up in the township. Some of them had brothers, 
uncles and relatives who had lived in the hostels for many 
years, but they did not imagine themselves falling in love 
with hostel dwellers, let alone staying with them in the 
hostel. ^They despised women who had affairs with hostel 
dwellers and who lived in the hostels. These women were 
regarded as "failed women'^j (Key informant no. 7, township 
resident).
The other category of women who came to inhabit hostels on the 
Reef during this period were ^  township "drunks" dubbed 
"izibotho" were township women of low status.^ They were 
regarded as township rejects who stood little chance of
r
"getting" township men. <, Their only solace was with the hostel 
dwellers. This category of women made up a large percentage 
of women in the hostels. These women did not drink because
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moved into the hostel, but moved into the hostel because 
ey were heavy drinkers. The hostel was the only place that
uld provide them with different concoctions at cheaper
prices. Their plight is best articulated by Kopelus:
Most of these women are unemployed, giving them the 
time to sit in the shebeens for most of the day and 
part of the night. As men come off from shifts at 
different times of the day and night, they are 
willing to buy alcohol for them (Kopelus, 1994: 
91) .
(d) THE FOURTH METAMORPHOSIS 1990 - 1993: Hostels become
centres of violence
The 1990's marked the fourth stage of transformative change
as hostels, particularly those in the Transvaal, gained
international notoriety as theatres of violence. According
to Everatt (1992), hostels in the 1990's
. . . also lay at the centre of the strategy of 
destabilisation, which the figures strongly suggest 
is being carried out by Inkatha and various agents 
of the state some who were previously involved in 
destabilisation of neighbouring countries [Emphasis 
added] (Everatt, 1992: 9).
According to the Human Rights commission in the three year 
period between 1990 and 1993, 44 per cent of Soweto's 1,106 
deaths from political violence have been hostel linked. 
According to the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal 
Repression between July 1990 and April 1992 there were 260 
attacks on township residents launched from some 15 hostels.
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This development was to change the perceptions of township 
residents and their social relations with almost all hostels, 
particularly those which were used as launch pads for attacks 
on the townships. Previously only the Dube and Meadowlands 
hostels were viewed negatively by the surrounding township 
communities because of the 1957 and 1976 conflicts.
The first conflict that involved hostel dwellers and township 
residents occurred from the Dube hostel in the mid 1950's. 
This conflict was provoked by thugs from the township who 
often robbed the hostel dwellers of their hard earned cash. 
These thugs were perceived as Basothos by the predominately 
Zulu-speaking hostel inmates, giving the conflict its ethnic 
flavour (Wentzel, 1993). The conflict broke out on 14 
September 1957 when bands of Zulus living in the hostel 
attacked Sotho-speaking people living in the family houses in 
the adjacent township of Zones 4 and 5 in Meadowlands. The 
conflict left 40 people dead and over 40 injured. The 
violence began on Saturday afternoon, and broke out again on 
Sunday during the memorial service of those killed the 
previous day (Mokwena, 1990). This marked the first schism 
between the hostel residents and the township community that 
later developed into an "us and them" syndrome.
\
The "us and them" syndrome was further fortified by another 
violent confrontation that occurred in 1976 between the 
Meadowlands' hostel inmates and surrounding townships. The 
violence occurred when the students of Soweto rebelled at the
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introduction of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in black 
schools. The students sought to enforce a number of stayaways 
and consumer boycotts without the mandate of every stakeholder 
in the townships. The inhabitants of the Meadowlands hostel 
claimed they had never been consulted on this strategy and 
were not obliged to risk their jobs by following orders from 
children. They bulldozed their way to work in the midst of 
stones; rampaged into the surrounding community killing and 
maiming many male township residents, particularly the youths 
who stood in their way.
A psychological, political and social schism developed between 
township residents and the hostel inmates after this conflict. 
The outcome was the feeling on both sides that they were 
enemies.
However evidence which emerged from interviews with both the 
township and the hostel residents suggests that a healing 
process, had been taking place after the 1976 violence in 
Meadowlands. This was best articulated by respondents who 
claimed that:
We were trying our best to put the Meadowlands 
episode behind us, we felt it was an unfortunate 
event that was engineered by elements opposed to 
societal unity (Respondent 31, hostel resident).
We were on the verge of uniting the two communities 
when the violence erupted in mid-1990, which 
shattered the dreams of knitting the relationship 
between the two communities (Respondent 50, hostel 
resident).
85
;<The onset of the 1990's saw hostels on the Reef turned into 
"fortresses of fear". Violence spread to the rest of the Reef
l
areas where there was a high concentration of single-sex 
hostels. In most of the hostels non-Zulu male hostel dwellers 
ye re forcefully expelled as each hostel was turned into a 
fortress from which attacks on surrounding communities and 
nearby squatter settlements were planned and executed. Zulu­
speaking inmates who refused to align themselves with 
destructive forces, were also violently ejected from the 
hostels (Everatt, 1992; Innes and Kentridge, 1992).
As non Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers were evicted, they were 
replaced by pro-Inkatha Zulu speaking members who were either
I bused in from Natal, or who moved in from expensive township backyard rooms or even from other hostels where there was acute overcrowding (Respondent 48, hostel resident).
Contrary to Minnaar's assertion that only Xhosa-speaking 
migrants were targeted for expulsion, every non Zulu-speaking 
male hostel dweller was a victim. Those who remained as 
members of Inkatha were interrogated as to why they preferred 
Inkatha to the "Xhosa/communist-led ANC". If someone was 
suspected of being a member of the ANC, he would be expelled.
However at no stage were the hostels exclusive Zulu enclaves 
as suggested by Minnaar. Non Zulu-speaking women who had 
boyfriends in the hostels were never expelled, even Xhosa- 
speaking women who were girlfriends to the hostel dwellers
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Bere granted reprieve, and allowed to stay with their 
^pyfriends in the hostel.
0m CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that hostels have gone though a number 
of changes since they were built in 1913. Hostels were 
institutions that were first built in the inner city near to 
industry to house and control exclusively male migrants. 
Hostels were later relocated to the peripheries of most of the 
black townships in the mid 1950's to ensure an "us and them" 
syndrome that complemented the "divide and rule" policies of 
the apartheid government. In the post-1976 period, the 
hostels came to accommodate women and children who flocked to 
the urban areas particularly after the collapse of influx 
control laws. Despite this changing social composition, from 
the beginning of the 1990's, hostels, particularly those on 
the Reef, began to house mainly Zulu-speaking migrants. They 
were bused in from rural Natal, and were largely IFP 
supporters. These themes are explored in more depth in the 
following two chapters.
The chapter has further given a full description of the two 
social categories of women found in the hostels. The chapter 
has argued that the first category of women found in the 
hostel ware rural women who came looking for their husbands, 
boyfriends, relatives. A second category of women who
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inhabited the hostels during the height of violence, were low 
status township women.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A SOCIOLOGICAL PROFILE OF MEADOWLANDS HOSTEL 
l, INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I will try to paint a picture of the inmates 
of the Meadowlands hostel and show how they were involved in 
the destabilisation of the neighbouring communities in the 
1 early 1990's. When the idea of erecting the Meadowlands 
hostel was first mooted, in the mid 1950's, the idea behind 
its development was that many of the urban Black workers were 
migrant workers who through choice, or because of influx 
control, had left their families in the rural areas and would 
never gain permanent urban status, which at the time was the 
preserve of whites. The government's utopian dream was that 
because the migrants had left "their families and their hearts 
in the homelands" it could accommodate them in bleak barrack­
like "single" hostels for the purpose of controlling and 
monitoring their entry to and presence in the cities.
Today Meadowlands hostel is one of the more than 22 0 South 
African hostels, housing more than one million people (Race 
Relations Survey, 1991/92) .j It is one of eight hostels in 
Soweto to be featured on national news for months in the
1990's, because it was involved in violent conflict with the
\
surrounding townships.
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A conspicuous pattern in the Meadowlands hostel since 1990 has 
been that Inkatha—supporting vigilantes seized control of this 
hostel and ejected non-IFP-supporting residents. They 
instituted a militaristic regime, attacked neighbouring 
houses, occupied some and kept others empty to maintain a 
buffer-zone around the hostel. It had become a launching pad 
for destabilising the surrounding townships.
This chapter will endeavour to show clearly how this 
development took place, after the unbanning of the liberation 
movements in February 1990. The chapter has four sections. 
It will firstly give a historical background of the hostel 
showing the social composition of the hostel and the 
relationship between hostel inmates and township residents 
before 1990. Secondly, the chapter will examine the changing 
social characteristics of hostel inmates in the 1990 - 1993 
Thirdly, the chapter will outline the changed social 
organisation of the hostel in the 1990's, and finally, will 
analyze the pattern of violence that came to characterise the 
relations between hostel and township residents.
2. A HISTORY OF MEADOWLANDS HOSTEL
The Meadowlands hostel is a huge structure that was conceived 
in 1954 by the non-European Affairs and Housing Committee 
because of the serious shortage of hostel accommodation for 
single male "natives" in Johannesburg. By then there were 13 
500 names of people on the official waiting list for beds in
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hostels (Johannesburg City Council File N342/8). Immediate 
steps were taken to set aside four sites for the establishment 
of hostels.
The first site was set aside at portion 504 and 505, farm 
Doornfontein, no. 24, where a barracks type multi-storied 
hostel with 4 000 beds, called Inhlazane hostel was erected. 
The second was the Dube Hostel built in Dube between 
Meadowlands and the railway line. The third site was the 
portion of Klipspruit site no. 8 which was situated to the 
West of the Railway line near the Nancefield station. This 
one was called the Nancefield or Lifateng hostel. The fourth, 
was built in the portion of Orlando West (Mzimhlophe) between 
Klipspruit and the railway line (JCC, file N342/8). This is 
the hostel under focus: the Meadowlands hostel.
The Meadowlands hostel, which was built in the early 1960's, 
is similar to the physical structure of most Soweto hostels. 
^It consists of more than 20 rows of single storied brick 
barracks. Each block has one entrance that leads to a huge 
kitchen with one small coal stove. The blocks are comprised 
of single rooms and sixteen-bed dormitories (because of the 
critical accommodation shortage more than 2 0 beds are often 
squeezed into the dormitories) public toilets, an ablution 
room, a boiler room and taps (hot and cold) set above concrete 
wash tubs outside the toilets and ablution room.!
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^The general appearance of the rooms is somewhat depressing and 
dark. Unpainted, semi-plastered walls and ceilingless 
asbestos roofs add to the general gloomy environment. The 
inhabitants suspend their larger possessions from the roof 
beams, and their clothes hang from poles or ropes across the 
room. Old calenders, pictures of semi-naked women, pictures 
of Chief Buthelezi and King Zwelithini, news paper cuttings, 
an IFP flag and other such decorative materials are pasted 
onto the walls and are the only sources of colour^
The grimy dilapidated, windowless structures are enveloped by 
a sickening stench that permeates the entire block. Some of 
the stench emanates from the ever blocked toilets which are 
located in close proximity to each block. Most residents 
claimed that the toilets had not been functioning properly 
since 1988.
The hostel is bordered on the east by a minedump. On the 
north of the hostel there is a ghost town dating from 1990 of 
about 200 houses which were either gutted or evacuated as the 
residents fled for their lives, in an area known as Zone One, 
in Meadowlands. This was in response to the political 
violence. On the west, the hostel is separated from the 
neighbourhood township of Killarney by a two lane extension 
of the Soweto highway called Modise street, named after Rev. 
Modise of the International Pentecost Mission Church of Zion. 
On the south, the hostel is divided from the neighbouring 
township of Mzimhlophe by the two lane MaBasotho Street.
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Because of its proximity to both Meadowlands and Mzimhlophe 
townships, the hostel is either called Meadowlands or 
Mzimhlophe hostel. Notwithstanding its position, residents 
of these townships still perceived it as culturally and 
geographically separated from these townships. This form of 
subtle marginalisation of the hostels, is strongly reinforced 
by the hostels being named after railway stations next to 
which they were located, instead of the township in which they 
were built. There are many examples of this: Mapetla hostel 
in Mapetla Township is called Merafe Hostel, Merafe is a name 
of a station. Lefateng Hostel next to Nancefield station is 
called Nancefield hostel, and Jabulane Hostel situated in 
Jabulane and next to Inhlazane Station is called Inhlazane 
Hostel.
Meadowlands/Mzimhlophe hostel inmates even though they come 
from the hostel that is situated between the three townships, 
are not referred to as Meadowlands, Mzimhlophe or Killarney 
residents, but are categorised as hostel dwellers.
This disassociating of the hostel name from the township name
is a clear indication of the patterns of marginalisation. As
one of the respondents asserted:
Hostels are not part of the townships, they are a 
government creation. They housed people who do not 
regard themselves as part of the township popula­
tion. People who come to the cities only because 
they are looking for jobs. Theirs is to live as 
cheaply as possible. They are dedicated to conso­
lidating their lives in the rural areas. The large 
number of overloaded buses and vans leaving the 
hostels every Friday night bears testimony to the
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goods hostel inmates take home to the rural areas. 
Goods such as doors, corrugated irons, chairs, 
windows and many other things that symbolise 
consolidation of life in the rural base. Some of 
the goods that are sent home by migrants are bought 
with their hard earned meagre salaries, some of 
them are looted in our houses during the violent 
confrontations. They have nothing to lose these 
people, their wives and children are left in the ir­
respective homeland. While we had to fight with our; 
backs against the wall defending our wives, 
children and belongings. Most of the time we defendj 
these things with our lives because they are our I 
lives (Key informant no. 3, Mzimhlope resident).
It is only hostels built far away from railway lines that have 
tended to retain their names. Hostels such as Dobsonville, 
Diepkloof and Alexandra to mention just a few, are hostels 
that still maintain their original names.
The Meadowlands hostel is sandwiched between two stations, the 
Mzimhlophe station and Phomolong station. Most hostel inmates 
who live in the north of the hostel use the Phomolong station.
In the case of Meadowlands, when the hostel was first 
established, township residents used to pride themselves on 
their relations with hostel residents. However these 
perceptions changed immediately after the 1976 hostel inmates' 
conflict with the township community. Each township refrained 
from associating itself with the hostel. Meadowlands 
residents called it Mzimhlophe hostel while Mzimhlophe resi­
dents called it Meadowlands hostel (Respondent no. 14).
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Meadowlands residents vindicated their assertion by pointing 
to the fact that the hostel's single gate was located on the 
north of Mzixnhlophe township. A number of the shops, most of 
them damaged during the 1976 uprising, were built around this 
area. Since then residents bought their goods in shops that 
were located in townships adjacent to the hostel, i.e. 
Mzimhlophe, Meadowlands or KiHarney.
Male residents of Meadowlands claim to have come from "Kofifi" 
(Sophiatown). They call themselves "real ouens van Ndofaya" 
(real male inhabitants of Meadowlands) They claim to be 
South Africa's jazz connoisseurs, whose thirst for jazz music 
is unquenchable. This was evident by the sounds every Sunday 
morning when they would be'heard playing either Duke Ellington 
or Johnny Hodges (Respondent, no. 4) . In the hostel a 
different kind of music was popular, mainly traditional choral 
music which could be heard on weekends especially.
Over time the initial acceptance of hostel inmates by township 
residents changed to attitudes of contempt. Hostel inmates 
were perceived as "mogoes van Toeka" (stupid rural boys), 
whose origins were various rural places of South Africa. Even 
though the townships were built to house the poor, lower 
income group of people living precariously on or below the 
breadline, the township male community felt socially superior 
and materially better off than the hostel inmates.
95
The history of the Meadowlands hostel will be analyzed in 
terms of two historical phases: (1) The PRE-1976 PHASE, and 
(2) the 1976-1990 PHASE, which includes the KLIPTOWN episode. 
Each phase involved people with different social 
characteristics and different social relations between the 
hostel residents and the township communities.
THE PRE-1976 PHASE
The pre-1976 era covers the period when the hostel was built 
in 1962 right until the Soweto uprising of 1976. During this 
period Meadowlands hostel was mainly inhabited by predominant­
ly peace-loving migrants who came from all over South Africa 
and represented different ethnic groups. Among them were 
migrants from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Botswana and those who came from countries north 
of Limpopo who were dubbed "makwerekwere" for their inability 
to express themselves in any of the South African black 
languages. Over the years these migrants had developed 
creative strategies to cope with their social reality.
During the 1960's the standard of living of both the hostel 
and the township residents was still very low, and the 
rural/urban divide was tenuous. The life style of the two 
communities was still unsophisticated, and both communities 
kept strong links with their traditional authorities.
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Zulu-speaking migrants were still dominated by traditional 
Zulu men dubbed "iziqhaza", conspicuous with deep traditional 
marks on their faces and enlarged earlobe openings for 
traditional earrings or corks. Migrants lived side by side 
with the township people. It was only when some township 
residents experienced vertical occupational mobility in the 
late 1960's that class differentiations emerged. These 
changes in social status created divisions between the hostel 
inmates and the township residents and between the township 
residents themselves.
A sense of harmony and social solidarity was expressed by Tom
Magawana, a former resident of Mzimhlophe hostel and one of
the oldest residents of Mzimhlophe Township. He came to
Johannesburg as a migrant, and then married Lindelwa Ndlazi
a daughter of a Mzimhlophe resident:
I came to Johannesburg from Villiers (OFS). I was 
among the first inhabitants of Mzimhlophe hostel.
I was scared of the township life because for many 
years we have been bombarded with news that urban 
life was rough, fast and cruel. Only the fittest 
survived, we were told. I was not sure whether I 
would cope with that pace. Poverty compelled me to 
move out of my long protected environment where 
only cows determine the pace. But things turned 
out different when we came to Mzimhlophe hostel.
We were more than welcomed by the communities 
around us. Elderly women called us "bakhwenyana" 
(sons-in-law) presumably because we were
bachelors,and men and boys called us "s'ball" 
(brothers-in-law). The pass-raids by the "black­
jacks" (municipal police) were rife during those 
days: we were compelled to seek temporary
accommodation with friends, relatives and even 
strangers in Mzimhlophe Township, when we had 
visitors from home. Mzimhlophe residents were more 
than eager to extend their hands of friendship (Key 
informant no 3, Mzimhlolpe resident).
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Influx control was strictly enforced during the 1960's, only 
people in possession of section 10(1) (a), (b), and (c) of the 
Urban Areas Act were allowed into the townships. Black South 
Africans who had lived and worked in an urban area legally, 
for less than 15 years, faced expulsion from the urban areas 
once they lost their employment (Posel, 1992). The official 
"modus operandi" for access to hostel beds was that men should 
have guaranteed employment upon their arrival in the urban 
areas (Ramphele, 1993). Meadowlands hostel was a well guarded 
male-only institution housing two main social categories of 
people: employed males older than 40 years, and younger 
employed males between sixteen and forty years of age. That 
is where the name "ezimpohlweni" (bachelor's paradise) 
emanated from (Key informant no. 6, Mzimhlope resident).
During this time, according to one respondent:
only men stayed in this hostel. Women and children 
were locked outside the gate. We met women in 
shebeens which were littered throughout the 
townships. Shebeen aunties invited us left right 
and centre to drink at their joints. They
attracted us to their shebeens by inviting mainly 
Basotho girls as a ploy to attract us to their 
shebeens (Respondent no. 14, hostel resident)
Female migration from Basotholand was at its peak in the 
1960's when Johannesburg and several other towns on the Reef 
"experienced an unprecedented influx of Sotho women" (Posel, 
1991: 31) . That is why it was possible for shebeen queens to 
use them to attract single migrants.;
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Many Meadowlands and Mzimhlophe residents turned their houses 
into shebeens, working many hours a day brewing and pressing 
home brews dubbed "blue-train", "skokiaan" and "barbaton" in 
order to minimise poverty and to generate a cash income with 
which to educate their children. Some women operated shebeens 
in their houses in order to augment their husbands' meagre 
salaries. As Longmore said: "Perhaps the most outstanding 
characteristic of the urban African community during this 
period was its poverty" [Emphasis added] (Longmore, 1959: 34).
Whether they were married or single, almost all Black women 
had to carry a major responsibility of supporting themselves 
and their offspring (Posel, 1991). The practice of turning 
their houses into shebeens was a matter of survival for some 
of them. Even in stable marriages, the majority of fathers 
did not give a reasonable proportion of their earnings for the 
use of their families (Kuzwayo, 1960). Also their earnings 
were very low;the vast majority of male city workers earned 
less than R30 a month. (Key informant no. 6, Mzimhlope 
resident).
Despite this shared experience of poverty, certain social 
differences existed. The townships were family communities, 
while hostels were bachelor quarters for men who had left 
their wives and children back home.
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in this pre-1976 phase, the hostel population was composed of 
people from different ethnic groups including:
(a) Elderly migrants
A larger proportion of this group apart from having their 
families in the rural areas, also owned land, cattle, goats, 
sheep and other livestock in their respective homelands. 
Because of this they had no intention of settling permanently 
in the urban areas.
(b) Young married migrants
A small proportion of this group had families, land and live 
stock. But a larger proportion had none of these commodities 
and came to the cities mainly to accumulate capital in order 
to acquire these goods.
According to one informant in this pre-1976 phase, over half 
of these migrants were young men from different ethnic groups 
who came to work for bride-wealth payments and to buy cattle, 
agricultural implements and consumer goods (Key informant no. 
7, Mzimhlope resident).
(c) Migrants from white-owned farms
This group only had families in the rural areas, but possessed 
neither land nor livestock. They had no secure access to land 
and other assets on white farms. Their tenure on white farms 
was usually contingent upon the ability of the household to 
provide labour to the white farmer.
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(4 ) Township Bachelors
k small percentage of township bachelors stayed in the hostels 
j becaiise of overcrowding in their respective homes. This category 
included single township men who vowed never to get married, as 
well as those township youth who felt out of favour with their 
* families because of their quest for an independent existence or
! because of their deviant behaviour.
i'I
THE POST 1976 PHASE
The face of the Meadowlands hostel changed forever after the 1976 
student uprising. The first serious conflict between Meadowlands 
inmates and its adjacent areas occurred in 1976, when the 
students of Soweto revolted at the introduction of Afrikaans as 
the medium of instruction in black schools. The trouble that 
flared between Meadowlands hostel inmates and township residents 
lasted two weeks and left 70 people dead as well as countless 
others injured (Kane-Berman, 1978).
The students tried to coerce all Soweto residents including 
'hostel inmates to obey "stay at home" calls. The hostel inmates, 
Who had never been consulted on this act of protest and were 
rlittle inclined to risk their jobs resisted the call. To them 
; ^  was business as usual and they went to work under police 
escort (Kane-Berman, 1978).
i-
i
[While this non-consultation was a source of deep resentment among 
'hostel inmates, it is debatable whether even ordinary Sowetans
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pere consulted on the issues of stayaways. The calls were issued 
jpy the Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC) , which was 
a significant factor in Soweto politics during that period. The 
power of students is best expressed by Kane-Berman who argues 
that:
Their [students] writ was virtually law in the series 
of campaigns which they organised in the second half 
of 1976, among them the four strikes, the crusade 
against shebeens, the Christmas shopping boycott, and 
the ban on festive and sporting activities (Kane- 
Berman, 1978: 110).
These were decisions enforced by students without concern for, 
or consultation with the broader community. According to 
interviews most of the hostel dwellers supported the stayaway, 
in principle, even though they still went to work.
On Tuesday, August 24,1976 something extraordinary took place 
in Meadowlands and Mzimhlophe. A section of the migrant worker 
population of Meadowlands Hostel, with the condonation and even 
suspected encouragement of the police, rampaged through the 
streets of the township attacking any young person who dared 
cross their path. The attack did not involve all migrants who 
lived in that hostel but only the Zulu migrants, of whom there 
Were 1 630 in the hostel that housed a total of 10 300 people 
(Rand Daily Mail. 26.8.1976). At that time, armed with their so 
called traditional weapons (clubs and pangas), the Zulu migrants 
foamed the streets of the township and beat up all children of 
school-going age on their way to school. There were police 
armoured cars within sight and from time to time the police would 
fire tear gas or live ammunition, not at the migrants engaged in
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'these violence, but at the children and youth (Lodge, 1983; 
Gorodnov, 1983).
in this episode, township houses were not damaged or looted. A
pand Daily Mail reporter wrote:
There I saw a policeman in a camouflage suit, armed 
with an FN rifle. Through an interpreter, the 
policeman said: 'You are warned not to continue 
damaging the houses because they belong to the West 
Rand Administration Board. If you damage the houses, 
you will force us to take action against you to 
prevent this. You have been ordered to kill only the 
troublemakers (Rand Daily Mail. 26.8.1976).
■These violent confrontations between Meadowlands hostel dwellers 
and township residents not only affected the relationship between 
the two specific communities, but affected the relationship 
between the whole community that lives adjacent to hostels in 
Soweto. Township residents became highly suspicious of the 
hostel migrants. Zulu-speaking Meadowlands Hostel dwellers, 
particularly those who could be easily identified by marks on 
their ears and faces were targeted. Whenever they appeared from 
the hostel or railway stations, shouts of "MaZulul" (there come 
the Zulus!) would echoed in the streets of Mzimhlophe or 
Phomolong, while the youth descended on them with all kinds of 
weapons. Often when they were caught they would be beaten and 
left for dead, because necklacing had not yet begun in the 
townships during this period (Key informant no. 4, township 
resident).
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Fghese changes in hostel/township relations is best articulated
[jjy Nkanyezi Madlala, one of the few remaining Meadowlands Hostel
residents from the 1976 epoch:
Before 1976 we were not totally isolated from the! 
township environment, many of us preferred to call: 
ourselves as members of the township instead of the 
hostel, because we spent our weekends with the' 
township people. The hostel was just the place to lay 
our heads. But 1976 spread a black cloud over the 
entire hostel community. Our families were evicted 
from their temporary accommodation, never to be taken 
back again. There was nothing we could do to reverse 
this decision, the township jungle justice has taken 
its toll (Respondent no. 7, hostel resident).
In the pre-1976 phase hostels were characterised by male 
exclusivity. The 1976-1990 period, however, brought many changes 
to the hostel environment. Meadowlands hostel ceased to be an 
exclusively male domain. This change echoed Mamphele Ramphele's 
observation on Cape Town hostels, where she claimed that "What 
was essentially a 'man's world' ... changed into an environment 
accommodating men, women and children" (Ramphele, 1993: 57).
Prior to June 1976, women were prohibited from entering, let 
alone staying in the hostels. Pass raids and arrests were, for 
decades, a common feature of South African urban life and hostels 
were easy targets for such raids. Women in hostels were in a 
particularly vulnerable position as they were susceptible to 
prosecution both for not having residence rights and for 
trespassing (Segar, 1991). The events of June 1976 resulted in 
the disintegration of the West Rand bureaucratic structures of 
control. Women, children and the unemployed flooded into the
hostels.
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The first group of women and children to enter the hostel were 
hostel inmates' visitors and wives who had been temporarily 
housed in the township. A large number of these were traditional 
Zulu women, who were illiterate and unemployable. Most of them 
were accommodated in parts of the hostel that had been vacated 
by inmates fleeing the violence.
The social composition of Meadowlands hostel also changed in that 
it included children after 1976. Migrant labour hostels in 
general were not built to house children, but children have 
entered the hostel social environment in great numbers, after the 
1976 upheavals (Reynolds, 1984). From then on children became 
a permanent feature of the hostel social milieu. At first it was 
children who accompanied their mothers on visits to fathers and 
other relatives. There were also a small number of children who 
came on their own to visit during the school holidays, while 
others came for special reasons such as the need for health care 
(Jones, 1990). Other children were born in the Meadowlands 
hostel. This pattern is also reported by Ramphele in her 
writings of Cape Town hostels, "Many children below the age of 
17 have been conceived in the hostels, as the results of the 
increasing trend, since the 1970's, for women to come to the 
city" (Ramphele, 1993: 37).
Before the 1976 violence between the hostel and township 
Residents that took the lives of 70 people, the security of the 
hostel was tight, with a "black jack" policeman at every entrance 
to the hostel, preventing outsiders entering the premises. The
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E st-1976 period resulted in a slacking of security that allowed ee traffic between the townships and the hostel. The hostel
_ ased to provide exclusively for employed males, and unemployed
I
finales, women and children, moved into the hostel. This 
phenomenon attracted even people from countries as far afield as 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi etc, who were living illegally in 
South Africa and previously had not been able to rent beds in the 
hostel because of their illegal status. They would have been 
easy prey to the previously frequent police raids.
This loosening of control led to an escalation of criminal
activities that initially strained the relationship between the
hostel and the township residents. Crime, murder and rape
increased around this hostel, as
some inmates and other foreign inhabitants of this 
hostel, formed bands who invaded the location at night 
solely to rape and kill, so that there was someone 
lying dead somewhere in the adjacent locations, one in 
every week. This gave the hostel people a formidable­
ness that made it difficult to befriend them or to 
sympathise with their terrible lot (Matshoba, 1987:
2 2 1 ) .
The changing social composition of the Meadowlands hostel was 
given a special impetus by the arrival of Kliptown squatters. 
The beginning of 1977 introduced hundreds of families into the 
Meadowlands hostel. These were families whose shanties were 
swept away in an avalanche of rain, in a place called Kliptown, 
a few kilometres away from Meadowlands.J These families moved 
into a section of the hostel that was vacated during the 1976 
turmoil between hostel dwellers and township residents^ (Keller, 
1993; Matshoba, 1987).
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This section of the hostel was situated on the south eastern side 
Df Meadowlands Zone one, and it was later called Kliptown, named
r*after the new occupants' place of origin. The new Kliptown 
section attracted a wide variety of people, particularly those 
from the lower echelons of the job market. Among them were 
street-vendors, washer-women, gangsters, security guards, factory 
workers, as well as day labourers and unemployed people^
*The hostel inmates used the same transport as the Kliptown 
squatters. As they travelled together side by side in mini-bus 
taxis and trains during long journeys to and from their places 
of employment, new bonds and relations were forged. Mistrust, 
fear and suspicion slowly evaporated as they started calling one 
another "makhelwane" a Zulu word for neighbour. This brought
r~~with it a neighbourly atmosphere to the hostel. As a hostel 
"induna" said: "The presence of a large number of women and
children contributed a certain amount of warmth and reason for 
living" (Key informant no. 7)
A number of other social practices emerged that diffused the 
atmosphere of hate and mistrust that had come to exist between 
the township residents and the hostel inmates, after the 1976 
revolts. An example of these practices was participating in 
sporting activities.
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3m SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY MEADLOWLANDS HOSTEL 
RESIDENTS
This research has revealed a different picture from media reports 
of hostel inmates as a homogeneous group characterised by violent 
pro-IFP, Zulu-speaking, single males, who wage war against the 
township at night and rub shoulders with the same community at 
the workplace during the day. This different picture emerged 
after extensively interviewing 31 Meadowlands hostel inmates.
Hostel inmates were found not to be an homogeneous group. There
were profound differences in age, educational levels, social
class, rural origins, marital status, skill, and in personal and
r*political loyalties and aspirations. The majority, 80% of the 
respondents were Zulu-speaking and belonged to the Zulu ethnic 
group, factors that helped to strengthen ethnic allegiance and 
pride among Zulus in the Meadowlands hostel. Only a small number, 
10% of hostel dwellers spoke Tswana, while 5% spoke Sotho and a 
further 5% spoke Pedi.j The research uncovered underlying 
tensions that were not immediately apparent.
(i) Age profile of hostel inmates
TABLE 1: AGE PROFILE OF MEADOWLANDS HOSTEL INMATES, VN_
AGE IN YEARS 10-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60
NO OF PEOPLE 7 10 7 4 3
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Seventeen (55%) of the people interviewed were below the age of 
3 0 , and 70% of them had come to Johannesburg for the first time.
(ii) Relations with rural origins
A large proportion of those interviewed, 75%, had not visited
their rural homes since coming to the Reef.! Their experiences
are clearly articulated by Manz'ekhofi Mpiyakhe who claimed that:
I have never gone home since I was here (Meadowlands 
hostel) . Maybe I will go this Christmas. I do not 
want to arrive at home empty handed. My wife and 
children know I have gone to Johannesburg. They 
expect a lot from me. The precedent have been set by 
those who had come to Joburg before us. After twelve 
months in Johannesburg they go home with boxes full of 
all sorts of things. But they must expect that things 
have changed now. They must appreciate that even if 
I do not bring home anything, I am still alive. Many 
go back to their homes in coffins, if they were lucky 
enough to be identified in the mortuary. So our 
families must learn to appreciate just to see us alive 
that is all (Respondent no. 12) .
A significant number, 10 (32,3%) of the newly arrived young
rmigrants preferred Johannesburg to any other place. Social
networks of relatives appeared more powerful magnets than job
prospects. ; This is what one respondent had to say about the
choice of coming to the hostels on the Reef:
I do not have a brother or relatives in Cape Town or 
in any other places. Cape Town is the place of the 
Xhosas, I will never set my foot in that place. 
Xhosas think they are the most cleverest than any
other ethnic group in South Africa. I came to 
Johannesburg because my brothers are here, and I am 
assured of a place to stay in the hostel. Unlike in
Cape Town or Orange Free State where I would be
compelled to stay in a sguatter camp. Me never
(Respondent no. 21) .
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j.arge number, 2 8 (90%) of the people interviewed, among them 
5ople who were in full time employment, did not pay rent .jj Those 
did, paid as little as R15 a month for a bed.
jn spite of its violent nature, hostel life was positively 
evaluated by 16 (52%) of the respondents. Life in the hostel is 
best summed up as:
I found every thing okay for me here. It is better 
than staying at home (Tugela). Because even there, 
there is heavy fighting that is coupled with poverty 
and hunger. Here (Meadowlands hostel) we are 
protected. Nobody touches us here. But at home they 
can burn you and your family at once. There is too 
|much violence at home, both political and the remains 
(of faction fighting (Respondent no. 18).
What emerged clearly from these interviews was that the pride of 
association with home was declining as compared to the pride 
which older migrants felt. There were no longer young men 
wearing beads and skin necklaces, which indicated engagement to 
a girl from home (Meyer, 1982). f~There was a strong element of 
emulation of their urban peer group: those who could afford it,
s'” '
wore gold or silver chains around their necks, rather than skin 
necklaces. They permed their hair, wore Dobbshire trousers and 
"All stars" canvas shoes. They preferred urban to rural girls; 
they were regarded as smart because they always wear perfume and 
look presentable, while rural girls allegedly wear towels over 
their bodies and look old long before their twentieth birthdays.\
A large number of this group (10 respondents) preferred settling 
permanently in an urban area to going back home.j They felt 
hostels should be converted into family units, rather than being
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demolished. The group did not mind living in a multi-ethnic 
environment, as long as Zulus could occupy separate dormitories 
from other ethnic groups.
There was a sharp difference between the older and younger 
groups. A large proportion, six of the eight (75%) older 
migrants, although they had worked in the urban areas all their 
lives, said they would prefer to retire to their rural homes, 
rather than to stay in the cities .j. The idea of retiring to an 
old-age home would have been unthinkable to them. They advocated 
the retention of hostels as they were, and preferred their 
families to stay in the rural areas while being able to visit 
them in the hostels.
Another vast difference among Meadowlands hostel inmates was 
their geographical origins. Migrants in this hostel were not 
exclusively newcomers from rural areas, but included a few 
migrants from smaller cities and towns situated outside 
Johannesburg.
I—
Intra-hostel harmony was attainable largely because most Zulu­
speaking residents came from the same village or rural setting, 
and they were accommodated as such in their separate dormitories .JJ 
The majority, 19 respondents (61%) preferred this arrangement
f'whereby rooms in the Meadowlands hostel were not only ethnically 
divided, but were divided according to the rural origins of the 
migrants. \ According to a number of respondents, nobody 
deliberately set out to divide the inmates, but:
Ill
the process happens automatically, it is a case of 
people feeling comfortable among their own kind 
^particularly during these strife torn period
^'(Respondent no. 6, hostel resident) .
jjjis arrangement of grouping people who came from the same
\
jeographical area, who shared the same norms, values and culture
rd spoke the same dialect had other effects. It made communal looking possible and easy to organise. ^Generational boundariesrpere prevalent and were respected by people who hailed from the 
lame geographic area. Those who were employed contributed to the 
iommunal budget, which ensured that food was distributed 
iquitably. Internal conflict was thus minimised.]
fourteen respondents (45%) came from Nkandla, Bergville, Msinga,
... rind Mahlabathini m  Natal.J The research revealed that most of 
Jie older respondents from these areas had live-stock such as 
foats, cattle, chicken and sheep at home.^ 50% of them had 
ligrated to the cities because the rural way of life was
S
Inadequate as a sole means of earning a living.
fhis group of migrants were people who had been in the
leadowlands hostel the longest - in most cases longer than ten
r^ears. These older migrants were a war weary group. They were 
^ S a t i c  and ardent followers of the King of the Zulus, King
fwelithini, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party/)
i
|hey were naive about Inkatha's ideology and policies but its
l
jfchnic tag acted as a powerful magnet. Their quest for peace is 
[tticulated here by Mbadlanyika:
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"impi ayinamvuzo, ayikho impunzi yehlathi" (there i
n° War- Everybody is a loser because it il
mankind that you destroy) . We cannot run away from 
the war m  the village and come and cause war in the 
townships (Respondent no. 1 1 , hostel resident).
^ie areas which many hostel dwellers came from had long been 
Ingulfed by faction fighting amongst different Zulu tribes, 
liolence had become a dominant culture among both young and old 
len of these areas. According to one informant, in these areas 
I man's status was established according to the number of people 
|e had killed. This informant was a hostel resident who 
►referred to remain anonymous:
In my area (Msinga) you cannot be called a man if vou 
have not killed anybody. That is why 1 " i l l  £ot
l i k ^ w o m e ^ t h " 1”6!  (amadodedolob^ )  because they are like women they have not killed anybody. Thev run
away like women leaving their sons to fight the war 
(the township violence) . You will never see that with 
us (Respondent no. 16, hostel resident).
This statement expresses a sharp polarisation of gender roles and 
fc militarised conception of masculinity. This conception 
legitimates violent activities for many actors.
(iii) Marital status
Because of the changing demographic structures of the hostel 
Whereby inmates were becoming younger and younger, only nine 
(29%) of the people interviewed were married and had children. 
The number of children per family ranged from eleven to three, 
and there was an average of seven children per family. Five 
(56%) of the married people would have liked their children to
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pVe joined them in the urban areas, whereas the other four (44%)
pjected the idea of being joined by their children. This is how
pe respondent viewed the issue:
No! No! No! I do not want my children to come to 
Johannesburg. But because there are no schools at 
home, I would like them to come only for education.
After attaining their qualification they must go back.
That is how they are going to escape the corruption of 
the city life (Respondent no. 17, hostel resident).
|iv) Women in the Meadowlands hostel
Pne of the themes that emerged during the interviews was that the 
"Peadowlands hostel was fast becoming home for not only young 
pingle males, but for a growing influx of young and middle-aged 
temales from both the townships and rural areas. Both these 
young males and females who came from the rural areas were 
becoming less interested in maintaining their rural bases. For 
them, the urban areas held better prospects than drought-stricken 
and violence-ridden rural Nataly
Meadowlands hostel had for a long time ceased to provide only 
single-sex accommodation, the number of families having increased 
in the post-Kliptown period. Women became an integral part of 
the hostel environment. Some became residents of the hostel out 
of their own choice, while others had their residency imposed 
upon them. Their existence in the hostel was explained by one 
of the inmates as follows:
They live with us in the hostel. Most of them have 
children by hostel dwellers, fSome come voluntarily 
while others are dragged against their will because 
they think they are smart. They think we are worthy 
nothing and we are township rejects, that is why we i
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drag them in screaming and kicking (Respondent no. 7, 
hostel resident).y
ply those women who are regarded as township "rejects" and rural 
Dinen voluntarily visited and inhabited the hostel. Those women 
Jk> perceived themselves as "ladies" or "mshozas", i.e. the best 
ownship women, had to be coerced into the hostel.
|v) Educational profile of hostel inmates
p^he inmates of Meadowlands hostel show a surprisingly high level 
£f education particularly among the young inhabitants. This is 
jpontrary to Ramphele's findings of low levels of education among 
■Cape Town hostel dwellers (Ramphele, 1993).^ This level of 
educational attainment may be due to May's assertion that the 
rural household tended to invest their monies in their children's 
education because it represented "an investment in an urban- 
orientated future in which education is seen as the primary means 
of securing employment" (May, 1990: 178).
Twelve people (39%) interviewed had standard nine education. Six 
(19%) of other interviewees had gone up to standard ten, while 
the other six (19%) had standard three. Five of the respondents 
(16%) were totally illiterate, while only three (10%) had post 
®atric and other diplomas.^ Their educational status elevated the 
youth ahead of their parents (Bernhardt et al., 1990). However 
the older^migrants were a valued source of informal, experiential 
knowledge. They understood the complexities of the urban social
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^ilieu. This understanding according to Segal, acted as "a
survival kit” for youthful migrants.
It is the elders who initiated the younger migrants 
into the struggles and complexities of the city by 
sharing the knowledge of job opportunities, survival 
strategies, etc. As a result, a gerontocratic form of 
control has been established in the hostST (Segal,
1991: 9-10).
(vi) Employment profile
Meadowlands hostel was mostly inhabited by unemployed migrants. 
This became apparent both from interviews and from participant
r . . .observation. Of the 31 people interviewed, nineteen (61%) were 
unemployed, five (16%) were in informal employment that ranged 
from dagga smuggling and distribution, running shebeens, 
repairing shoes, recharging car batteries, selling blocks of ice, 
street vendoring, running spaza shops, fixing cars, "izinyanga" 
(traditional healing) and "mashonisa" (money lending). Seven 
(22%) were in formal employment that ranged from working as 
security guards, taxi drivers, bank messengers, to owning mini­
bus taxis. Only one (3%) of the respondents was in professional 
employment, as a teacher in one of the Soweto schoolsJ 
These unemployed people acted as "soldiers for conscription into j 
the violence" (Shubane, 1990), As Woods stated:
The presence of unemployed people in the hostel could 
create several problems for their working co­
inhabitants, as many of many of the former are
naturally frustrated, anxious, insecure and poor. 
Although many of them are supported by their fellow 
inmates in terms of the meagre amount of money and 
food, many of them turn to petty crime and
unacceptable behaviour inside and outside the hostels.
Their actions do at times, have a direct and negative 
effect on the relationship between the hostel
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residents and the surrounding community (Woods, 1993: 
71) -
Salaries or wages of those respondents who were employed in the 
formal sector ranged from R600 to well over a R1000 a month, 
fjiree of those who earned more than R1000 included a bank 
pessenger, a teacher, and a taxi owner^ All of them had been in 
their respective employment for more than five years. None of 
them or any of the employed respondents reported belonging to a 
trade union.
This is in contrast to Sitas's (1982) research finding that in 
the 1980's the trade unions had recruited extensively in the 
hostels on the East Rand with many migrant workers becoming 
members (Sitas, 1982). Hostel inmates became the centre of the 
emergence of the unions. When Sitas conducted his research among 
the East Rand migrant workers in 1982, the East Rand contained 
the largest concentration of industrial workers in the PWV, who 
were grossly underpaid and lived in appalling conditions in the 
hostels. It was these appalling conditions that gave impetus to 
workers' grievances and mobilisation. By the early 1990's this 
had changed, particularly in the Meadowlands hostel as it came 
to be inhabited largely by unemployed migrants.
A major tension existed between hostel dwellers who did business 
with the township community as customers during the day and were 
hitter foes after sunset. ^Taxi-drivers and "mashonisas" often 
found themselves in this predicament. Many taxi drivers, 
Particularly those who were hired by township taxi owners, left
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|ie hostel for backyard rooms in the townships, in spite of high 
®ntals charged for rooms, because of this tension. ?
ongani Shusha explains the problem as follows:
| Life was unbearable to me. Every morning and every 
1 day I had to carry a load of fifteen passengers, all 
‘from the township who related the same story of being 
attacked by hostel inmates. I was always scared that 
one day they will find out that I was one of them and 
they will turn against me. 'Besides, how do you kill 
your own customers?^ I had to battle for months with 
my conscience, until finally I divorced myself from my 
own brothers and clan group. I had to or I would have 
been torn apart. I live a lonely life in the 
township, but at least my conscience is clean, it is 
, a matter of months before I get used to people. 
\ Surely I will (Respondent no. 18, hostel resident).
4 . THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF MEADOWLANDS HOSTEL 
[i) Leadership
Those who were living in the hostel, were ruled over by 
committees that were led by indunas. Part of the induna's brief, 
apart from attending meetings that linked the Meadowlands hostel 
to other hostels, and "enforcing" decisions taken by the Inkatha 
central Committee in Ulundi, was to ensure that peace prevailed 
among his "subjects" .j Only Zulu inmates were chosen as indunas 
because Zulus made up the largest proportion of this hostel's 
population.
r
The indunas were mostly senior residents of the hostel, they were■ \
hot elected but were imposed by the Inkatha structures in the 
hostel, j Most of them were "traditionalist" Zulus, respected by
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Zulu residents for their wisdom. The way the Indunas were 
gpposed from above by Inkatha hostel leadership fits well with 
j^ie organisation's non-democratic traditions in the hostels.
lii) Hostel activities
fhe major leisure time activity in Meadowlands Hostel was 
listening to their radios .j Their plight was best articulated by 
(latshoba writing at an earlier time when many hostel inmates were 
Illiterate:
The thirst of the illiterate masses for knowledge 
about the world at large is quenched by the mass 
media. To them, the radio is still one of the 
technological wonders of the world - a box that speaks 
many languages, including their own. And there is no 
suspicion in their minds that the box may tell lies in 
their languages (Matshoba, 1979: 144).
What became clear when questioned about activities within the 
hostel was how hostel dwellers had become completely margina­
lised. The social networks that prevailed between the hostel andj
i
the township communities prior to the 1990 period had completely! 
ceased to exist. Only two respondents (6%) still maintained 
relationships with the township community by way of membership 
of a Makgotla, which is equivalent to a stokvel-j Both of these 
respondents were Tswana-speaking hostel dwellers.
Eleven (35%) Zulu speaking hostel dwellers belonged to a burial 
society that only admitted Zulu-speaking hostel dwellers from 
various hostels. Each member contributed R25 a month.>
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remaining 18 people (58%) belonged to other social groups 
githin the hostel. The most prominent was a football club whose 
membership in theory was open to every person but in reality was 
pnly open to hostel inmates.
■pie lack of recreational facilities in the hostel underlines the 
intense boredom of hostel life, an existence which is largely 
Isolated from mainstream township life. Before the current 
Iriolence erupted township people including women would flock to 
the soccer field situated at the edge of the hostel.
Only seven people (23%) interviewed stated that there were soccer 
Activities in the hostel, meaning informal, infrequent matches 
between inmates. 28 respondents (90%) said that formal soccer 
Batches including township residents ceased to exist when the 
violence erupted.
For many hostel dwellers drinking is the only social activity
that they are involved in. As one respondent said:
We live to drink. There is nothing we do except 
drink, drink, drink. We buy it. What is surprising is 
that people do not have money to buy food but they are 
always drunk (Respondent no. 4, hostel resident).
(iii) Economic activities
From the time that violence erupted and the Meadowlands hostel 
community became isolated from the township, business activities 
Proliferated inside the hostel. These informal businesses ranged 
from shebeens, motor mechanic shops, barbers, meat sellers, spaza
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liops and jumble sales. According to one respondent businesses 
perating in the hostel
are run by Zulus who have money. They are very 
expensive though they are helpful to most of us. 
Everything was built for the township people. 
Schools, hospitals, doctors surgeries, shops and 
everything. One cigarette cost fifty cents. Most of 
us buy it, what can we do? (Respondent no. 4, hostel 
resident).
nineteen respondents (61%) believed that there was an outside
Ridden hand that ran most of the successful businesses in the
"hostel. These business people were thought to use hostel
■flwellers as covers to run these businesses for them and supplied
them with everything, including transport. By contrast those
Jiostel dwellers who owned their informal businesses sold their
goods and services in a more hand to mouth fashion. Most of the
time their goods were stale in comparison to those that were
sponsored by outsiders. Ntuthuko Majozi believes that:
People get permission from leaders to own and manage 
such undertakings amidst the uncertainty and violent 
hostel environment. Not everybody can afford this 
type of business. You must have a car and plenty of 
money before you own it. Most people take things on 
credit and do not pay. You cannot force them to pay 
because most of them are not working (Respondent no.
22, hostel resident).
Shebeens were the most successful businesses in the hostel. 
Twenty five (81%) of people interviewed drank alcohol. Types of 
drinks which were popular were: brandy, beers, skokian,
Mqombothi and Malamb'edlile among others. Unlike the township 
shebeens which are mostly owned and operated by women, shebeens 
in the hostels were owned by men and sometimes operated by women 
as a ploy to attract customers.
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Because of the recession and high levels of unemployment "if one 
0f the hostel inmates dies, the society will buy a coffin for the 
dead body, and bury him nicely" [my emphases added] (van Onselen, 
1976: 199). Death among hostel inmates was regarded as a solemn, 
dignified affair, a passage to the place of the ancestors, 
jecent and dignified funerals were the only hope the inmates had 
ifter living a degraded life (Ramphele, 1993).
For decades hostel inmates buried their dead in the rural areas
irrespective of the financial implication this custom had on
. r~their limited economic resources. For many years funerals were 
not seen at the hostel because dead migrants would be taken home 
for burial. The post-Kliptown era introduced a new phenomenon 
in the Meadowlands hostel. Funeral ceremonies were held regu-’ 
larly inside the hostel, with marked differences to township 
funerals .j
Funerals in the black townships are generally regarded as 
dignified occasions, preceded by night vigils where the 
deceased's coffin is left for mourners to pay their last 
respects. Mourning women, surround the coffin wrapped in black 
shawls or blankets, wearing black head scarves or black berets, 
to communicate with the bereaved during the ritual of the wake. 
Chief among the mourners would be the deceased's mother or wife, 
Who would be seated between four lit candles which symbolise a 
light in the dark cloud that has befallen a family.
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This is a standard practice among most black families regardless 
of class or status. The sense of community is powerful. it is 
easily discernable when mourners return from the graveyard and 
a number of tin bathtubs with water are placed outside the yard 
next to the gate, for people to wash their hands before queuing 
for food in a kind of ceremony of purification or cleansing, to 
wash away death from the mourners' h a n d s . T h e  feasting 
reinforced social bonds. However hostel funeral were very 
different from township funerals.
As already stated hostel inmates preferred to be buried at their 
country homesteads where all their ancestors were clustered.
Spakupaku (not his real name) claimed:
r*
^ wa^s stretched the almost non-existent 
£welier s resources to a breaking point. With 
the high rate of unemployment in the hostel, we relv
donat°i«leC? 10n fr0m thS- fellow hostel dwellers and donation from sympathetic undertakers just to secure
a coffin Otherwise we would have settle for a 
pauper s burial. We always remind ourselves that 
••wnuntu akalahlwa* („e do not throw away1V|s
- being) we do our best under the difficult circum­
stances. We all have our wishes. None of those is to
? L bUr.led lr\ 1he Clty because a man who is buried ini
1S Xike a man Who is buried hy the road side (Key informant no. 6, hostel resident).
Hostel funerals differed sharply from township funerals. There
was no slaughter and feasting which characterised township
funerals, there was no traditional wearing of mourning dresses
by women. Funerals in this environment appeared like pauper's 
funerals.
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A funeral observed by this researcher was like that of a 
completely different nation, there was little of the community 
spirit that prevails at township funerals. Almost ail funerals 
in the hostels irrespective of the nature of death were regarded 
as political funerals, and involved political speeches by hostel 
inmates.
(v) Political organisations
Meadowlands hostel, like most other hostels on the Reef has 
become an Inkatha Freedom Party stronghold with 28 respondents 
(90.3%) claiming to support the organisation, and only three 
respondents (10%) belonging to other organisations. Ten of the 
respondents (32.25%) had joined the organisation before 1990\ 
while 13 (41.9%) respondents joined in 1990 and 7 (22.6%) joined 
in 1991.
Their reasons for joining the organisation differed from person
to person. A discernable pattern was that the Zulu- speaking
hostel dwellers joined the organisation because of its
articulation of their Zulu aspirations. This is captured by one
respondent who claimed that:
"Ngaba yilongo le Nkatha (IFP) ngoba kwiyiyona 
nhlangano yodwa elwela ilungelo lama Zulu" (I joined 
the IFP because it was the only organisation that 
represents the aspiration of all the Zulus) 
(Respondent no. 17, hostel resident).
This is a clear expression of the ethnic nationalism described 
in Chapter two above. The non-Zulu Meadowlands hostel residents
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claimed to have joined the organisation because of its ability 
to protect its members.
Only seven respondents (22.6%) could articulate the aims and the 
ideals of the organisation while 24 (77.4%) respondents gave 
vague statements about the organisation's objectives. From the 
scant information this researcher received, it is possible to 
infer that no thorough explanation of aims and ideals was given 
to members during meetings.
All respondents (100%) unanimously agreed that only Inkatha 
meetings were held regularly in the hostel. Two types of 
meetings held in the hostel were identifiable; formal meetings 
that were held once a week, particularly on Sunday mornings, and 
informal meetings that were held on an ad hoc basis whenever 
there was a problem.
Again all residents claimed that hostel meetings were for hostel 
residents exclusively and no township people were allowed to 
attend. They claimed that with suspicion running very high it 
would be a dangerous move to allow township people to attend 
these meetings. They felt that sensitive information could 
easily have leaked out, which would have endangered the lives of 
all hostel inhabitants.
Similar sentiments were raised against the organisation holding 
meetings in the township. All respondents claimed that it would 
not benefit the hostel residents to hold meetings in the township
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because of the strong possibility of being attacked by township 
people.
(vi) Relations with township residents
Township residents have coined various derogatory names for 
hostel dwellers which accentuate their aloofness from the hostel 
and demonstrate their general attitude of contempt. Historically 
hostels have been geographically secluded from the adjacent 
communities but the 1977 Kliptown floods obliterated this 
phenomenon. The clear distinction between the hostel and the 
Meadowlands community became blurred as hundreds of members of 
the Kliptown community moved into the Meadowlands hostel. 
Relationships, "vat-en-sit" (live-in lovers), and marriages 
proliferated.
Most respondents claimed that the relationship between the hostel 
inmates and the townships improved a great deal during the 1977 - 
1990 period. Hostel inmates began to see themselves as residents
of Meadowlands township rather than just of the hostel:
:* i
r~ . . . .‘I spent lot of my time with my new in-laws in Zone one
Meadowlands. I go to the hostel only to visit my 
father and my relatives, particularly on weekends. I 
was slowly seeing myself as a township person, so did 
many of my colleagues who were in similar positions, 
[only traditional marks on our faces and our deep Zulu 
laccents remained conspicuous, and eventually sold us 
i]but when the violence broke out. I was forced to 
separate from my wife and my son who I have never seen 
ever since just because I once belong to the hostel 
and I am a Zulu (Respondent no. 8, hostel resident).
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However relations deteriorated markedly after 1991. There was 
a clear divide between the two communities, concretised by a* 
strip of bombed-out houses which divided the hostel from Zone one 
Meadowlands where one respondent - Bkekani Mthiyane's family was 
located. If he dared to venture to visit his girlfriend and son, 
he would have been a marked man, as he said, "I am sure I would 
never see the sun rise again".
The same sentiments were echoed by twenty-one (68%) other hostel 
respondents who claimed that their separation was forced upon 
them by the township residents. Educational institutions such 
as schools were situated in the townships, and as the result, 
hostel children did not go to school for fear of beatings and 
harassment. Doctors' surgeries, Community Health Centres, 
clinics and a hospital were all in the townships. Even ambulance 
drivers did not want to drive into the hostel. Sick and injured 
hostel dwellers relied on traditional healers, or were driven 
kilometres away to Coronationville or to white hospitals in town 
(Respondent nos. 9,11,13 and 14; hostel residents).
5. VIOLENCE IN AND AROUND MEADOWLANDS HOSTEL 1990 - 1993
Violence in the Meadowlands hostel began in March 1991 between 
the hostel inmates themselves in what was tantamount to "ethnic 
cleansing"; Zulu-speaking residents of the hostel ejected Xhosa- 
speaking residents. Twenty four Xhosa speaking inmates died in 
that confrontation (Key informant no. 3).
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There were many factors which made the Meadowlands hostel a 
centre of violent confrontation between inmates and township 
residents. What emerged after interviewing hostel inmates about 
the violence was that although Zulu-speaking hostel inmates were 
often blamed for the conflict, it was not this entire social 
category who were violently inclined. A substantial number of 
older migrants, particularly those who had been around 
Johannesburg for more than ten years were sick and tired of 
violence, and were doing everything they could to create peace 
between the two communities. Their efforts were overridden by 
factors beyond their control, specifically they felt that the 
younger generation of migrants had become uncontrollable. Most 
of the migrants interviewed came from rural areas of Natal where 
a long and established tradition of violence reigned. Most 
informants believed that the Reef violence was a continuation of 
what they call the "Natal war".
Seventeen of the respondents (54.84%) believed that the conflict 
was caused by the "bully boy tactics" of the ANC which they 
claimed wanted to be "the only bull in the kraal". They claimed 
that:
The Xhosa-led ANC thinks that it can rule over the 
Zulus. Where have you seen "ixhosa" (derogatory for 
i small man) leading a great nation like the Zulu 
jnation. We will fight to put the Zulu-led Inkatha ye 
sizwe back to the throne (Respondent no. 16, hostel 
resident).
This comment illustrates the politicisation of ethnicity referred 
to above in Chapter Two. The other ten (32.26%) respondents
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believed that socio-economic factors were major contributory
factors in Natal violence. Most of them believed that:
The rate of unemployment is higher in rural Natal, 
very few school leavers find employment over there.
This phenomena is further exacerbated by a large 
number of people who are retrenched and had to go back 
to their rural homes because in here they will not be 
able to pay for their rent, services and food 
(Respondent no. 11, hostel resident).
The other four (12.9%) respondents attributed the violence in 
Natal to faction fighting (impi yezigodi). They believed it was 
hard to separate political conflict from faction fighting. They 
claimed that in areas like Mondlo, Nkandla and Msinga there were 
different regions that had neatly divided themselves into 
political regions, some belonged to the ANC, others to Inkatha 
and they continued to fight.
A large proportion of the respondents, twenty-two in number 
(71%), believed that the conflict on the Reef was the continua­
tion of the conflict in Natal. The reason advanced for this 
argument was that:
... our brothers in Reef hostels are being killed 
just for being Zulus and members of the IFP but when 
we retaliate by defending them and ourselves we are 
then labelled troublemakers and perpetrators of 
violence (Respondent no. 28, hostel resident).
Only nine people (29%) believed that the Reef conflict was a
township versus hostel conflict. To these people:
township people have always looked down upon us as 
uncivilised low class people that still adhere to old 
fashioned traditional norms and values. They scorned 
us in buses, trains and taxis us people who do not 
wash their feet and armpits. We have become their 
children's laughing stock and source of mockery and
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play. Even Christians of high magnitude would have 
defended themselves against these ridicules 
(Respondent no. 12, hostel resident).
Nineteen respondents (61%) perceived the current violence as
"war" because of the scale and intensity of political violence.
In a "war" situation many homes are left with lots of 
widows, single mothers and sometimes many orphans.
South Africa's black townships and hostels does not 
differ from countries that are at war (Respondent no.
14, hostel resident).
Twelve (39%) respondents perceived this as violence and not
"war". One of the respondents asserted that the anarchic nature
of the violence and the absence of restraining norms meant that
the conflict it was not a war.
A war is fought by strong men and not sp^ll_.„fe©ys 
(abafanyana nje) as it is the case in this situation.
And again in a war situation a woman is respected, if 
you dare kill her, the whole operation will fail 
because "intelezi" (muti sprinkled in a war situation) 
will be affected by this. This is again not the case 
in this situation as women and children are indis­
criminately killed every day and nothing happens 
(Respondent no. 31, hostel resident).
Ironically more than 50% of the respondents had arrived in the
hostel once the "war" was already raging, and thus do not know
when it actually started. This situation is best explained by
one respondent (No. 9) who claimed: "I do not know when and how
the violence started in this hostel. There was a "war" (imp!)
when we arrived" When the respondent was asked whether he was
afraid to go into a hostel involved in violence, he replied:
No! how could we be afraid, if we claimed to be real 
Zulu men we can't really afford to be afraid of a 
"war". We do not want to be seen to be behaving like 
Johannesburg men who behave like women. Johannesburg
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men do not fight, but send the children'''to fight the 
"war" for them. What kind of^lmen are'they? That is 
why our brothers kill them so easily in the train. 
They do not fight back, but throw themselves out of 
moving trains. Can you call these people "men"? Some } 
of them die in their pyjamas without even fighting i 
back (Respondent no 13, hostel resident).
This comment illustrates the theme of militarised masculinity 
described above in Chapter Two.
Those respondents who were in the hostel longer than ten years 
tended to link the current violence to the first serious clash 
between Meadowlands hostel and the surrounding townships in 1976. 
These tensions deepened over hostel resistance to the UDF call 
to boycott white shops over the Christmas of 1985. These 
differences left scars in the minds of hostel residents that made 
it difficult for them to separate the current strife from that 
of the past.
Six of the respondents (19%) , who had Standard 10 education 
located the genesis of this violence in March 1991 when non-Zulu 
speaking inmates and ANC sympathizers were raided and forcefully 
driven out of the hostel in March 1991.
Hostel inmates variously regarded township residents, the ANC and
"the youth" as their enemy. Thirteen respondents, (42%)
perceived every township dweller as an enemy. Some of them
expressed a strong antagonism to "township people":
The township people, all of them, men, women and 
children are our enemies. It must be an eye for an 
eye, when their children who call themselvescomrades 
see any of the hostel inmates in the township, they
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kill and necklace him or her. Why should we not do 
the same? (Respondent no. 22, hostel resident).
Seven (23%) of the respondents perceived only members of the ANC 
as their enemies. Eight respondents, (26%) perceived township 
youth or comrades as their enemies. They maintained that the 
conflict with the township youth began long before the current 
political violence, and was rooted in criminal attacks. They 
believed that the township youth perceived them as targets and 
claimed that for decades township youths, dubbed tsotsis or 
comrades by hostel inmates, had been robbing and molesting 
migrants at will.
Three (10%) respondents believed that the enemy was any person 
who regard them as enemies. This group was aware that not all 
township residents or youths were their enemies. They also 
believed that not all ANC members regarded them as their enemies.
Some believed that all strangers were enemies.
It is easy to identify your enemy, particularly when 
he lives in the township. Any person we do not know 
is the enemy to us (Respondent no. 13, hostel 
resident).
A very large number, twenty eight respondents, (90%) believed 
that the language which people speak and their dress codes were 
not the best forms of identifying their enemies. Most hostel 
dwellers particularly the younger ones, emulated the urban;
I
township style of dress which could easily have categorised them 
as urban youths.
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During the 1990 - 1993 period most of the notorious killings and
massacres on the Reef occurred in areas that had hostels nearby.
A high level of militaristic organisation was displayed by groups
of what appeared to be, highly trained young hostel dwellers.
There were persistent reports from Meadowlands township residents
of police arming, transporting, and assisting hostel -based
attackers and being the last line of defence for Meadowlands
hostel inmates. This observation is supported by Nkosenkulu
Maphalala who claimed that:
We do not organise attacks against the communities, 
ry but tye defend purselyes^’"against them,. And let me tell 
cT ' you something for nothing; the best form of defence is 
attack, because once your enemy attack you first, you 
will be lucky to see the sun rise again (Respondent no 
17, hostel resident).
Twenty one respondents (68%), who claimed that they were informed 
in advance when attacks were going to take place. A team of 
Inkatha organisers would arrive at the hostel and would call a 
meeting of all Zulu-speaking inmates and instruct them to ready 
themselves for an impending onslaught by "comrades", who were 
coming to demolish the hostel. The residents would be urged to 
take cognisance of the fact that the best form of defence was to 
attack first. One of the respondents confirmed that: "We always 
organise in retaliation, just like they plan their attacks on us 
we plan it too" (Respondent no. 9, hostel resident).
The other ten (32%) , which included non-Zulu speaking respondents 
and older Zulu-speaking inmates claimed that they were not 
informed in advance when attacks were going to be launched. They
claimed that they were always informed at the eleventh hour and 
were forced to join the fighting.
The changing demography of hostel inmates mentioned previously 
also affected the leadership of the Meadowlands hostel. ^ ~Young 
and highly trained Inkatha Youth Brigade members seemed to have 
usurped the leadership of the hostel from the tribal authority 
of the indunas. Their leadership was confirmed by sixteen 
respondents (52%), one of whom claimed that:
I’* yintsha engashisi, equ'zumentshisi" (we
articufat^i7 ,p yout^fui leadership that is sharp and articulate) (Respondent no.7, hostel resident).,
This is further strengthened by Bill Keller's assertion that:
T hOStel ^efense' Inkatha has deployed men
who^avsShe ka' ®k.inny. and voluble 21-year-oldwho says he hasrlearned his military skills as a teen-
recruit in the military wing of the ANC. He
studied weapons and tactics at ANC centres in Angola
East Germany and Tanzania before a falling out landed
him in a camp for traitors. Upon his return home he
Zlilt ho^t jfhich sent him first to anotherhostel called Nancefield and then to 
Meadowlands in June (Keller, 1992: 49).k
Several neighbouring township residents claimed that there were 
people who were bused into the hostel whose duties were to foment 
and sustain the violence for as long as they were in the hostel.
All thirty one people, (100%) interviewed were unanimous in 
mentioning one of the following weapons as frequently used by 
hostel dwellers against township people: AK-47's, R4 automatic! 
rifles, pistols, Ri rifles, shotguns and pistols, handguns,!
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knives, axes, spears and knobkierries, sharpened iron poles, 
sticks, tomahawks, pangas and machetes.
Reports of arms coming into Meadowlands hostel were rife during 
the height of the violence between hostel inmates and township 
residents in August 1992. Residents of Mzimhlophe township, 
particularly those who lived in houses facing the hostel entrance 
gate claimed to have seen police and white men in plain clothes 
offloading weapons for hostel dwellers.
The arms traffic changed the way hostel dwellers approached the
attacks they launched into the township. Most of the fierce
attacks were made during the night. When interviewees were asked
why they mostly fought at night, thirteen respondents, (42%)
believed that at night everybody was at home resting in
preparation for the next day.
We know that township men are like women, they are all 
either drunk or asleep at night. So we attack them in 
the comfort of their pyjamas. Where have you seen a 
man sleeping in pyjamas? (Respondent no. 9, hostel 
resident).
Eleven (35%) respondents believed that nightfall protected them 
from being seen by their enemies and by the police. Furthermore 
it is difficult for people to run away when it is dark, most 
people get caught during the confusion. The night time raids 
also enabled hostel dwellers to loot people's houses and then to 
disappear into the safety of the hostel with the loot.
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Seven (23%) of the older hostel dwellers believed that nighttime
attacks had to do with traditional ways of fighting war, where! '
the entire regiment had to be: ^
"ngwekwesiko amabutho uma ephuma kumelwe achelwe 
ngezintelezi, manje ezinye zihambisana nobumnyama 
basebusuku kanti nezitha zisuke zijumekile ubuthongo 
zingazelele lutho bese kumbozwa ngehlahla labe 
sivakashele khona" (be sprinkled with "muti" because 
some of those traditional herbs are associated with 
forces of darkness that compels the enemy to fall 
asleep as we discern to attack them) (Respondent no.
28, hostel resident).
6. CONCLOSION
This chapter has attempted to draw a sociological profile of 
Meadowlands Hostel. It has done so by firstly describing its 
physical location in Soweto and then outlining a history of 
Meadowlands Hostel from its establishment in 1962. This history 
is analyzed in two phases, pre and post 1976. The events of this 
year were decisive; after 1976 the relationship between hostel 
and township residents was predominantly characterised by 
conflict and antagonism.
The chapter then attempted to draw a social profile of 
contemporary hostel residents emphasizing the growing influx of 
youth and female migrants, as well as unemployed migrants. The 
chapter also analyzed the social organisation of the hostel with 
reference to leadership structures, leisure activities, political 
organisation, economic activities and relations with township 
residents.
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The final section analyses the political violence in and around 
Meadowlands Hostel during the 1990 - 1993 period focusing on the 
perceptions of hostel inmates. It is suggested that the pattern 
of increasing political violence is mainly due to the influx of 
younger, Zulu speaking men originating from the rural areas of 
Natal and supporters of Inkatha. It is this group who were 
involved in the destabilisation of the surrounding community.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A SOCIOLOGICAL PROFILE OF MERAFE HOSTEL
1. INTRODUCTION
As with Meadowlands hostel, Merafe hostel was built in the
early 1960's. It's establishment generated much frustration
and a sense of helplessness in neighbouring communities. This
is best expressed by a key informant who said:
We had to sit back and watch the emergence of what 
was to be the last hostel in the area we call the 
"wild west". The hostel was built without overt 
opposition from its neighbouring communities. 
Unlike the people of Sophiatown who mourned the 
destruction of their well established community - 
we bemoaned the birth of a fostered community. 
Because we neither had any political nor economic 
power to resist its emergence, we learned to cope 
by turning the lemon into a lemonade - we accepted 
the community that lives in it, not the hostel 
(Key informant no. 6, Township resident).
For decades Merafe hostel was at peace with neighbouring 
township residents to the extent that the hostel dwellers 
would call from inside the hostel window to any township child 
and send him\her to the shop without fear that the child might 
abscond with the money.j. Inmates cemented relationships with 
neighbouring communities by buying presents for township 
residents in preparation for the visit of their wives or
relatives, particularly those who were not allowed into the
r~
hostel. They did this hoping that such township residents 
would offer hospitality to visiting relatives.:, This 
harmonious relationship was destroyed by the violence which 
first began on the Reef towards the end of August 1990.
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Merafe hostel became the first hostel to erupt into violent 
confrontation with its neighbouring communities of Mapetla, 
Mapetla Extension, Naledi Extension, Tladi and Moletsane.
2. A HISTORY OF MERAFE HOSTEL
Mapetla township is situated about 20 kilometres west of 
Johannesburg, bounded on the northern side by two 
predominately Sotho-speaking townships, Moletsane and Tladi. 
The eastern side is bounded by another predominately Sotho- 
speaking township, Molapo. On the southern side it is 
bordered by a predominately Tsonga- and Venda-speaking 
township, Chiawelo.
The township of Mapetla was built in the mid 1950's as a by­
product of the Group Areas Act, when existing mixed townships, 
i.e. townships with the population of Indians, Coloureds and 
Blacks and Chinese were dismantled. Blacks were to be 
isolated in areas defined as "Bantu Areas" where all 
individuals not classified either as White, Coloured or Indian 
were to be dumped. Ethnic grouping was to be enforced and 
Soweto was divided into three basic main groups, Nguni, Sotho 
and "other".
Within Mapetla township a hostel was built which was 
officially named Mapetla hostel. Its name changed to Merafe 
hostel because of its proximity to Merafe station. Merafe 
hostel is a maze-like, colossal, grey structure that was built
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in 1962 between four locations, Mapetla, Mapetla Extension, 
Chiawelo Extension 3 and Moletsane. On the north-eastern 
side, the hostel was separated by Masilela street from 
Mapetla, an area that was predominately zoned for Sotho 
speaking people. On the northern side, the hostel was divided 
by a railway line from Moletsane township, also a township 
that was built for Sotho-speaking people.
Like most hostels in South Africa, Merafe hostel was conceived 
as part of the apartheid ideology to house hundreds of 
thousands of single men, most of whom had left families in the 
homelands in search of job opportunities in the city of Gold. 
Unlike Meadowlands hostel and the vast majority of hostels in 
South African townships which were located on the fringes of 
the townships, Merafe hostel was one of two hostels in Soweto 
which was built within the township. It was characterised by 
its close proximity to all four townships surrounding it, all 
of which were predominately Sotho-speaking.
It was partly this proximity to the four townships that 
enabled the inmates from this hostel to form harmonious 
relationships with the people from these townships. The 
peculiar characteristic that distinguished Merafe hostel from 
most of the hostels in Soweto was that it was separated by a 
single brick wall built adjoining each outer structure as 
compared to most hostels which were fenced in.
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In the late 1960's, the hostel inmates together with the 
township residents demolished this brick wall to enable an 
easy passage for both hostel and township residents to visit 
each other. The passage was mainly used by Mapetla Extension 
residents who live on the south-western side of the hostel. 
As Sophie Motsumi said:
We used to cross right through the heart of the 
hostel on our way to and from work. This path was 
used by males, females and children without 
incidents. The only problem was when the hostel 
inmates were drunk particularly on weekends, when 
they would scold and insult us even in front of our 
husbands. Other than that we were just a big happy 
family (Respondent no 14, hostel resident).
On several occasions the West Rand Administration Board (WRAB) 
rebuilt and closed this wall in its endeavour to keep the 
hostel dwellers apart from the township residents in 
compliance with the grand apartheid plan of keeping races, 
communities, and ethnic groups apart. In 1984 the National 
Housing Commission approved an advance of 26 million rand to 
the Soweto Council in order to extend and enlarge the 
following hostels: Mapetla, Dube and Jabulane, because of the 
unavailability of land in Soweto for the construction of new 
hostels. The better part of the budget allocated to the 
Merafe hostel was used for rebuilding the wall (Race Relations 
Survey, 1984: 390), which was done irrespective of the number 
of times hostel inmates and township residents demolished the 
wall.
Merafe hostel consisted of fifteen dormitories popularly known 
as "hostel blocks". Each dormitory was about fifty paces long
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and consisted of one door that led to a medium-sized kitchen
rwith one coal stove m  the middle. The floors of the dormi­
tories were bare, rough cemented and dust-laden. The place 
was gloomy, and worsened by windows that had not been cleaned 
since the hostel was built in the early 1960's. This marks 
one of the differences between the hostel and the township 
community. In the township, particularly over weekends, women 
compete by washing windows and hanging expensive curtains 
which have become a symbol of their class and status. Most 
of the township women join "mogodiswano" (stokvels) called 
"kitchen parties" where exchange of curtains and other 
household goods take place. s By contrast women in the hostel 
had resigned themselves to being temporary sojourners and they 
lacked a sense of pride and belonging.
 ^On each side of the kitchen there were two smaller cubicles 
that housed eight people each, which made sixteen men to a 
dormitory, a number which increased three fold after the 
collapse of the hostel security arrangement in the post-1976 
period.
Each kitchen consisted of two tables which were made of cement 
slabs anchored by sewerage pipes. Two taps of cold and hot 
water protruded from the sink. Long steel cabinets lined the 
side walls where inmates stored everything from food to 
clothes. Inside walls were not plastered and they were made 
to look more depressing by unceilinged asbestos roofs which
143
were "coated with thick layers of soot and spider-webs" 
(Matshoba, 1987: 224).
There were a number of other distinguishing features that gave 
the Merafe hostel features of a rural location. Township 
residents beautify their homes by planting flowers in their 
backyards and by paving their motorways. The hostel 
neighbourhood on the other hand consistently looked 
unappealing and drab though every available space was filled 
with mealie plants. , This suggested that the hostel was 
regarded as a little piece of rural South Africa relocated in 
the city.
The history of the Meadowlands hostel is best understood in 
terms of two historical phases. The first phase covers the 
period in which the hostel was built in 1962 when the first 
occupants of the hostel formed harmonious relationships with 
neighbouring communities. The second phase is the post-1990 
period when social order in the hostel disintegrated; older 
inmates who belonged to non-Zulu ethnic groups were ejected 
from the hostel. The hostel then provided a fertile ground 
for nurturing chauvinistic tribalism.
When this hostel was built in the 1960's, it was meant to 
house an official figure of 5 045, single males who were 
prohibited from staying with either their spouses or their 
children (Key informant no. 9, Soweto Council spokesperson). 
However in 1986, "...due to the repealing of influx control
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and the demise of the Soweto Council's tight control over 
hostels in the mid-1980's, people started flocking in the 
hostel in huge numbers" (Respondent no. 14, hostel resident).
According to one informant in the 1962 - 1990 period hostel
residents were older people.
...people who migrated to Johannesburg and 
inhabited Merafe hostel were largely of middle age, 
and some of them have been to the city before and 
had a fair working knowledge of the city life and 
the dynamics of township and hostel politics (Key 
informant no. 9, Council spokesperson).
However after August 1990 the inflow of new inmates bore the
r~
hallmark of a planned campaign. The age profile of the hostel 
changed; instead of the middle and early old age mixture of 
earlier times, Merafe hostel came to be characterised by the 
presence of a constantly high number of young men, who were 
available to wage war against township youth^
The entry of these youth into the hostel was understood by one 
key informant as part of a planned and calculated strategy of 
destabilisation:
Their mission seems as clear as day light, that is 
to destabilise townships adjacent the hostel 
through promoting a so called Zulu/Xhosa or hostel/ 
township war. Like in the case of Meadowlands 
hostel, they first brought what appear to be highly 
trained, mainly Youth Brigade leaders whose 
knowledge of the township and urban warfare was 
unquestionable (Key informant no. 3, Mapetla Civic 
leader)
These youth occupied strategic positions within the hostel 
structures, breaking the monopoly of the Induna system. They
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either ignored the prevailing hostel Indunas or removed them. 
Their leadership role was not guestioned by their subjects 
because of the raging violence. They were seen as the 
solution to the monstrous township "comrades". They were 
articulate, well armed and vicious (Key informant no. 7, AZAPO 
spokesperson).
3. SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY MERAFE HOSTEL 
INMATES
(i) Age profile
TABLE 2: AGE PROFILE OF MERAFE HOSTEL INMATES
AGE 10-30 ■31-40 41-50 51-60 61 ±
NO OF PEOPLE 32 11 6 2 -
A general pattern of youthfulness in Merafe hostel was 
discernable. Of the 51 people interviewed, 32 (63%) were 
between the ages 10 and 30. Eleven (22%) were between the 
ages 31-40. Seven (14%) were between the ages 41-50 and only 
two (4%) were between the ages 51-60.
This change in age structure had a deep impact on the sub­
culture of Merafe hostel. The "young migrants" or "youth" 
(intsha) as they preferred to call themselves, were linked to 
criminal activities in the minds of several informants. They 
were described by a key informant as:
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. .'.people who had not only formed a strong regiment 
to unleash violence against the township residents, 
but were able to integrate well with the township 
"car hijackers" and the gangsters who use the 
hostel as a place of relative security. \
This informant went on to say:
The particular problem with Merafe hostel emanate 
from the harbouring of the township car hijackers 
call "SULA" (sweep), who specialise in hijacking 
mini-bus taxis and other private vehicles. These 
gangsters or car hijackers were harassed by police 
in the township almost daily, they then sought 
refuge in Merafe hostel while becoming nominal 
members of the Inkatha Freedom Party. While using 
the hostel as a base and for protection they 
continue their criminal activities harassing the 
passing motorists and the residents alike.
This statement was supported by another informant (No.11) who 
asserted that:
Motorists dare not drive past the hostel half an 
hour before sunset lest they play into the hands of 
the thugs from the hostel rwho also rob and kill 
people indiscriminately. Cars are hijacked and 
taken inside the hostel because no police dare 
enter the hostel to recover them. Girls are 
jackrolled into the hostel in broad day light and 
police are doing nothing to save our children from 
these hostel rapists^(Key informant no 11, township 
resident).
Thus Merafe hostel became a zone of terror to township 
residents.
(ii) Rural origins
Similarities between the Meadowlands and the Merafe hostels 
were discernable in that an overwhelming majority, 39 
residents interviewed, (76%) came from Natal and Kwa Zulu, 
with the Eastern Transvaal as the second largest source of
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recruitment. Seven of the residents (14%) came from the 
Eastern Transvaal township of Wesselton in Ermelo, four of the 
residents (8%) came from Harrismith in the Free State and only 
one resident (2%) deserted Zondi township in Soweto.
Those who came from various places in Natal spoke Zulu and 
claimed to be Zulus, those who came from the Eastern Transvaal 
spoke Pedi and Setswana. Five of the respondents were Bapedi 
(pedis) and two respondents were Batswana (Tswanas). Those 
who came from Orange Free State spoke Sesotho and Zulu and 
claimed to be Basothos who lived on the fringes of the Free 
State bordering Natal.
A large number of people interviewed, 33 (65%) came to
Johannesburg between 1990 and 1991. ? It was strange that all 
of a sudden in the 1990's Merafe hostel experienced an influx 
of rural people who came to inhabit the hostel amidst the 
violent confrontations between the residents of the hostel and 
the township. Ten (20%) of the respondents came to 
Johannesburg between 1980 and 1990, and only eight (16%) of 
the people interviewed came to Johannesburg in the 1970's and 
in the period before that.
Most of the respondents said they chose Johannesburg over Cape
Town because of the job opportunities. The feeling of this
group is best captured by the following:
"Igoli yilona okwiyidolobha elikhulu futhi 
nezimboni zabe ziningi, kukhona ngisho nezimayini 
lapho ngafikela khona ngiqala ukusebenza". ("Igoli" 
is the only big town that has most factories and
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mines. It is the first town that introduced me to 
urban life) (Respondent no. 9).
(iii) Marital status
■ Of the 51 people interviewed, 32 (63%) were single and had
never been married. Fourteen (27%) were married and either 
lived with their wives in the hostel or had left their wives 
in the rural areas. Three (6%) of the interviewees were 
divorced and two (4%) were widowers with both of them having 
lost their wives in the current violence. ,
Most of the people interviewed in the Merafe hostel had
rchildren, unlike in the Meadowlands hostel where only a very
small proportion of people interviewed had children. In
Merafe hostel a large proportion of people interviewed, 38,
(75%) had children. The issue of children was not only
confined to the married migrants. Of those who were single,
seventeen (53%) had one or two children with different women
in their respective places of origin. The overwhelming
majority, 25 (93%) of married migrants had between three and
nine children each. . Two of those who did not have children
were desperately trying to have their wives conceive. )Their
plight was articulated by one of them as follows:
We have previously tried every witch doctor 
recommended to us by our peers or relatives with no 
avail, and now as a proof of our desperation, we 
have brought our wives to the cities amid the 
violence to try the white men's medicine as a last 
resort (Respondent no. 33, hostel resident).\
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This points to the deep seated nature of gender identity among 
some informants. The content of this identity and in 
particular the relation between fathering children and 
masculinity is an issue that requires further research.
The dominant perception among hostel inmates was that hostels 
were places for adults and not children. Twenty one (41%) 
respondents said they did not want their children joining them 
in the hostel. This group included a large number of the 
middle-aged traditionalist migrants who still believed 
strongly in old fashioned traditional values which they feared 
could easily be corrupted by the urban environment.
By contrast 15 (29%) respondents, who were largely drawn from 
the group of younger hostel dwellers, preferred their children 
to be in the hostel rather than sending them back to the 
drought stricken and violence-ridden rural areas, j' Most of 
this group had escaped from these environments and they were 
loathe to see their children brought up under similar 
conditions.>
I know how it is to grow up yearning to grow up 
beside your father while my peer group were running 
home to their father every night. I vowed that I 
would never let it happen to them because I have 
walked that road for them (Respondent no. 7, hostel 
resident).
(iv) Educational profile of hostel inmates
The level of illiteracy in Merafe hostel was very high.
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^Sixteen people interviewed (31%) had no formal education at 
all, while fifteen interviewees (29%) had between Standard 1 
and Standard 3 education. Eight people interviewed (16%) had 
between Standard 4 and Standard 6 education while six had 
Standard 10 education. Only three respondents claimed to have 
any post-matric qualification.
(v) Employment profile
The majority of the residents of this hostel were unemployed - 
34 (67%) of the people interviewed were unemployed. Those 
in full-time employment were low-income earners who did 
unskilled work that ranged from being security guards to flat-
r-
cleaners. Of these unskilled workers, five (10%) security 
guards earned between R500 and R1000 per month. Three (6%) 
were flat cleaners who earned between R500 and R750 per month. 
Two (4%) were hotel porters who earned R1500 per month.; Five 
of the respondents (10%) worked as taxi drivers most of them 
in taxis owned by hostel inmates.% This last point illustrates 
the heterogeneity of hostel inmates. Taxi owners were clearly 
of a much higher socio-economic status than most of the 
inmates.
However they were not popular figures. It was these taxi 
drivers who were blamed for fomenting the train violence in 
order to boost the taxi industry. From July 1990 to late 1993 
attacks on commuters on Soweto trains took place near or 
around stations bordering the hostels. In eleven of these
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incidents were 73 people were killed and 265 injured between 
August and December 1993. According to several key informants 
Merafe hostel inmates were involved.
Only a fraction of the inmates worked for taxis owned by 
township residents. Only two (4%) of the respondents worked 
in the semi-skilled sector of the job market. Both of these 
respondents worked as clerks in the Soweto Council Offices 
which were located inside the Merafe hostel itself. They 
earned R1350 and R1665 respectively.
(vi) Unionisation among Merafe hostel inmates
Most of the employed inhabitants of Merafe hostel were not 
unionised. This suggests a shift from Sitas's findings on the 
emergence of unions in the East Rand in the 1980's that the 
East Rand hostel migrants, faced with the rural collapse and 
growing retrenchments built a strong union that was able to 
articulate their demands (Sitas, 1983).
Only five (29%) of the respondents who were in full time 
employment belonged to a union. One security guard belonged 
to the National Education Health Allied Workers Union 
(NEHAWU). Both hotel porters belonged to the South African 
Catering Commercial Workers Union (SACCWU), and both the 
Soweto Council Employees belonged to the South African 
Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU). All these unions are 
affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions
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(COSATU). This change in patterns of unionisation reflected 
the changes in the social composition of the hostel that 
occurred between 1980 and 1990.
(vii) Ethnic composition
A large number of people interviewed, 41 (80%) claimed that 
only one ethnic group, the Zulus occupied the hostels. However 
10 (20%) respondents claimed that there were a number of other 
ethnics groups, even Xhosas, who shared their hostel rooms. 
Ethnic groups mentioned by informants were Southern Sothos, 
Zulus, Pedis, Vendas and Xhosas.
A number of informants referred to a block called 
"Zonk'izizwe" (a block housing different ethnic groups) . This 
researcher suspects that there was an attempt to camouflage 
the fact that this hostel had become a predominantly Zulu 
enclave. A total of 6 (12%) respondents claimed that, in the 
same way as in the Meadowlands hostel, Zulu-speaking hostel 
dwellers stayed in the same blocks as each other in order to 
ensure their control of the institution. Seven respondents 
(14%) said they did not know and were not aware of these 
ethnic divisions.
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4. THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF MERAFE HOSTEL
(i) Inmates perceptions of hostel life
Merafe hostel, like Meadowlands hostel did not inspire deep
loyalties among all of its inmates. Most of the respondents
felt that if they had cheap alternative accommodation they
would not wish to see themselves living in a hostel. \ This
validates Can Themba's assertion that, "For many of them it
is just a place to lay down a weary head, and a shelter from
the dust or rain” (Themba, 1985: 117). Living conditions were
mostly overcrowded, dirty and unhealthy. This is best
captured by a Merafe hostel leader who angrily asserted that:
This is not a fit place for human inhabitant. Where 
on earth have you seen a place were on average 16 
people to a block in two groups of eight and 
sometimes more are forced to sleep? It would be an 
insult even to the animal kingdom if animals could 
be squeezed like this under one roof (Respondent no 
6, hostel resident).
For many inmates it was only the economic constraint of high 
rents and the violence that had already claimed thousands of 
lives and destroyed the fabric of black society that kept them 
from seeking alternative accommodation in the adjacent 
townships.
In spite of the distressing conditions in the Merafe hostel, 
there were people who had spent two decades of their lives 
there. Two (4%) of the oldest residents had been in the 
hostel for 20 years. Thirteen respondents (25%) had been
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residents in the hostel for eleven years. Eight hostel 
dwellers (16%) had stayed in the hostel for six years. The 
largest number of respondents,' 23 (45%) had arrived in the 
Merafe hostel in 1990 and afterwards. It is argued below that 
it was this group of relative newcomers who were responsible 
for much of the political violence between 1990 and 1993.
Only four of the 23 people interviewed (45%) came straight 
from rural Natal into Merafe hostel; the other 19 respondents 
(37%) had lived in other hostels before coming to Merafe 
hostel. All these hostels had been flash points for violent 
conflicts between hostel inmates and township residents.
Thirteen respondents (25%) came to live in the Merafe hostel 
through various social networks, such as relatives, and 
"homeboy" networks. Nine interviewees (18%) arrived because 
of calls by village indunas who disseminated information that 
there were plenty of job opportunities for young and middle 
aged men on the Reef. Sixteen (31%) were recruited by various 
security companies with promises of well paid secure jobs that 
would provide them with uniforms including bullet proof vests, 
training, and armaments. These promises were attractive to 
the scores of unemployed rural youth who were living in 
violence-ridden areas. Seven respondents (14%) came out of 
curiosity. .
I wanted to grab the opportunity of venturing out 
to the big city of Johannesburg - kwa ndonga 
ziyaduma, kwa mfaz'ushayindoda ngemfaduko (the city 
of the rambling mountains were women beat their 
husbands). I have heard so much about Johannesburg.
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When the opportunity availed itself I grabbed it 
with both my hands (Respondent no. 13).
Only six of the respondents came because they were running
away from the violence that had already claimed hundreds of
lives in their home areas of Natal. *
...there was no way we could go back. At least 
here we can seek protection in the hostel. At home 
there is no place to hide unless in your own grave 
(Respondent no. 21, hostel resident).
For many of them it was a matter of choosing the better of two 
evils. The countryside had long ceased to be a safe haven 
since the advent of political violence in the 1980's. The 
violence coupled with the poverty and drought that pervades 
the rural areas of Natal/KwaZulu were powerful "push" factors.
Despite living under these bad conditions, a substantial
number of the respondents were determined to make Merafe
hostel their home. For most of them appalling living
conditions appeared to be better than spending their rest of
their lives under open skies or highways or in violence-torn
rural areas. This perspective was articulated by 25
respondents (49%) one of whom claimed:
We saw nothing wrong in living in the hostel. To 
us conditions in this hostel were not different 
from the conditions in the rural areas with one 
exception, here (in the urban area) you only become 
hungry because you are lazy. There are many ways 
to survive in the urban areas even if it is putting 
your life into your hands every day. At least you 
survive (Respondent no. 8, hostel resident).
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On the other hand seventeen respondents (33%) found living in 
the hostel intolerable. Nine respondents (18%) were neutral; 
one claimed that:
. . . there is no difference between the two 
dwellings. The only difference we can claim to see 
is that in the rural areas we stay with our 
families and our girlfriends are only a stone throw 
from our homes whereas in the hostel we have to 
produce instant families who most of them exploit 
our loneliness as migrants just to milk us and dump 
us after they have finished our money (Respondent 
no. 23).
(ii) Rent payment in the hostel
The high level of unemployment among hostel inmates made it 
difficult for hostel dwellers to pay rent. The figure 
supplied by the Soweto Town Council shows that more than 75% 
of hostel residents stoppfed paying their rent in 1992 (Key 
informant no. 9, Council spokesperson). Most of the Council 
structures had already collapsed by then.
The majority of the respondents, 37 (73%) claimed that they 
did not pay rent, while seven (14%) respondents, particularly 
those who were hosted by a close relatives, did not know 
whether their hosts were paying rent or not. The other seven 
(14%) claimed to be paying R45.65 monthly rental. All seven 
(100%) of the residents who payed their rent, paid it 
themselves.
(iii) Hostel residents relationships with township residents
Before the advent of political violence between Merafe hostel
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inmates and the adjacent townships in August 1990, the hostel 
vicinity was a hive of social activity. These activities 
constituted a strong social link between hostel dwellers and 
township people. On weekends, groups of people from different 
ethnic groups would converge on the playing ground opposite 
the entrance to the hostel draped in their various traditional 
attires waving their dancing shields and sticks to entertain 
the township people. Most of the spectators of these games 
were township traditionalists who were reminded of their 
places back home. Among the spectators were township women, 
particularly those who were rejected by township men for 
either being less appealing, too fat, having too many children 
or widows in search of new husbands. ,
The games that formed part of social activities in and around 
the Merafe hostel ranged from soccer to traditional dancing. 
These were games that catered for every hostel inhabitant 
young or old, either as administrators, players or spectators.
The most popular activity was the riotous money-making game 
of dice that normally began on Friday evenings when everyone 
had money, and followed through right up to Sunday afternoon 
when most would have lost their hard earned wages and would 
have to prepare themselves for another long hard week. The 
game of dice attracted men from various townships who wanted 
to augment their meagre salaries, though unfortunately they 
usually ended up losing the little they did have. ,
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The second most popular game which formed a strong social link 
between hostel and township people was soccer which recruited 
young players from the townships. \ Owners of various soccer 
teams would be hostel dwellers, who would play against other 
hostel teams from other townships or township soccer teams.
rThe third most popular social activity in the Merafe hostel 
involved religion, which was evidenced by inmates from 
different denominations leaving the hostel in droves to 
worship in the townships, while others worshipped under the 
trees near the hostel. Given the poor conditions in which the 
hostel inmates lived and their exploitative working 
conditions, one could use a Marxist explanation of why they 
sought solace in religion. However some hostel dwellers used 
religion as a social avenue to get to know township women whom 
they could then develop relationships with (Informant no. 17, 
hostel resident). All church buildings were in the townships 
and most of the congregation were women. Church thus provided 
a means of social access to township women.
However political violence, however, came to obliterate these 
social activities which involved intimate relations between 
hostel and township residents..
The crucial point is that there was no history of acrimony 
between hostel dwellers and township residents before 1990.
1 Over half of the people interviewed, 29 (57%) were envious of 
township people and wanted to emulate township life styles.
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They too wanted to live in big houses and drive fancy cars 
(sishayel'imoto zikanokusho) . People with these aspirations 
and a positive view of the township residents were a diverse 
sample of the hostel inmates including young and old, new 
arrivals and veterans of the hostel. Before 1990 many hostel 
inmates seemed to be becoming assimilated into an urban 
lifestyle and culture.
Many youthful migrants hardly referred to the rural areas as
"home". According to one respondent:
For us the young hostel dwellers the word migrant 
is no more appropriate. We do not want to be 
called migrants any more. Our future is in the 
urban areas. We regard ourselves as permanent 
urbanites. We do not see ourselves ploughing 
fields and herding cattle, goats and sheep any 
more. The days of the empty, meaningless tedium 
days of migrant life'are over, forever (Respondent 
no. 16, hostel resident).
Some traditionalist Zulu men had undergone surgery to close 
their earlobes which had been opened as part of their 
tradition. This indicates the decline in adherence to 
traditional life styles.
On the other hand a significant number of hostel residents had 
resisted this assimilation process. Fifteen respondents (29%) 
made up of thirteen people who inhabited the hostel during the 
post-1990 period, and two respondents who had stayed in Merafe 
hostel for more than ten years, claimed that they had never 
associated themselves with the township and its community. 
To them the hostel was their only home while they were in the
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city of Gold and their loyalty to it was deep. All of these 
informants claimed to have only had limited contact with 
township people and did not wish to extend this relationship 
beyond already existing parameters. Their only friends were 
other hostel dwellers living in other hostels.
(iv) Indunas in Merafe hostel
The Induna system was a dynamic institution fraught with 
favouritism and nepotism. A sizeable number of hostel inmates 
claimed to believe in and honour the induna system. An 
overwhelming majority of respondents in the Merafe hostel, 41 
(80%) confirmed the existence of indunas in the hostel. 
However six (12%) respondents did not believe indunas existed 
in the hostel and maintained that if the indunas did exist, 
they would be inefficient. Four respondents did not know 
whether indunas existed or not and were ignorant of their 
functions.
A noticeable trend was that the majority of hostel dwellers 
who came from the rural areas and peri-urban towns of 
Natal/KwaZulu were loyal to the induna system. In contrast 
hostel residents who came from other parts of rural South 
Africa outside the borders and boundaries of KwaZulu/Natal 
were ignorant of indunas.
There was a lot of confusion about how indunas were elected. 
Seventeen respondents (33%) believed that indunas were imposed
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from above by "Amakhosi" back home in the rural areas and 
therefore represented only the aspirations of the Amakhosi and 
not the hostel dwellers. However an equal number (33%) 
claimed that the induna system had evolved from below. This 
group believed that it was the hostel residents themselves who 
were responsible for electing hostel indunas. The latter 
group further argued that a person who was elected to the 
position of induna was a person who was endowed with the 
dynamism of both the urban and the rural cultures; a person 
who displayed leadership qualities and who was impartial in 
his judgements. They claimed that this rare combinations of 
leadership qualities is normally found in people who are in 
their early 60's.j
The duties of Indunas differed from hostel to hostel. One of 
the duties of the induna in Merafe hostel was to see to it 
that most of the "king's" subjects were accommodated and fed. 
The fact that 29 respondents, (57%) came from the same rural 
area fostered a type of communal living in the hostel. 
Seventeen respondents (33%) said they had created their own 
social networks that involved close ties, while only five 
respondents (10%) said they lived a lonely, isolated life.
Belonging to a rural network was an urban survival strategy; 
it meant that one did not go to bed with an empty stomach. 
This was confirmed by 31 (61%) respondents, as one said:
... we buy food for those who are not working.
most of us know how painful it is to go to bed on
a hungry stomach, especially when one is at a
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strange place were violence is the order of the day 
(Respondent no. 17, hostel resident).
Another ten respondents (20%) claimed that strong family 
relationships existed among hostel inmates; paternal 
relatives and family members looked after each other. 
According to these respondents, food did not come from the 
Induna but from other relatives in the hostel. The other 10 
(20%) respondents claimed that they bought and cooked their 
own food in the hostel. Most of this latter category either 
belonged to other non-Zulu ethnic groups or their rural 
origins differed from the rest of the inmates.
(v) Burial societies
The advent of political violence in the mid 1990's involved 
the proliferation of burial societies, which came to the 
forefront of activities in the Merafe hostel. Prior to 1990, 
burial societies were few, their membership was not compulsory 
and was confined to members of the same tribe. According to 
one informant subsequent to 1990, membership was made 
compulsory for hostel residents, and the indunas forced 
everyone to join.
Almost three quarters of respondents, 39 (76%) claimed to
belong to burial societies in Merafe hostel. Seven (14%) 
respondents were on the verge of joining at the time they were 
interviewed. All had been briefed by indunas about the 
importance of taking out membership in a burial society. Five
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interviewees (10%) said they did not belong to any burial 
society or stokvels in the hostel for fear of losing their 
deposits. These five respondents were non Zulu- speaking 
hostel inmates and they perceived burial societies to be Zulu 
associations which mainly catered for the needs of Zulu 
speaking hostel inmates.
'Their view was confirmed by 37 respondents (73%) who affirmed 
that burial societies were Zulu village-based structures 
(izinhlangano zezigodi) which were controlled by hostel 
indunas. Membership was confined to specific people who were 
either known to the hostel population or had relatives or 
friends who could pay their dues. However 10 respondents 
(20%) claimed that membership of burial societies was opened 
to anybody who could afford the monthly instalments, 
irrespective of his ethnic origins. \
Burial societies were clearly support structures in the 
hostel. In the case of the death of a member, funds would be 
made available to the bereaved family. A coffin and the means 
of transporting the dead for burial in the countryside were 
paid for by the burial society. Each time a death occurred 
the affected member was obliged to pay an extra amount to 
replace the amount that had been withdrawn.
Unlike burial societies outside the hostel where an elected 
treasurer collected money from each member and banked the 
total amount, with a fine imposed on individuals who brought 
their donations late, in the hostel a different system
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operated. The hostel induna was charged with the collection 
of money. Furthermore, the induna chaired all burial society 
meetings which were attended by representatives from each 
block. Defaulters were identified in those meetings. In each 
case of the death of a member, the induna decided whether the 
deceased was to be buried in the rural or urban area. 
According to most respondents this depended on the status of 
the dead migrant or his rank in Inkatha. People with high 
political prestige were buried in the country because 
according to one informant there was a fear that their bodies 
might be exhumed and necklaced by township youth (Respondent 
no. 21, hostel resident). ?
In the hostel there was a perception that the burial society
was an ethnic one that catered for the Zulus, and that other
ethnic groups were being exploited for their contributions and
did not benefit when they lost members of their families.
. . . even if we complain until we are blue in our 
faces there is nowhere we could sue or report 
these people (Respondent no. 14, hostel resident).
Burial societies seemed to engender more social cohesion 
amongst Zulu inmates than amongst inmates generally.
(vi) Economic activities in Merafe hostel
The political violence that erupted in 1990 seemed to have 
brought about a proliferation of small and medium businesses 
in the hostel. The ownership of business ventures in the 
hostel became the monopoly of the Zulu-speaking hostel
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inmates, particularly those with highly developed entrepreneu­
rial skills. These inmates took advantage of the rift which 
developed between the township and the hostel communities 
which compelled inmates to refrain from buying in township 
shops where most of the business are located, for fear of 
being killed.
Chief among the medium size businesses was the ownership of 
a fleet of mini-bus taxis which had also become the monopoly 
of hostel inmates. , Further research needs to be conducted to 
establish how all of a sudden hostel inmates were able to own 
and control one of the biggest informal sector activities in 
South Africa. It was suggested that train violence was 
deliberately instigated by hostel dwellers to boost the taxi 
business (Key informant no. 6, SCA spokesperson).
Other medium size businesses found in the hostel were shebeens 
and "spaza" shops. Unlike other businesses, shebeens in the 
hostel catered for both hostel and township customers. Before 
the start of the political violence in 1990, most of the 
"township drunks" would flock to the hostel in search of the 
variety of concoctions that had long been the speciality of 
hostel shebeens. However with the emergence of political 
violence in the 1990's, the shebeens in the hostel began to 
serve only hostel inmates and a few of the "township drunks", 
particularly those who could not afford the expensive township 
concoctions. This group of "township drunks" dubbed "izibotho"
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(hobos) swelled the numbers of the people murdered and 
necklaced by hostel inmates during the period 1990-1993.
The deaths of these people did not prevent or discourage the 
increasing numbers of profligate women in hostel shebeens, 
some of whom had no other intention than selling their bodies 
to sexually starved hostel men. As in the case of the 
Meadowlands hostel, prostitutes moved in from the periphery 
of the hostel where they were confined prior to the emergence 
of conflict between the two communities. Their access to the 
hostel had previously been prevented by the ever vigilant 
municipal police.
The 1990's, however, saw prostitutes becoming an integral part 
of the hostel social milieu. In Merafe hostel, prostitution 
was a more complicated issue than simply "the granting of 
sexual favours for monetary gain" (Giddens, 1992: 195). Most 
prostitutes in and around the Merafe hostel were found to be 
poor and relatively powerless women who originated from both 
urban or rural environments. They were women who because of 
their high rate of illiteracy could not find any alternative 
means of survival and therefore resorted to prostitution.
Two categories of prostitutes could be identified: the first 
group were women, both urban and rural, who were genuinely 
looking for permanent partners. Some were either divorcees 
or widows, who because of their low educational status and 
their unemployability, were compelled to enter the hostel,
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using prostitution as a way of trying to locate permanent 
partners. This new phenomenon of black women "chasing" men 
goes against the grain of African culture. In most African 
cultures women are not supposed to display their affection to 
men, less they be labelled "izifebe" a derogatory term for 
"whores". The dominant perception among hostel dwellers of 
these women that they were "izifebe". They failed to 
understand that it was the poverty and homelessness of these 
women that turned them into sexual victims of hostel men.
The second category of prostitutes were commonly referred to 
as "izibotho" or "township drunks". They descended on the 
hostel and used sexual favours in order to get alcohol. They 
became victims of all the sexually starved men in the hostel 
when they were drunk.
(vii) Political organisation in Merafe hostel
The IFP itself maintained that hostels in Soweto and other 
areas had become exclusively Inkatha strongholds. In figures 
provided to the IBIIR by one of the IFP senior members, Mr 
Humphrey Ndlovu, the figures of its hostel support were 
claimed to be as follows:
Merafe - 100%
Dube - 87%
Nancefield - 90%
Jabulane - 100%
Diepkloof - 95% (IBIIR, 1992: 32).
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This figure was confirmed in interviews in this research. 
Informants stated that from July 1990 there had been a 
concerted drive by Inkatha elements to establish political 
hegemony in Merafe hostel. Within a short period of time 
after the violence began in this area, Inkatha leadership had 
moved swiftly to organise a large majority of Zulu-speaking 
migrants who came from different geographical areas of Natal 
into a strong Inkatha force. Within a short space of time, 
Inkatha leadership was able to mobilise hundreds of hostel 
dwellers to attend Inkatha meetings and to become card- 
carrying members of the organisation. It was also able to 
expel from the hostel all those who refused to conform, after 
accusing them of collaborating with the enemy (Key informant 
no. 6, SCA spokesperson).
This coercive method of mobilising elevated Inkatha from an 
unknown organisation in the hostel to a position in which it 
enjoyed a monopoly inside the hostel. This was supported by 
a large majority of respondents, 45 (88%) who claimed to be 
card carrying members of the IFP, with only six (12%) 
respondents who claimed to belong to the PAC.
Twenty-nine respondents (57%) claimed to have joined the IFP 
in 1990, while 13 interviewees (25%) had joined between 1991- 
1993, with only nine respondents (18%) claiming to have joined 
the organisation before 1990. This is a clear indication that 
the IFP mobilisation policy of the 1990 gained the 
organisation a huge number of supporters.
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This coercive mobilisation method of the IFP was further
validated by the statements of 23 respondents (45%) who
claimed they joined the IFP to secure a place in the hostel,;
coupled with their allegiance to the Zulu nation, rather thar*»
to the party itself. This method of recruitment was similar
to IFP recruitment methods during the 1980's in Natal where
IFP—aligned warlords abused shackdwellers and other groups.
The ways in which Inkatha manipulated the relation between
ethnic mobilisation and access to resources is best
articulated by Mare who claimed that:
Allegiance to the "Zulu nation" - measured through 
membership of Inkatha could determine access to 
resources. Inkatha claimed total representation of 
"Zuluness" in the first years after its formation 
in 1975. It was the sole party in the bantustan 
government. Those who sought to politicise and 
mobilise Zulu ethnicity also controlled pensions, 
land allocation and education; signed work-seekers' 
permits; and approved bottle store licences (Mare,
1993: 67).
As in Meadowlands hostel an overwhelming majority of 
respondents, 39 (76%) were not clear about the aims and the 
ideals of the IFP as an organisation.^ Bhekizwe Ndwade claimed 
that:
. . . the policies of the IFP were to seek the 
liberation of the black man by confiscating the 
land from the whites and distributing it among the 
Africans (Respondent no. 13).
The organisation held all of its meetings in the hostel as 
according to a large number of respondents (32) 63%. These 
meetings were held every Sunday and all members were coerced
to attend.
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The only time the organisation held meetings in the township 
was when there was a large Zulu gathering dubbed "imbizo" at 
Jabulani Amphitheatre when they were expecting to be addressed 
by either the Zulu Monarch or Chief Mister Buthelezi. These 
were not meetings that were attended by everybody, they were 
Zulu meetings that were held guarterly.
5. VIOLENCE IN AND AROUND MERAFE HOSTEL 1990 - 1993
A large majority of respondents, 34 (67%) perceived the
conflict in Natal particularly during the mid 1980's to date
as a war between the ANC and the IFP.
The war is between two bulls, the ANC and the IFP 
fighting over political turf. The issue of multi 
causes is the issue of academics, peoplewho are 
cursed with the ability to think, people who find 
reasons were there are no reasons. There if you 
are ANC in an IFP turf you are dead, the same 
happens if you are IFP in an ANC environment.
There are no other causes unless you construct 
them, a thing which academics are good at 
(Respondent no. 8, hostel resident).
Most respondents argued that when the ANC was still banned, 
the only violence in KwaZulu/Natal was "faction fighting" 
between different clans. These faction fights were said to 
be over non-political antagonisms. However after the 
unbanning of the liberation movements, the ANC was perceived 
as threatening IFP hegemony in the region: "people buried 
their tribal differences in defence of their political 
ideology" (Respondent no. 19, hostel resident).
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Many Merafe hostel residents articulated a strong ethnic 
nationalism. The belief that the proud Zulu nation would 
fight to the last man in defence of its Zulu heritage was 
strong among Merafe hostel dwellers. Several informants 
stated that since they had defeated the ANC in KwaZulu/Natal, 
there was a strong possibility that they could weaken it in 
the Transvaal. These respondents argued that the strength of 
the PWV IFP lay in the number and power of the Zulus particu­
larly those who fled the war torn KwaZulu/Natal.
Seventeen respondents (33%) believed that the conflict in PWV 
was the continuation of the violence in Natal. Nineteen 
respondents (37%) believed that the violence in the PWV was 
precipitated by the threat from ANC factions that the hostel 
was going to be demolished. The response by many hostel 
dwellers to this perceived threat was aggressive defense of 
the hostel. The issue of closure and demolishing of hostels 
was not an idle one because the hostel in Kathlehong as well 
as the Tsakane hostel were demolished by township residents. 
Hostel dwellers thus felt that it was foolish not to take 
rumours of attack and demolition seriously.
The issue of the hostel was raised as one of the differences 
between the violence in Natal and the PWV. In Natal most of 
the opposing factions either lived in shacks or formal housing 
whereas in the PWV area there was this township/hostel divide. 
Twenty four (47%) respondents noted similarities between the 
Natal and PWV conflict with all citing politics as the cause
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of the conflict. According to these informants in both Natal 
and on the Reef fighting was over political power and 
influence and involved many of the same techniques such as» 
mobilisation through emotional rallies, the use ofi 
"traditional weapons" and the bussing of Inkatha supporters 
from various strongholds in rural Natal.
Well over 80% of the respondents (43) referred to the pattern
of political violence on the Reef as "a war", because of the
number of people who had died and were still dying. As
Lungile Ngcobo explained, it is:
... a war that has taken thousands and thousands of 
innocent lives particularly women and children. In 
our part of the country "wars" are not defined in 
terms of instruments used or uniform that various j) 
factions wear. To us war is war as long as there j 
is conflict and people are dying in large numbers \ 
to us it is war (Respondent no 3; hostel resident) .
On the other hand, eight respondents (16%) did not believe
that the current political violence was on a scale justifying
the use of the word "war". To this group:
a war involves men fighting each other with what 
ever weapon they could lay their hands on. It is 
a situation of such a magnitude that men are 
forcefully separated from their wives and stay in 
the mountains for weeks or even months.War is not 
what we are experiencing now where men from the 
hostel fight children from the township. None of 
the group has fleet its dwelling (Respondent no. 11, 
hostel resident).
It is an extraordinary feature of Merafe hostel that even 
during times of violent turmoil it attracted a sizable number 
of newcomers from the rural areas. It is surprising that 19
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respondents (37%) claimed to have arrived at this hostel from 
Natal or other hostels when the violence in Merafe was at its 
peak. This supports the suggestion that Reef violence was 
imported from elsewhere.
Sixteen respondents (33%) claimed to remember how 'the war'
started in 1990. According to Azikhwelwa Majozi:
On the 22 August 1990 we held a meeting in the 
hostel, where it was reported that the hostel was 
about to be attacked by township comrades - there 
was no way that we could take the rumour lightly ■ 
because our brothers had died in Sebokerf§^when they 
had been warned beforehand. To us it was the 
matter of "ukubona kanye ukubona kabili" (once 
bitten twice shy). As in any other war - the best 
defence is attack. We then planned the attack for 
the 24 August after we had thoroughly consulted 
with the traditional healers, inyangas and sangomas ; 
op all the rituals that had to do with war. When* 
the day of the attack finally arrived - we then 
attacked the townships - they were all unaware, we 
caught them by surprise - we attacked and attacked 
and attacked (Respondent no. 40, hostel resident).
However not all respondents were told of the attack;a sizeable 
number of respondents, 16 (31%) were not aware and therefore 
had no part in the decision making regarding the attack. They 
claimed that they did not know how "the war" had started.
The origin of the political violence in and around Merafe 
hostel appears from interviews with several key informants to 
f lie in rumours of an attack on the hostel by township 
residents on the evening of 24 August 1990. That night alone 
14 township residents were killed and 124 were injured in the 
attack by an estimated number of 400 hostel dwellers (Everatt 
and Schrier, 1994) . In that year alone there were 121
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incidents of violent conflict between Merafe hostel residents 
and residents from the surrounding township. In these 
incidents 73 people died and 265 were injured (IBIIR, 1992).
An overwhelming majority of respondents did not perceive all 
township people as their enemies. 21 people interviewed 
(41%), perceived only the ANC^allied township comrades as 
their enemies. However this group admitted that it was 
difficult to distinguish these comrades from the rest of the 
township youth because they almost all spoke the same language 
and wore the same clothes. But "... when we attack every 
youth we come across - we know there is a 99% chance that we 
will hit the right target" (Respondent 31, hostel resident).
According to Thembinkosi Biyela this blurring of antagonists 
is problematic:
If you are in a war situation where the line of 
division is blurred, where it is not overtly 
identifiable by race,in terms of black and white we 
must create a badge of identification. Our common 1 1 
symbol of identification is red head bands. We see 
that as normal because wEinre^ we"*"e6ffie“"from every • 
regiment was identified by the colour of its shield ‘ 
(Respondent no. 47, hostel resident).
Not all inmates agreed on this form of identification, 2 3 
respondents (45%) believed that the lines of identification 
between themselves and their enemies were blurred, to this 
group: "There were no clear lines of identification of the
enemy in terms of external appearances or languages" 
(Respondent no. 27) . Because it was difficult to identify who
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belonged to the ANC, specifically the target of attack 
sometimes became all township residents.
During the height of the conflict between the two communities, 
there was increased arms traffic into the hostel. Township 
residents who lived near the hostel accused the police of 
being the main suppliers of arms to hostel inmates. To some 
informants a clear indication of police complicity in violence 
became evident from 1990 when teargas canisters were fired 
from within the hostel. In South Africa teargas is one 
commodity that is the monopoly of the State, and is 
unavailable on the open market. Its availability within the 
hostel was said by nine respondents to constitute proof of the 
hidden hand of the state in the carnage. These were older 
inmates who were opposed to violence.
The nature of the war that raged in the townships is indicated 
by the types of weapons used. The most common types mentioned 
by 48 respondents (94%) were bush-knives, AK47, pistols, knob- 
kierries, pangas, spears and teargas (usisi lezinyembezi) 
among others. Most respondents asserted that possession of 
weapons had become common in the hostel. Inmates described 
it as follows:
"Abantu sebaba nezikhali zabo ngoba vele 
nasemakhaya bakhula ngezimpi zombango okuyizimpi, 
zezigodi" (people have long acquired the habit ofi 
possessing arms because even in the rural area they ji 
are socialised in the environment of faction* 
fighting) (Respondent no. 49) .
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On the other hand 17 respondents (33%) claimed that most of 
the weapons used in the violence were manufactured in the 
hostel by inmates themselves. These are weapons called 
"qwashi" which are hand made guns firing various objects such 
as nails or marbles termed "irons". Hostels had not only 
become "fortresses of fear" but also armouries, institutions 
where weapons were manufactured, stored and distributed.
The confrontational nature of this violence and the type of
weapons used coupled with the desire of most inmates to
maximise the damage inflicted on their enemy were cited as
reasons why the hostel war was fought at night. One informant
maintained that the darkness helped him cope with his
emotional responses to violent actions:
When you fight your enemy during the day, you are 
bound to feel pity when you are confronted by 
his/her spouse or offspring. But not at night, jve 
just destroy everything that moves and has life, 
even dogs or cats suffer the same fate. We oftly 
- learn about the extent of the damage when we listen 
to the news on TVs or radios stolen from their 
houses the following day. But if we fight during! 
the day we would be compelled to preserve other! 
things, therefore minimise the damage (Respondent 
no. 3).
This informant was one of 31 interviewees (61%) who asserted
a great wish to end this violence because:
. . . the winner in this violence is the grave - 
which like a sea is never satisfied. The sea 
receives water from many rivers and rivulets but 
has never ever bursts its banks - in times of 
serious drought, the sea never dries up and will 
always supply water to the rivers and rivulets 
(Respondent no. 48, hostel resident).
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6. CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that there have been dramatic changes 
in Merafe hostel since it was built in 1962. These changes 
included a gradual erosion of the harmonious relationship that 
existed between the hostel dwellers and the township 
residents. Between 1962 and 1993 there was also a dramatic 
change in the social composition of the hostel from middle 
aged, older employed residents in the early period to that 
of predominately younger unemployed migrants who flooded the 
hostel in the 1990's. Most of these younger migrants who came 
to inhabit the hostel in the 1990's were bused in from areas 
engulfed by violence in Natal. It is suggested that this 
group of relative newcomers were responsible for much of the 
political violence between 1990 and 1993. This group's modus 
operandi was not only to destabilise the neighbouring 
communities by violent confrontation, but they were also 
implicated in criminal violence. They integrated with the 
township gangsters, thugs and ganged up against the 
neighbouring communities by hijacking cars, raping women and 
causing complete chaos in the area.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE FUTURE OF HOSTEL IN POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
1. INTRODUCTION
The role of hostels on the Reef as "launchpads" for political 
violence during the 1990 - 1993 period raises complex policy 
questions for the transition to a more peaceful social order. 
This chapter attempts to identify different perspectives on 
the future of the hostels as perceived by different stake­
holders, including the hostel dwellers themselves. The 
chapter will identify different views on the future of the 
hostels by categorising four broad positions: (i) those who 
were in favour of the total destruction of hostels, (ii) those 
who advocated hostels being kept as single sex institutions, 
(iii) those who supported the integration of hostels with 
township communities by converting them into flats and family 
dwellings, (iv) and, as a short-term measure, those who 
advocated the fencing off of all troubled hostels. While 
there is some degree of overlapping these positions are 
distinct in terms of emphasis.
It has been apparent right from their inception in black 
townships in 1956 that migrant worker hostels were apartheid 
creations. They were built not only as part of the rigid 
apartheid ideology that required separate accommodation for 
people who were regarded as temporary sojourners, but also as
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a form of control that facilitated the monitoring of the 
movement of black people.
Furthermore, the blocks within the hostels were organised in 
such a way as to accommodate hostel dwellers along ethnic 
lines. This was a blatant attempt to accentuate and deepen 
ethnic cleavages. It formed part of the strategy of urban 
social control that was integral to the "divide and rule" 
policy of apartheid.
In recent times, particularly in the 1990's, when the dawn of 
the new South Africa was in sight, these hostels, particularly 
those on the Reef and some sections of hostels in some of the 
townships of KwaZulu/Natal, were used as launch pads for 
destabilising activities.
This strategy of destabilisation involved hostel dwellers 
launching attacks on the neighbouring communities. These 
attacks not only resulted in the loss of thousands of lives 
and in the dislocation of thousands of families, they 
seriously damaged the social fabric of the black community. 
This pattern of dislocation resulted in the majority of the 
original hostel dwellers being either forcibly evicted or 
fleeing of their own accord. The destabilisation of the 
neighbouring community generated a controversial question: 
should these apartheid institutions be preserved as the 
country entered into a transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy?
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This question of the future of the hostels was constantly 
debated by ordinary people both in the hostels and in the 
neighbouring communities. A crucial question was, who had the 
authority to decide on the future of the hostels? Was it the 
hostel inmates? Was it the residents of the surrounding 
communities who bore the brunt of the destruction wreaked by 
hostel inmates? Finally, it could be asked, what about the 
views of the thousands of wives of migrant hostel residents?
2. THE "ABOLITIONIST" POSITION
The 'abolitionist' position asserted that hostels should be 
totally abolished as institutions. This view was asserted by 
80% of the hostel dwellers interviewed. Those who believed 
that hostels should be totally abolished included township 
residents and members of political organisations. They 
maintained that hostels had long been a menace in society; 
that they threatened peace and stability; that they were 
never built with the mandate and consent of the community; 
that they were "technocratic designs" imposed from above by 
apartheid ideologues whose intention was to divide black 
people in order to subjugate and control them.
According to one informant, "It is a matter of time before the 
future of the hostels are ruthlessly decided by communities. 
There has been no doubt that the hostels have been the 
albatross of the apartheid regime, their future is in a 
precarious position. Their days are numbered. A few years
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ago, most township communities spoke with compassion about the 
conditions in which their fellow South Africans were living. 
But since the beginning of this violence, a feeling of hate 
and resentment has descended. Many township residents, 
especially those bordering the hostels, are demanding that the 
hostels be demolished" (Key informant no. 3, township 
resident).
Informants who articulated this position included members of 
very different political persuasions, such as the Black 
Consciousness Movement (AZAPO), the ANC and ANC-aligned 
organisations such as the civics and the progressive trade 
unions (ANC, 1992). All these organisations advocated the 
urgent abolition of the single-sex hostels their replacement 
with family dwellings. The ANC advocated abolition because 
of the havoc the hostels had caused among its constituency 
(ANC, 1993). A document released by the ANC on the issue of 
hostels claimed that:
Hostels have been cynically used to foster and 
further racial policies, isolation, dependency 
relations and the exploitation of labour. 
Generations of Africans, numbered in millions, have 
endured hostels as places of misery, poverty, 
loneliness and despair.
The ANC, and other parties, have consistently over 
the years called for the demolishing of these 
structures and their replacement with more appro­
priate accommodation for migrants (ANC, 1993: 11).
This view was further supported by the views of other parties. 
A member of AZAPO, for instance, believed that hostels had 
to be destroyed as part of the overthrowal of apartheid:
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If AZANIA truly believes in liberation - it cannot 
afford to inherit all albatrosses of the outgoing 
apartheid institutions, particularly those who have 
played a pivotal role in engineering black 
emotional destruction. Hostels are good examples 
of these institutions. The government, if it 
claims to represent the will of the majority, 
should bulldoze them from their foundation so as to 
obliterate any ideas of rebuilding them in the 
future. They must be destroyed roots and all, so 
that those who ever think of rebuilding them and 
should never forget the nation's feelings towards 
such institutions (Key informant no. 7, AZAPO 
branch chairperson).
A member of the ANC-allied Civic echoed the same sentiments, 
and warned that if the government did not act to abolish the 
hostels; township residents would destroy the hostels 
themselves.
. . . the government must do away with the hostels 
while people are still prepared to negotiate their 
future. Once it leaves this issue for too long, 
they (hostels) will take the same route taken by 
hostels in Duduza, Tsakane and Khalanyoni. People 
will bring them down with their bare hands, because 
there is no way that our people will ever accept 
the issue of hostels. They have caused enough pain 
and destruction in our communities, they must be 
destroyed or the people will destroy them. (Key 
informant no. 9, Civic member)
This 'abolitionist' view was also articulated by some township 
residents interviewed who stressed the destructive social 
impact of hostels:
... the epoch of the hostel is over. The should be 
demolished brick by brick - even the shadow of 
their roots must be uprooted. They have done 
enough harm to the dignity of the black people.
What have we done to deserve these institutions? 
Where have you seen or heard of an Indian only 
hostel? A coloured only hostel or even a white 
only hostel? They must go now - not even the 
shadow of their existence should linger on the 
minds of our black people. Their site make us feel 
like vomiting - the sooner they are terminated the 
better (Respondent no. 2, Township resident).
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This same view, was expressed by Selina Liphoko who had lived
next to Merafe hostel since its inception in the early 1960's:
Living next to a hostel is like living next to a 
zoo that contains wild and sometimes dangerous 
animals. They are only contained during the day.
At night not even the moonlight can stop them from 
causing havoc to entire neighbourhoods. This is 
what has come to characterise our lives since the 
eruption of violence in 1990. We live just for 
today only wishing we are not the next victims. 
Nothing can be done to reform them (the hostels) - 
they must be demolished - they must go because they 
have really overstayed their welcome (Key informant 
no. 6, Township resident).
Thabiso Molorane, a resident of the community next to
Meadowlands Hostel maintained that because hostels are
sources of deep social antagonisms and tensions, their
abolition is essential if political violence is to be ended.
No peace will ever prevail if the hostels still 
exist. Opponents of the new democratic order will 
always find reasons to manipulate the division that 
exists between the two communities to the detriment 
of the entire social order. If one hostel is 
embroiled in violence the entire communities who 
live adjacent the hostels tremble because they do 
not know where and when it is going to hit next.
We cannot live like this. We have already become 
a nation of neurotics because of these hostels.
Our children have sacrificed their childhood 
stages. They have been propelled to adulthood by 
the crime committed by people who live in these 
hostels. The only solution is the total
destruction of all the hostels (Respondent no. 11, 
Township resident).
However not all informants supported this 'abolitionist' 
position. From a number of interviews a 'reformist' position 
could be identified.
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3. THE "REFORMIST” POSITION
The reformist position stated that hostels should not be 
physically destroyed, but be upgraded, improved and retained 
as single sex entities. This position was primarily 
articulated by the Inkatha Freedom Party, a minority of hostel 
inmates themselves, the Hostel Association and some academics 
who were sympathetic to the IFP's cause. Inkatha's interest 
in the position relates to the fact that 90% of hostel 
dwellers on the Reef were card-carrying members of the IFP 
(Woods, 1993; Minnaar, 1993; Schlemmer, 1991) and therefore 
it wanted to be seen to be protecting the interests of its 
constituency.
Adherents of this position believed that the dismantling of 
hostels would have no bearing on the violence that has 
engulfed South Africa since the mid-1980's. Schlemmer for 
instance asserts that:
South Africa has known many poorly considered and 
hurriedly attempted solutions to the social 
problems in the black townships, many have done 
more harm than good. The latest argument to 
dismantle the hostel system may be yet another.
While hostels are manifestly inadequate institu­
tions, they both contain and have created certain 
social realities which will not go away with the 
dismantling of the physical structure (1991: 5).
Schlemmer further argued that:
The inevitable conclusion one must draw from my 
research results and other similar results is that, 
notwithstanding the constrained, frustrating and 
unnatural conditions in the hostels, a substantial 
proportion of the residents prefer this mode of 
urban existence to making any significant
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investments in more stable urban accommodation. 
Their priorities are in rural areas (1991: 5).
To support his argument for the retention of hostels as 
single-sex dwellings, Schlemmer used results from the research 
he conducted in the mid-eighties that indicated a massive 
support for hostels as single-sex accommodation. At that time 
a sizable proportion of hostel dwellers preferred having 
temporary single status in the cities in cheap hostel 
dwellings (Schlemmer and Moller, 1985).
This view is further supported by a minority of hostel
inmates. As has been shown repeatedly in this thesis,
violence adversely affected life in almost all hostels on the
Reef. Life in these hostels has never been a paradise for
inmates nor for the neighbouring communities. Yet, the
hostels had become home to thousands of migrants whose loyalty
to them was astonishing. This loyalty is seen in this
statement by one hostel dweller:
To some of us these hostels have acted as the only 
shelter in a strange land. We arrived from the 
rural areas jobless, penniless and nowhere to stay.
We would not have afforded rents in the townships.
As long as we are in this position we are going 
protect these hostels (Respondent no. 12, hostel 
resident).
A group of seven respondents (23%) in the Meadowlands hostel 
and 11 respondents (22%) in the Merafe hostel preferred living 
in single-sex hostels where accommodation was very cheap. Of 
this group of respondents, 22% were young migrants who were 
either illiterate, unemployed and unable to support them-
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selves, and 65% of them were older migrants who were not only 
unemployed but illiterate and too old to enter any meaningful 
job market. Both of these social categories are characterised 
by a marked sense of vulnerability; they harboured a bleak 
view of their future. Their views are well articulated by 
Nkanyezi Madlala:
We are going to stay in these hostels until our 
dying days. Some of us have been here for many 
years now, we have grown to know each and every 
stone in this hostel. We have no other place to 
stay except in here. Life is affordable in here 
though the conditions are deplorable. Rent is 
cheap for those who still pay it, communal life is 
still rife except that this violence is threatening 
to erode this communal life (Respondent no. 12, 
hostel dweller).
Both these groups view their only possible survival in the
urban areas as remaining in migrant labour hostels. They
argued for the retention of hostels as single-sex institutions
because they were opposed to bringing their families with them
to the urban areas. For example:
bringing the whole family to the urban areas is 
going to be encumbered. Living from hand to mouth 
of one individual is hard enough - having to feed 
and accommodate an extra mouth or two is really 
going to be difficult. The pain of seeing your 
children cry of hunger and disease is unbearable.
I doubt most of us are ready to encounter those 
problems. It is only our wives who are better 
equipped and better suited to absorb these pains.
They hardly complain about these things 
(Respondent no. 6, hostel dweller).
This was further supported by another hostel dweller who 
claimed that:
I do not want my wife and children to stay with me 
under these conditions. It is really hard enough 
for me to provide food for myself- what more if I
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have to provide food for my wife and children it 
will be a big task. At least at home (Natal) I 
have got an extended family to run to in time of 
difficulties. If there is no plate on the table - 
they could easily go to any of the relatives for a 
plate (Respondent no. 7, hostel dweller).
Some informants gave a very dismal account of hostel life.
For example, Thamsanqa Ximba said:
... violence in this hostel alone (Meadowlands hostel) 
has become the order of the day. The rule of law has 
collapsed, people are killed inside here and nobody 
bothers to investigate who the murderers are, women are 
raped in broad daylight and nothing is done about it - 
and lately even thugs from the townships have tended to 
make this hostel a hide-out from the police from their 
various criminal activities. They too know that no 
policemen would dare sat his foot inside the hostel 
(Respondent no. 17, hostel dweller)
However the notion of retaining hostels as single sex 
accommodation is limited in a number of ways. It fails to 
acknowledge that the position of migrants has changed over the 
years as indicated in this thesis. Increasing numbers of 
younger and literate migrants have over the years flocked to 
the urban areas. Their position in the job market has been 
enhanced by higher levels of education than that obtained by 
some of the older migrants. Their improved educational levels 
coupled with the fact that old apartheid laws have been 
repealed, changed their views on permanent urbanisation. The 
availability of low cost housing through various schemes was 
an added factor in shifting views regarding urbanisation.
The majority of hostel dwellers in both Meadowlands and Merafe 
prefer permanent urbanisation where they would be able to live 
with their wives and children. Only older migrants were
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totally opposed to the idea of their wives and children 
joining them in the hostels or in the city. Their rigid 
traditionalist position emanates from the fact that they were 
firmly established back home. Years of apartheid influx 
control has engrained an urban- rural dichotomy in their minds 
so that the urban areas were regarded as "esilugwini" (the 
Whiteman's territory). Furthermore, years of working in the 
cities had enabled them to build houses, accumulate livestock 
and educate their children, albeit to a limited degree. Their 
marriages were the authoritarian, patriarchal kind that 
ignored the views and the feelings of women and children. 
There was a feeling that bringing their dependents to the 
cities would not only corrupt them, but spoil what seemed to 
be a totally controlled family life and marriage.
A further limitation of the view that hostels should be 
retained as single-sex institutions is that it only echoes the 
opinion of male migrants, disregarding the feelings and the 
opinions of hundreds of wives and children of the migrants who 
form a new category of hostel dwellers. In the quest to find 
a balanced view of the position of hostels remaining as 
single-sex dwellings the opinion of women on the issue was 
sought by interviewing ten women in each hostel and eight 
Zulu-speaking wives of hostel inmates in the rural area of 
Nongoma in KwaZulu/Natal.
Their views are important to the hostel debate. It must 
always be remembered that when migrants flock to the urban
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areas in large numbers, they leave behind hundreds of
destitute women and children who for the rest of the year
struggle to make ends meet. Their plight is well articulated
by Nokuzama Ndwandwe who attested that:
... ours (rural women's story) will always remain 
the story of pain and suffering that will never be 
heard by the world. When our men go to the mines 
and factories (ezimbonini) in the cities we are 
left to look after the children and plough the land 
that has never produced enough for our subsistence, 
but nobody ever cares to listen to our stories of 
pain. Some of us are even married to polygamous 
marriages where many children are born. Most of 
the rural women raised these children single 
handedly, without a cent from their migrant 
husbands. But still what is important to 
researchers and academics is the feelings of the 
migrant husbands.
Furthermore rural women still believe that children 
help with farming and would provide them security 
when they have reached the old age. In most part 
of the rural areas women's identity is associated 
with motherhood. Women only derive their social 
status from the number of children they are able to 
bear, as a result we suffer for our ignorance when 
all the men had left for the towns. But still our 
plight and pain is never articulated. Instead the 
world go on to ask the very men who are party to 
our suffering about how we feel (Respondent no. 6) .
These women viewed single-sex hostels as sources of pain
linked to family disintegration.
... if from the beginning we were allowed to 
migrate to the cities with our families we would 
have long avoided the pain caused by the migratory 
system and its hostel situation. The system allows 
our husbands to disappear in the urban area, God 
knows where they disappear to, and hardly send 
money to us and the children to survive on. We are 
seated with heavy hearts, unhappy that our husbands 
are not contributing to the upkeep of the family. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that most of 
us are not working and therefore lack the finance 
to send our children to school. When we follow 
them to the cities we are always scolded like 
children in these crowded hostel rooms, constantly 
being threatened with deportation and being asked 
who gave us permission to come to the cities.
190
Whereas if we were part of the deal from the outset 
our family structures would have been intact. That 
could only happen if hostels as they are currently 
are demolished or turned into family structures 
(Respondent no. 8).
Allowing hostels to remain as single-sex accommodation 
perpetuates the denigrating of women, according to Phangisile 
Khuzwayo:
the hostel system must be phased out 
immediately because it make us appendages of our 
husbands. We spend a lot of money and time 
locating which hostel they live in. After we have 
found them, that is, if we are lucky they are not 
staying with local girls, who boast of been "umfazi 
we phepha" (legal wife with a marriage certificate 
-rural marriages are customary marriages with no 
marriage certificate) we would be threatened with 
deportation if we misbehave. We do not have a say 
in anything our husbands do because hostels are men 
places. We also want places that we would be proud 
of. But they must be cheap so that we could afford 
them (Respondent no. 9) .
An overwhelming majority of 17 out of 28 women interviewed 
(61%) were in favour of migrating to the cities with the 
purpose of joining their spouses in order to resuscitate their 
dying family lives. The argument for retaining hostels as 
single sex institutions or upgrading them but restricting them 
to accommodate single migrants does not have widespread 
support. It was clear from these interviews that the views of 
women connected to male, migrant hostel dwellers must be made 
the subject of debate and intensive research.
4. '’CONVERSION OF HOSTELS INTO FAMILY UNIT" POSITION
The position that hostels should be converted into family
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units was the most widely held position put forward by the 
majority of academics, COSATU-aligned unions, civic 
organisations, hostel inmates and people living in communities 
neighbouring the hostels.
Proponents of this position believe that if hostels were 
either converted to family units or flats, they would be able 
to retain the bulk of the inhabitants and hostel dwellers 
would be able to bring their immediate relations, such as 
their wives and children to live with them. The type of 
accommodation advocated by this position is that they should 
be affordable to ordinary hostel dwellers (DBSA, 1993).
Advocates of this position believed that this proposal had a 
number of benefits for hostel inmates in the sense that (i) 
the hostel community would not be interrupted or dispersed as 
a settled community. The entire community would still occupy 
their located site; (ii) There would not be any new 
acquisition of land required; (iii) There might be spare 
capacity in the existing infrastructure, the use of which 
would also signify a saving in the cost of resettlement (DBSA, 
1993) .
This position supports Schlemmer's assertion of the need to
keep the hostel community intact because:
The hostel dwellers are not merely a category 
defined in terms of accommodation. They are in a 
sense a social "enclave" with a different/ 
political culture and different kinds of interest 
than the surrounding township dwellers. Clearly, 
dismantling the hostel system is not only complex
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in its implications for the residents but may not 
remove the problem perceived to surround the hostel 
and their environments (Schlemmer, 1991: 5-6).
Schlemmer further asserted that forced integration by 
demolishing hostels was not the solution to the current 
violence because:
... the hostel dwellers are so distinct in terms of 
socio-economic interests and political orientation 
that they will remain "enclaves" even if their 
hostels are closed down (1991: 6).
Citing his two decades of experience working among township
communities as a city council employee, Schlemmer concludes
that integrating migrant and township residents is impossible:
Having been employed in the township prior to the 
programme of hostel construction in the sixties and 
seventies, and mindful of the pattern of 
residential locations elsewhere in Africa and in 
the third world, I would make the confident 
prediction that migrants would establish themselves 
in clearly defined and bounded concentrations 
within squatter camps and easily cause havoc from 
within, with an added advantage [Emphasis added] 
(Schlemmer, 1991: 6).
The view that hostels should be converted into family units 
was supported by a large number of respondents in both the 
Meadowlands and Merafe hostels, and many residents in 
neighbouring communities. Most respondents in the two hostels 
believed that:
... upgrading the hostels and converting them into 
family accommodation would not only remove the 
violent element from within the hostel but would 
create an environment that is conducive to peace 
and stability (Respondent no. 39, hostel inmate).
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The call for the conversion of hostels into family accommoda­
tion was opposed by the IFP and the IFP-allied National Hostel 
Residents Association (NHRA) which was formed at the peak of 
the hostel debate by predominantly IFP dominated hostels in 
the PWV and Natal/KwaZulu regions. These groupings perceived 
the call for conversion of hostels into family accommodation 
as an endeavour to weaken the IFP's strong power base 
particularly in the PWV, where the IFP was only strong in the 
hostels.
The Transvaal Hostel Residents Association (THRA), added its 
voice to denouncing the dismantling of hostels and to 
converting them into family accommodation. Instead the 
organisation recommended the expansion of the existing single- 
sexed dormitories into structures that would accommodate a 
single person per room (Key informant no. 3, THRA member).
Members of the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) asserted that:
... Meadowlands and Merafe hostels had been 
converted into military bases for attacks against 
township residents. The IFP's opposition to the 
conversion of the hostels stemmed from the fear 
that the military bases would effectively be 
destroyed through the upgrading of these hostels 
into family accommodation (Key informant no. 1,
SCA) .
However a COSATU-aligned informant maintained that:
The call for the upgrading of hostels should not be 
perceived as the strategy to demobilise or 
undermine the IFP. Hostels throughout the Reef 
were a great social concern because of the 
continuous violence that emanates from them. The 
sooner they are upgraded and turned into family 
accommodation the better it is for both the
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residents and the hostel dwellers (Mbulelo Biyana, 
COSATU).
Informant's reasons for supporting this position on the future
of hostels varied widely. While some were concerned with the
violence or with political considerations such as the response
of the IFP, others were more concerned with protecting family
life. For example Nokulunga Mngadi maintains that:
. . . hostels should be made accessible to all who 
want to stay in them by upgrading them into family 
accommodation. Men should be encouraged to live 
with their wives instead of allowing hostels to 
destroy family life. Most of the rural women have 
never enjoyed a complete family life because most 
become married spinsters as soon as they got 
married because they have never experienced living 
with their husbands. Allowing hostels to remain 
unchanged is like allowing migrant labour policy 
that has split families and destroyed the fabric of 
social life to go unchallenged (Respondent no. 7).
This position on the conversion of hostels into family units 
also has many limitations. In places such as Duduza, Tsakane 
and Katlehong, where residents have demolished the hostels, 
inmates have moved to stay in shack settlements next to those 
areas. Not a single group has formed itself "in clearly 
defined and bounded concentration" within those shack 
settlements. Instead as their hostel structures have disinte­
grated, they have formed new structures linked to local 
community-based organisations. Contrary to Schlemmer's predic­
tion, no violence has been experienced.
The view that hostel dwellers are so distinctively different 
that they would remain in segregated social enclaves even if
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physically integrated, is problematic. It ignores the fact 
that hostel dwellers shared schools, clinics, and recreational 
facilities in the township for decades without incident, even 
though until recently women and children were not part of the 
hostel environment. The sharing of these facilities by the 
hostel residents and township people strengthened the 
relationships between the two communities.
Lastly, this view ignores the fact that the introduction of 
women and children, which has become a permanent feature in 
hostels, has meant a number of changes in the relationship 
between hostel inmates and township residents. Children 
cannot be physically restricted; they have transcended the 
boundaries of space by venturing into the township in search 
of peers and open playing space which is unavailable in the 
hostel milieu.
5. THE “FENCING OF HOSTELS” POSITION
In a summit meeting between Mandela and de Klerk on September 
26 1992 it was agreed that to prevent township violence by 
fencing and policing hostels. The position that all hostels 
associated with violence and crime should be fenced off as a 
short-term interim measure in order to curb the violence, 
emerged after an intensive investigation by the Goldstone 
Commission on the involvement of some of the hostels in 
politically motivated conflict and in criminal acts.
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The ANC also advocated this position. As early as 1990, the 
ANC believed that the para-militarisation of the hostels had 
been an attempt by various political parties to establish 
support for themselves through violence and intimidation. It 
then recommended that all hostels implicated in violence 
should be fenced off as an interim measure against violence.
Both the Goldstone Commission and the ANC believed that 
fencing could contribute positively to the hostel situation 
so as to increase the privacy and security of both hostel and 
township residents. Furthermore as an interim measure, fencing 
would allow police and other institutions of law and order 
easy monitoring of people entering and leaving the hostels. 
Many township residents, particularly those living adjacent 
to the two hostels under scrutiny welcomed the fencing of 
hostels as an interim move to curb the violence.
However the fencing of hostels was rejected by the Transvaal 
Hostel Residents Association. They emphasized that there had 
not been sufficient consultation with hostel residents. 
Instead they called on the government to "immediately speed 
up the process and provide the funds to enable hostel 
residents to take part in the process for the improvements of 
the hostels" (New Nation 2.10.1992). They pointed out that 
the R240,000 security fence erected at Thokoza hostel in 
September had already been torn down (Sunday Times 
4.10.1992) .
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6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is clear that the future of the hostels must
be located in a broader policy framework. The RDP programme
on hostels states that they must be:
transformed, upgraded and integrated within the 
policy framework that recognises the numerous 
interest groups in and around the hostels and 
provide a range of housing options, including both 
family units and single people (RDP programme,
1994: 25-26).
The RDP programme further stipulates that the hostel policies 
must address the integration of the hostels into communities, 
the safety and privacy of hostels, and arrangements for family 
living in the hostels (RDP, 1994: 26).
The RDP envisages a programme of housing that would (generate 
employment, skills and economic activities, as well as provide 
affordable and decent houses in a peaceful and dignified 
social milieu (RDP, 1994: 22-23). This is in line with the 
wishes of 66 respondents (80%) from both the Meadowlands and 
Merafe hostels who believed that hostels should be destroyed 
and that they should be replaced with affordable housing that 
would integrate them with the local communities. As Bonga 
Dludla said:
... the integration with the local community will 
make us part of the township. For decades we have 
never been regarded as the township people or the 
Sowetans like the rest of the residents of Soweto.
We are always referred to as hostel dwellers, no 
matter how many years we have stayed in Soweto, we 
never qualify to be Sowetans just because we live 
in the hostel (Respondent no. 39) .
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These desires for community integration were expressed by an 
overwhelming majority of young migrants and indicate that the 
younger generation of migrants wants to urbanise permanently. 
The process of urbanisation and social integration was 
understood as part of a developmental process. As one 
informant said,
. . . the upgrading and construction of hostels 
should be conducted in such a way that it shapes 
our future. Here in Meadowlands the development 
industries have the opportunity to do more than 
amend the skyline; they have the opportunity to 
alter how whole townships and hostel communities 
operate. Construction can be made to become an 
engine for change, a massive job creator and a 
means of achieving integration and harmony where 
there was once division and hostility (Respondent 
no. 14) .
Ultimately the social integration of hostel and township 
residents is part of the wider process of creating a common 
society in post-apartheid South Africa. One of the 
difficulties this involves is to unravel the linkages that 
have been forged between violence and deep seated ethnic, 
gender and political identities.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
This thesis has focused on the relation between hostels and 
the political violence on the Reef from the time the violence 
erupted in July 1990 until December 1993. This analysis was 
done using a case study of two hostels in Soweto, the Merafe 
and Meadowlands hostels.
The thesis has explored the pattern of political violence and 
the role played by hostel residents in the violence. The 
thesis argued that while "war" is a contested notion, the 
political violence that engulfed the Reef constituted a war. 
The thesis further argued that the hostel system played an 
indispensable role in this conflict since it frequently 
provided bases and launch pads for the agents of the political 
violence.
The dominant perception of hostels is that they were armed 
camps of the Inkatha Freedom Party. It is believed that 
Inkatha colonised these institutions, drove out non-Zulu 
occupants and ANC supporters and transformed the hostels from 
migrants camps into "fortresses of fear" from which they 
terrorized the surrounding communities.
This thesis has tried to anchor this view in a sociological 
profile of both the Merafe and Meadowlands hostels in Soweto. 
This involved examining these hostels as social institutions,
200
the social relations and culture operating within them, and 
their place in the social structure of the surrounding 
township. The thesis focused on the social characteristics 
of the hostel residents such as their ethnic identity, age, 
gender identity, marital and employment status, and work 
history. Through a series of in-depth interviews outlined in 
the methodology section, the thesis attempted to map the 
different experiences and understandings which hostel dwellers 
had of the political violence in relation to their own 
political and religious beliefs and broader world views.
The first chapter outlined the objectives of the study and the 
methodology. The second chapter explored political violence 
in South Africa generally and the Reef specifically. The 
chapter argued that these destabilisation policies which were 
initially aimed at neighbouring countries were finally turned 
inwards into South Africa, in order to weaken the anti­
apartheid forces and prevent South Africa's move towards 
democracy. These destabilisation methods involved 
unprecedented levels of political violence, especially on the 
Reef.
Chapter Three traced the changing nature of hostels from their 
inception in 1913 as migrant labour hostels built to house 
single males in the inner cities. The chapter indicated how 
present day hostels developed, by tracing their development 
from compounds to "fortresses of fear". This chapter has 
argued that there were five main changes in the hostels on the
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Reef since their inception in 1913. These changes involved 
firstly, a shift in location of hostels from the inner city 
to the townships. The second change concerned the gender 
composition of the hostels. While hostels were originally 
built to house and control exclusively male migrants workers, 
they came to accommodate increasing numbers of women and 
children who themselves migrated in large numbers into urban 
areas. The third change involved the ethnic composition of 
the hostel. When hostels were first built, they were multi­
ethnic institutions that housed male migrants from different 
parts of South Africa and its neighbouring countries. In the 
early 1990's Reef hostels came to house mainly Zulu-speaking 
migrants who had been bused in from rural Natal and who were 
sympathetic to Inkatha. The fourth change involved an 
increase in the numbers of people inhabiting these hostels as 
the control mechanism of influx control collapsed. The fifth 
change involved the relationship between township residents 
and hostel inmates. After the unbanning of the political 
parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, this 
relationship changed from one of peaceful social and 
commercial interaction to one of violent antagonism. These 
changes were both dramatic and negative. The concept 
"metamorphosis" has been used in the attempt to capture the 
dramatic nature of changes in the hostels.
The fourth and fifth chapters focused on Meadowlands and 
Merafe hostels by tracing their historical origins, the social 
characteristics of their inhabitants and their relationships
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with neighbouring communities. It was shown how in both cases 
the 1990's brought enmity and antagonism between hostel 
inmates and neighbouring township residents. These chapters 
explored the role which both Merafe and Meadowlands hostels 
played in the current political violence and suggests how both 
hostels provided sanctuary for "warlords" imported from Natal.
Chapter 6 attempted to identify the different perspectives on 
the future of the hostels as perceived by different 
stakeholders including the hostel dwellers themselves. The 
chapter identified different views on the future of hostels 
by categorising four broad positions: (i) those who were in 
favour of the total destruction of hostels, (ii) those who 
advocated hostels being kept as single sex institutions, (iii) 
those who supported the integration of hostels with the 
township communities by converting them into flats and family 
accommodation, (iv) and those who advocated the fencing off 
of all troubled hostels.
Hostels are deeply embedded in the history of apartheid. They 
were built to provide single-sex accommodation for male 
migrants and were part of an intricate system of control, 
exploitation and denial of human rights.
Almost all hostel residents on the Reef had a harmonious 
relationship with their neighbouring communities, except for 
the Dube hostel conflict of 1957 which was bound up with the 
ethnic policy of the Government. Serious conflict broke out
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on the 14th of September when Zulu-speaking inmates living in 
Dube hostel attacked Sotho-speaking people living in adjacent 
Meadowlands. The conflict left 40 people dead and more than 
100 injured. From then on hostels were quiescent except for 
a few intra- hostel conflicts which were also easily quelled 
by the authorities.
It was the post-1976 era when the face of Meadowlands and 
Merafe hostels were to change forever. The Meadowlands hostel 
violence of 1976 was the biggest hostel-versus- township 
conflict that had occurred in several decades since the Dube 
hostel violence of 1957. Even in that conflict, Zulu-speaking 
migrants were the perpetrators of the violence and it is 
arguable that the invisible hand of the apartheid state was 
used to stir up the conflict.
These migrants were scorned and feared by the more 
sophisticated township residents because of the perception 
that they were "born of warrior blood" ready to wreak violence 
at any moment. These perceptions increased the sense of 
isolation and resentment of hostel dwellers as they continued 
to be referred to as "communities in isolation".
This sense of isolation and resentment helped fuel the kind 
of violence we have witnessed on the Reef between the hostel 
inmates and the township communities. The township 
communities continued to call hostel residents the "OJ's", 
iziqhaza, (stupid people), amadramti, (literate), and
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amagoduka (migrants), and many other stigmatising names. 
Township people blamed them for political violence in the run 
up to the first ever democratic dispensation.
This 'invisible hand' was most active from mid-1990, a few 
months after the liberation movements were unbanned, when many 
Reef hostels became military barracks. They became a base for 
smuggling and manufacturing weapons and launching attacks on 
township residents.This thesis has shown that by this time 
both Meadowlands and Merafe hostels were then dominated by 
Zulu-speaking migrants who generally came from the rural areas 
of Natal. Most of these migrants were unskilled, and a 
majority of them did not find employment. This raises a number 
of questions such as, who was feeding these people? Who was 
clothing them? How many of them were graduates from Mkhuze 
camp, an Inkatha paramilitary training camp in Natal?
Various newspaper's exposes have revealed that the former 
Vlakplaas commander Eugene de Kock who was arrested in May 
1994, following the release of the Goldstone report, was 
involved in a sophisticated gun running network. Weapons of 
war were available to the inmates of both the Meadowlands and 
Merafe hostels in the 1990 - 1993 period.
There are grounds to suggest that the violence that engulfed 
the Reef from August 1990 was "imported from Natal". More 
than 60% of young respondents in the interviews in this study 
hailed from KwaZulu/Natal areas that were engulfed by violence
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from the early 1980's. More than 50% of them had moved from 
one hostel to the other between the period of August 1990 to 
December 1993. More than 50% of them arrived in either 
Meadowlands or Merafe hostels when the violence between the 
two hostels and their adjacent communities was at its peak. 
Several key informants maintained that there was nothing 
spontaneous about the conflict, that, on the contrary, it was 
carefully planned and orchestrated and had nothing to do with 
ethnicity. The randomness of some of the attacks which 
emanated from both the Merafe and Meadowlands hostels supports 
the idea that hostels were used as launch pads for attacks on 
neighbouring townships.
This researcher believes that the violence between the two 
hostels and its neighbouring townships was not simply about 
ethnicity and can be blamed on the covert actions by the 
agents of the state as a part of a secret destabilisation plan 
in the run up to the elections.
Ethnic groupings have long been a contentious issue throughout 
the African continent and elsewhere in the world. But 
ethnicity has not posed a serious threat in South Africa. For 
decades the apartheid government tried to promote ethnic 
cleavage without success. From as early as the 1950's the 
South African government fostered the housing schemes to be 
built on ethnic group lines. The government was fully aware 
that when racial groups were arbitrarily and compulsorily 
separated, latent group hostilities would be exacerbated.
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When black townships like Soweto were built, ethnic grouping 
was enforced, the township was divided into three basic 
groups, the Ngunis, the Basothos and "other". This ethnic 
division failed to produce the ethnic consciousness desired 
by the South African government for effective township rule. 
Different ethnic groups transcended ethnic differences by 
inter-marrying and by living harmoniously next to each other.
However Reef hostels have now come to be associated with 
political violence on the part of Zulu-speaking, Inkatha 
supporting migrants. Before 199 0 many township residents spoke 
with compassion about the conditions in which their fellow 
South African were living in Reef hostels. But since the 
advent of violent conflict between hostel inmates and the 
township communities, feelings of hate and resentment have 
developed. Many township residents especially those bordering 
the hostels, are now demanding that hostels be demolished. 
Residents who live in houses surrounding the hostels believe 
that if the residents of Duduza, Tsakane and Katlehong could 
physically destroy the hostels in those areas, there was 
nothing preventing them doing likewise.
Given that not all hostels in South Africa are involved in 
violent confrontation with their neighbouring communities, it 
is unlikely that all hostels will be demolished.But both 
Meadowlands and Merafe hostels were claimed by the IFP as its 
strongholds. The IFP leadership joined the chorus of people 
opposed to the conversion of these two migrant worker hostels
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into family units. IFP leader in the Transvaal, Humphrey 
Ndlovu demanded the right to speak on behalf of the hostel 
inmates, thus inhibiting free expression on the part of hostel 
residents.
Overall a sizable number of older migrants, a small number of 
unemployed young hostel residents, an overwhelming number of 
hostel leaders such as Indunas and hostel leaders were opposed 
to the idea of upgrading of hostels or even converting them 
to family units. Their fear stems from the fact that any 
upgrading of the hostels or even converting them to family 
units would put hostels out of the financial reach of most 
inmates: the old, the unemployed and even those inmates who 
do not earn more than a RIO00 a month.
It must be remembered that like their township counterparts, 
residents of both hostels have also developed a culture of 
non-payment of rent since the beginning of the conflict in 
those hostels. Furthermore, increase in rental would pose 
grave problems because of the high level of unemployment in 
both hostels.
Inmates opposed to upgrading and converting hostels into 
family units were also opposed to bringing their wives and 
children to the hostels in the urban areas for fear of 
corrupting them with fast urban life styles. But as reported 
above most rural women interviewed are opposed to the idea of 
remaining married spinsters. Many have already indicated
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their discontent at remaining in the rural areas by voting 
with their feet. Some informants claimed that they were going 
to migrate to the cities in spite of the difficulties they 
might face there. Many rural women, some in polygamous 
marriages, do not want to stay in the rural areas forever, 
while most of their husbands are "... swallowed by the man­
made mountains of the urban cities without even thinking of 
us and the children back home" (Respondent no. 2).
What is clear is that hostel residents are caught up in a web 
of tensions connected to geographical and social divisions, 
political antagonisms, ethnic, age and gender differences, 
inequalities in access to income, education, power and 
resources. This study has pointed to some of these tensions 
and attempted to provide a "view from below" of a complex 
issue.
It is clear from this research that hostels on the Reef were 
not only 'fortresses of fear' but precarious footholds in the 
urban environment for some migrants; they were not only 
launchpads for violent attacks on township residents but sites 
of refuge and survival. Hostel residents are clearly a 
vulnerable social category; their multiple identities as 
Zulus, migrants, Inkatha -supporters, men and hostel residents 
are all components of any explanation of their involvement in 
political violence. As Ramphele points out, "hostel dwellers, 
both as 'migrant workers' and as Africans, have been excluded 
from effective participation in the political and economic
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institutions of South Africa.." (Ramphele, 1993:3) The 
involvement of hostel residents in the political violence on 
the Reef between 1990 and 1993 was ultimately a reflection of 
this exclusion; of their powerlessness and vulnerability. This 
powerlessness must be addressed as part of creating a more 
just and peaceful social order in post-apartheid South Africa. 
For this to succeed it must be anchored in a the under­
standings and experiences of hostel residents themselves.
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APPENDIX ;
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE HOSTEL DWELLERS 
PERSONAL HISTORY 
1 . HOW OLD ARE YOU?
4 .
I 2 3 4 5
1 0 “20 21“30 3 i-4 0 41 - 50 51—60 61-*-
WHAT IS YOUR PLACE OF BIRTH?
WHAT LANSUAGE DO YOU SPEAK?
1 2  3 4 5 £3 7 =*
ZULU XHOSA PEDI NDEBELE 5. SOTHO TSLiANA VtNDA uirr-R
WHAT ETHNIC GROUP/TRIBE DO YOU BELONG TO?
MARITAL STATUS:
2 £ 5
M A R R I E D 5 I N G l E D I V O R C E D WOE»OWE/ER Q 7 H EP
o. HOW MANY CHILDREN TO YOU HAVE?
EDUCATION
7. WHAT IS THE LAST STANDARD DID YOU PASS AT SCHOOL?
gnRK HISTORY
S. WHEN DID YOU COME TO JOHANNESBURG?
WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO COME TO JOHANNESBURG AND NOT CAPE TOWN 
FOR INSTANCE?
10. ARE YOU EMPLOYED AT THE PRESENT MOMENT?
11. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED FOR YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER?
12. WHAT WORK DO YOU DO?
13. HOW MUCH DO YOU EARN PER MONTH?
0-500 / 500-600 / 600-700 / 701-500 / 801-900 / 900-1000 /
1000 -r
14. DO YOU BELONG TO A TRADE UNION? (i) YES
(ii) NO
15. IF YES, WHICH UNION?
X O  . WHEN LAST DID YOU RETURN HOME?
B0W OFTEN DO TOO R ^ ™  HOMY
hos tel?
HO« LONG HAVE YOU LIVED IN THIS
HOW DID YOU COME TO
LIVE IN THIS hos tel?
did you LIVE IN ANOTHER
HOSTEL BEFORE THIS ONE?
( a ) I -
(b ) I?
YES
NO
YES, which hos tel?
„  ™  ™  »  = » "  ™ s
1. yes
IF YES, HOW MUCH? ---* 
WHO PAYS THIS MONEY? -
22. HOW DO YOU FIND
LIVING IN THIS HOSTEL?
23. HOW MANY ETHNIC
g r o u p s  live w  your room?
4WHICH ETHNIC GROUPS?
1 4 5 o
7 'a  1
S . S O T H O Z U LU TSW ANA P E D I XHOSA SH A N G A A N VENDA f OTHER  j
25. ARE ROOMS ETHNICALLY DIVIDED?
i  . VES 
2 .  NO
26. IF YES, (i) HOW? ............................
(ii) BY WHOM..........................
27. IS THERE A LEADER OR INDUNA IN THIS HOSTEL?
IF YES, HOW IS HE ELECTED?
29. WHAT ARE HIS DUTIES?
30. ARE THERE MANY PEOPLE FROM YOUR HOME WHO LIVE WITH YOU IN THE 
HOSTEL?
31. WHO BUYS THEIR FOOD?
WHO COOKS YOUR FOOD?
5
HOW WOULD YOU LIKE YOUR CHILDREN JOINING YOU IN THIS HOSTEL?
3 4 . WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF TOWNSHIP PEOPLE? DO YOU SPEND TIME WITH 
THEM? ARE YOU FRIENDS WITH ANY OF THEM? (1). YES
IF YES. WHAT ACTIVITIES DO YOU SHARE? (2). NO
HOSTEL ACTIVITIES
35. DO YOU BELONG TO ANY SOCIETIES IN THE HOSTEL, e.g. BURIAL 
SOCIETY, STOKFEL, ETC.?
3o. WHO BELONG TO THOSE ORGANISATIONS - ONLY PEOPLE FROM YOUR HOME 
OR ANYONE WHO LIVE IN THE HOSTEL?
37. HOW DO THESE SOCIETIES OPERATE?
38. ARE THERE ANY OTHER BUSINESS OPERATING IN THIS HOSTEL?
39 . WHO IS IN CHARGE OF ORGANISING THESE BUSINESS?
are there shebeens and prostitution in the hostel?
WHEN DO WOMEN COME TO THE HOSTEL?
WHO BRING THEM?
ARE THERE ANY SOCCER ACTIVITIES IN THIS HOSTEL?
1. YES
2. NO
IF YES, DO YOU EVER PLAY AGAINST TOWNSHIP SOCCER CLUBS?
WHAT OTHER LEISURE ACTIVITIES ARE FOUND IN THIS HOSTEL?
WHAT ALCOHOL DO YOU DRINK?
HOW MUCH? HOW OFTEN? WHERE DO YOU GET IT FROM?
WHAT DO YOU SMOKE?
nr
ORGANISATIONS
48. DO YOU BELONG TO ANY POLITICAL ORGANISATION?
1.  Y E S
2. NO
49. IF YES, WHICH ONE AMONG THESE?
1 3 4 _5___ _ S __ 7 8___
AZABQ- INKHATA__ PAG — FI DA— ANC JSE__ _DP__ OTHERS
50. WHEN DID YOU BECOME A MEMBER?
51. WHY DID YOU JOIN?
52. WHAT ARE THE AIMS AND IDEALS OF THE ORGANISATION?
53. DOES THE ORGANISATION YOU BELONG TO HOLD MEETINGS IN THE 
HOSTEL?
54. HOW OFTEN?
56. ARE PEOPLE FROM THE TOWNSHIP ALSO ALLOWED TO ATTEND?
857 . DOES YOUR ORGANISATION HOLD MEETINGS IN THE TOWNSHIPS?
58. HOW OFTEN?
VIOLENCE
59 WHY DO YOU THINK THERE IS SO MUCH CONFLICT IN NATAL?
60. WHY DO YOU THINK THERE IS SO CONFLICT IN THE TRANSVAAL?
61. DO YOU THINK THAT THE REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT ARE THE SAME IN 
THE TRANSVAAL AS IN NATAL?
62. WOULD YOU CALL THIS VIOLENCE A WAR?
1. YES
2. NO
63. (a) IF YES, WHY? ................
(b) IF NO, WHY NOT?
64. HOW DID THE VIOLENCE START IN YOUR HOSTEL?
WHO DO YOU PERCEIVE AS THE ENEMY?
HOW DO YOU IDENTIFY THE ENEMY, i.e. BY THE LANGUAGE HE SPEAKS, 
BY THE CLOTHES HE WEARS, ETC.?
WHERE THE ATTACKS MADE BY THE HOSTEL DWELLERS ORGANISED IN 
ADVANCE?
DO PEOPLE INFORM YOU WHEN AND HOW THE ATTACK IS GOING TO TAKE 
PLACE?
WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?
WHAT TYPES OF WEAPONS DO YOU USE IN THE ATTACK?
WHERE DO YOU GET THESE WEAPONS FROM?
WHY DOES MOST OF THE FIGHTING HAPPEN AT NIGHT?
73. DO YOU WANT THIS FIGHTING TO COME TO AN END?
74. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE?
THE FUTURE
75. HOW DOES THE VIOLENCE AFFECT YOUR HOSTEL, i.e. WHAT CHANGES 
HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE HOSTEL SINCE THE VIOLENCE BROKE OUT?
76. ARE THERE DIFFERENT PEOPLE LIVING THERE NOW?
77. WHAT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE HOSTEL AND IN 
THE NEIGHBOURING COMMUNITIES?
78. DO YOU WANT TO CONTINUE LIVING IN THE HOSTEL?
1. YES
2. NO
79. IF YES, WHY?................................
80. IF NO, WHY?
11
81. SHOULD THE HOSTELS BE CONVERTED INTO FAMILY UNITS?
1 . YES 
2 .  NO
82. IF NO, WHY? ________________________________________
S3.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMUNITY
84.1 Some hostel people -feel they are surrounded by enemies. Do 
you feel this? Yes/No.
35.2 Give reasons for your answer.
S6.3 One hostei person said "we feel we are surrounded by enemies. 
Gur children can no longer go to school in the townsnios. We 
cannot buy in the shops. The houses of IFF supporters are 
burnt our girlfriends are necklaced. What are we to do".
Do you agree with this view? Yes/No.
Give reason.
APPENDIX _2 -
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR TOWNSHIP RESIDENTS
PERSONAL HISTORY
1 . Sex i . Male
2 . Fema1e
MARITAL STATUS
i / 3 4 5 6
M a m e d Sina 1 e WIDOW Wodower Divorces Other
HOW OLD
i
ARE YOU?
3 4 5 6
i 5-20 21-30 31-40 41 — 30 51 —sO ol ■+■
4. WHAT ETHNIC GROUP DO YOU BELONG TO?
TENACY
5. DO YOU RENT OR HAVE YOU BOUGHT THIS HOUSE?
1 . RENT
2. BOUGHT
EDUCATION
WHAT IS THE HIGHEST STANDARD OF EDUCATION YOU HAVE PASSED AT
SCHOOL?
HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU HAVE?
WHAT ARE THEIR ABES?
WORK HISTORY:
9. ARE YOU EMPLOYED?
1 .  Y E S
2 .  NO
10. IF YES HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED FOR YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER?
11. WHAT IS YOUR MONTHLY SALARY?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
50-100 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-600 601 +
12. WHAT WORK DO YOU DO?
13. DO YOU BELONG TO A TRADE UNION OR ANY WORK ORGANISATION?
14. IF YES, WHICH ONE?
15. WHEN, AND WHY DID YOU JOIN?
16. IF NO, WHY DID YOU NOT JOIN?
COMMUNITY LIFE
17. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED NEXT TO THIS HOSTEL?
18. HOW DO YOU FIND LIVING NEXT TO THE HOSTEL?
19. DO YOU KNOW ANY OF THE HOSTEL PEOPLE BY NAME?
1 . YES 
2. NO
20. IF YES, HOW DID YOU GET TO KNOW THEM?
21. DO YOU SPEND TIME WITH HOSTEL PEOPLE?
1. YES
2. NO
IF YES WHAT ACTIVITIES DO YOU SHARE? e.g. DRINKING, FOOTBALL.
WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF HOSTEL PEOPLE?
WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD HAPPEN TO THE HOSTELS e.g INTERNAL 
FENCES? REGULAR GUARDS? REGULAR WEAPON SEARCHES? CHANGED INTO
FAMILY UNITS?
DID ANY RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN YOUR COMMUNITY AND THE 
HOSTEL INMATES BEFORE THE CURRENT VIOLENCE?
WHY DO YOU THINK THE RELATIONSHIP DETERIDATED?
IS THE COMMUNITY DOING ANYTHING TO REVIVE THE RELATIONSHIP?
1 .  Y E S
2 .  NO
IF YES, WHAT IS IT DOING?
Vi\'.
SOWETAN Monday March 16 1992
LEANED against the door 
. leading to another coach of 
' a train racing from Dube 
. Station to Phefeni. stenlatiously pulled out a book? roy bag to try and teusure the 
douseyes that were following my .i/v nowent They werescared, ' " aing.lhat 1 could be one of thel-'^
Illustration: JOHN TSATSI
*•. 'Ti’-.i* {,;V •. .VrfV' /
™rr“» conunilm on ' i  
t» more scared than they were?" ““uuuimc .
me an attack, 1 could be a VicUmilSva 1 could also be attacked by theious passengers simply because I * 1agwlthmeandiwasoopqregular^..'
■ybody had dropped a bottle or" ■g for that matter in that coach,": 
^taTOjianpedooto^win-i.
■ir was thick with feat; ’T*'' t n the train-9333, tbelieveltwas* Phefeni, I jumped out because I and itno longer. The scared eyesK coach now appeared menac- te. :
k a ride In a train on the Reef.
tracks
would 
rather be 
killed with my 
children than 
leave them J
I starred the day, Wednesday ^ week -thesame day on which
■ > , v BA®YLQN WWTWANI, a masters student in 
, ' sociology at the University of the
Witwatersrand, rode in trains from Soweto at 
peak hours last week and found himself 
suspected of being a train killer. This is the 
first article in a two-part series.
Jokes and the hangovers are all gone.Some people came aboard at Inhlanzane and this is where it became Clear that passengers accept only regu­lars in the coaches. There were nods and quiet hellos as the new people came it.I was still the stranger.
Nobody searched
~ urn a  . .
ivptoen^ sometimmtwice ;Wns from town. I L  .TtS?# 
not onlv because of mv i'cemen halfway down the stairs.
West in the subject but also that^tm^^^^n,^ J?^ *"dJ u*ea«urantn 1988.“W^ hjjredyinginihe u C S S t e S  «"d those who spoke.my flesh and blood. • “a to see bow they friends spoke solily as If they were atere the police doing to protect "-'f £ '  ' ' funeral.
SKS&SKE s‘*HellisatWjea so much death!':
A: brief.halt ‘ ^ • lv ride* •..*. »
In the morning. Just when the r, . r r> /* %rating td brighten. I gotplf a. O n  t i l e  J x e P T  7  Merafe railway station, i " J  rm w s a f  w  M I ^ I I I H b l ..cue oqtside the station for t to town was long. The taxis Id a brief halt : to load m, i raid sped away,’
reicled to a suspicious character. They just ignored me. ’On the Tladl township side of theTldffC. llvm urnra __ _
whose gun lay on the ground did not even attempt to pick it up.I walked down to the platform. There was a fair number of people down there; but not the numbers 1 knew when I last sd a ti iIt was quiet and those who spo  toends spoke softly as If they were at a
The usual shouts, the debates about , *°ccw “"I women, the gossip - the fun ofan early morning tide to work-was gone.
■ j walked towards the corrugated ironpolice station at the end of the platform.I could see one policeman in it.I did not reach it because I was til- . tracted by a man who was standing with two children, a girl of eight and a boy two or three years older.The children wore school uniforms; the man was neatly dressed in clean
compuaUvely «fer first das, i„ the
,■ [?edroP> °/Tlhc children at a school in ■’•'blown before going to work.
with hu'i!?.W0Ul;1 ralher *cl billed e5'ldren "““I leave them at schools in Soweto.
“““  . : !•; • v  inc j uku to s in iid» n f «tu»ptroplewertcliiubinglhe bridge, there were two other policemen. - «i,i«—  u,“lcu ,n c,ethe railway platform. Two. this lime with heavy guns One was ,hl5'.pressed Housers, but no jacket, lounged atJhe root of the f. leanlng.gainsthisgun^dtteothlhS *V 1? te risltin* children'sduff In the d iwilm. >k. r_TL. _ •  e-M auvuicouienw i lives when hofratU  l .
Furtive glances
We climbed into the train. Every­body found a seat, which was also unu- '°,d “* old day, of/urfr.wo tsur the pot, an expression used when women get into the train backwards and push with their bullocks to make space in crowded coaches) arc gone.I walked to the end of the coach andleaned against the door leading to the next coach. All the eyes In the coach turned towards me. Some stared. Others cast furtive glances. I thought if they realise that my bag had books, they would relax.No.
At Ikwezi Station 1 got off to look around the station: it was no different from Merafe. The four policemen I saw wore camouflage uniforms and were near the ticket office outside the station None were on the platform and again nobody searched my bag.I took a train and got ofT at Dube Station. Again I saw four cops.Here I spoke to two girls who were going to work. They gave tnc the feeling that they had resigned themselves to their fate.They said they could not afTord taxi fares.They feared death but they had the reeling that it happened only to other people....Then I got on the 9333 until the menacing stares drove me outat Phefeni *!n!:on.
Gun shots at Mzim- 
hlophe - but the po- •- 
lice at the station are
INALLY I reached
< Mzlmhlophe' station 
where I was (o observe 
how rHghte^h|glj Indif- '■ 
t the police at me stations '•• ^  ^ie pattern I had established since ^**) ‘; <:<■ gMetafe station, I walked to the -1 across the railway line; as later in the morning, 7.20, so ’ ere more people on it. Grownups 1 to work, children getting to ~ deeper In Soweto or in town. e were two policemen in the’'*' ary police shed on the platform. V them was naked bom the waist te were three policemen in the red. They were relaxed and did n to be on the lookout for any;^
.bang.Weheardgunshotsbom / ecu away, or thereabouts. Six
il ducked and lay bat On our is. Is this another attack? *•"I returned and we all stood tip.^1 ruths came dashing from among ., es to the east of the railway line. J: ran towards us while the third' ugh a hole In the fence around . 5 on and across the railway line. ’ ' ice car came speeding towards on and two white policemen . out and shot at the man who was across the line. i they shot and missed, n came between them and their nd he escaped into the townshipi. ; r -ouths who had run towards us, early in the morning, pretended I been with us all along. ■ • .spoke between themselves and .}■ ne clear that they Were car t}They were worried thata fourth^ tht have been shot, i if he's dead?’ 'one kept ask- . ey walked towards the western Oe township.the time we heard the first shots v (Three meti disappeared, the5'<I the station did nothing. They I '­ve easily attested thd two who - * the bridge.ilete indifference itwas. dyssey took me to New Canada •there there were mote police- the platforms. But again I was
Jn. this, the last part of a two^art. series^ 
sociologist Babylon xeketwane of Wits Uni­
versity tells of his ride in two kinds tof train 
coaches - one engulfed in fear and the other in faith.
not searched; nobody was searched.New Canada is an important node with Inins branching out to Johannes­burg, Faraday or Westgale in the city.It is possible to get to New Canada bycar and then board a train to wreak havoc in it.It was S.15am when I arrived in Jo-
6 Whcvt 
if he is 
; dead?
hannesburg. I was shaking slightly from Jhe tension of the journey. ^I walked through the streets of (lie city, marvelling at the number of police­men on patrol. Almost everywhere I turned I saw a policeman. Some ap­peared quite bored.
Couldn't some o f these lie used in thetrains to stop the bloodshed?
I hsd seen one side or the coin. Had 1seen all?On Thursday I look a taxi from my home to the Nancedeld station at the ‘other end of Soweto. Tshiawelo, ■ Crossroad and then Nancefield.All along that way I observed the long queues for city-bound taxis.The station is between two men’s hostels and there is also a third nearby.Violence in the trains from Nancefield has oben been blamed on the hostels. For me, it was an important starting point.
A t5 .SO.-im | was second ire a queue of 
four people buying tickets.
Alter buying my ticket 1 climbed to 
the b;i',tgn. rtu.-iv were i-t> pviiceincr: on 
1 it. Down oc the pl-tUbtii;* there were 
l’*o police siiedj with four policemen 
patrolling cnch platform.
Men with kirobkrrrics passed me and 
went down to the city-bound platform. 
The policemen did not confiscate their 
wcnimns.Other passengers gave way when the armed men walked towards them.
One man carrying what appeared tobe an iron rod Wrapped in a newspaperwalked past me. He passed the four polimnen and they just Ignored him and his weapon.Another carrying a similar weapon also walked past me. This time the po­licemen had walked to the other end ofthe pisiform and did not see him.
Clapping hands
As a train approached. I walked down to the platform and I found I was oppo­site a "church coach". The hymns and the dapping hands told me It was one.There was a time when you could distinguish between two coaches where there wasiinglng-the church coach and the m znbalazo (struggle) conch.In the m ta b a la w coach there would be younger passengers who would be singing freedom songs. The church ■ coach was (Hied by older passengers. 'It now appears only the church coach has survived.This one had more passengers than the coaches I had boarded the day be-
■uatradorcJOHN TSATSI
. What if  there 
is a gunman 
among us and 
he starts 
shooting? y
■ fore. Surprisingly, there-were lots of youngpropleimoogshe-oldecjisssen-
"Imlnl iyexa nakuwe,"(Your day is coming too) they sang and clapped theirhands. ---  __A middle-aged woman stood tip to tell how she was saved by tire Lord. She sang another hymn and then prayed.She called on hef Lord to help the perpetrators of violence to him their hearts.“Help them to join us on this toad to heaven,” she prayed.
My eyes were open and I scanned the 
earnest faces. Everywhere I looked, the 
eyes were closed.
“What if  there’s a gunman among us 
and he starts shooting while everybody 
else 's eyes .are closed in prayer?”  I 
taked myself, iThere was no such fear among the faithful in there. They continued to sing and dap their hands: “Ha le mpotsa tshepo ya ka. Ice tla re ke Jesu.” (ir you ask me where my hope is placed, I’Utell you. In Jesus,) .The (rain stops at Orlando and Mlamlankuiud and each time more peo­ple join the congregation.It was different from the day before. Something sustains these people.The signs of fear were still there if you searched hard enough: people wanted to be in the middle of the coach, possibly hoping that if there was any violence they would be infer there than at the edges. ..But it was not like the fearl eifcoun- tered the day before. . •I sat in the coach until I got to Johan­
nesburg station. I felt more comfortable 
in i t
Background to the 
Boipatong massacre
®  #\f l i i «  «M l<>n/<« h fifn r *  lh ^  **V
A Wits academic who has been studying the violence in the townships, places the Boipatong massacre in context. BABYLON XEKETWANE, a sociology masters student, 
questions the role of the police after 39 people were ruthlessly murdered.
THE Image of the South Afri­can Police has once more been throwit Into a crisis of credibility. Thelr'behaviour ; In Boipatong before and af­ter the massacre leavesimicfe' to be desired.
ther streng thened  by Justice  
Didcotl’s assertion that certain 
crimes and planned murders had 
been perpetrated by the security 
forces in defiance of the law.
The allegations against the po­
lice are not new.
A part from the Trust Feed case.
How could one explain the fact thete has been other strong confir- 
that it took them several days to mation o f police complicity with 
assign a team of 200 detectives to Inkalha. ? 
negotiate the detention of six peo- The “Inkathagate Scandal" is a
pie after an imp! of morethan M O ^ case ln p o ih e  -  ^u ltu re isp rev a len tw ith in U iesecu
k men raided Boipatong add1 killed Inkathagate lent credence to ac-' rity forces.
best police forces in Africa. It has 
uncovered sophisticated political - 
operations in die past. It has acted 
with precision and with lightning 
speed to apprehend the killers when 
the victims were either while farm­
ers or white policemen.
However, now that the victims 
are overwhemingly black the same 
force drags its feet instead of solv­
ing the problem.
It appears that a very special
39 men,-women and children?
'  "While we applaud that the police 
did act, we are still surprised that 
mass arrests of the murderers did 
not lake place on the day of the 
massacre.
But it should not be surprising 
w hen we rem em ber tha t the 
Boipatong massacre follows the 
pattern of other slaughters of blacks 
around the country where clear po­
lice support of the attackers was 
demonstrated.
The Boipatong massacre oc­
curred a few weeks after Mr Justice 
Wilson and Mr Justice Didcotl had 
pronounced about the role of the 
police in the cunent violence.
In his judgment at the end of the 
Trust Feed massacre case. Justice 
Wilson called for an independent 
inquiry into the involvement of po­
lice officers in “counter-revolu­
tionary strategies as well as police 
covcr-ups.”
Eleven people were killed after 
an order given by Captain Brian 
Mitchell who was later given II  
death sentences.
Mr Justice Wilson* s call was fur­
cusalions that the security forces 
have aided arm ed attacks by 
Inkalha members on innocent peo­
ple whose views were opposed to 
those of Inkatha.
In 1991 2 000 people died in 
what Stale President FW de Klerk 
calls black-on-black violence, giv­
ing support to those who assert that 
inherent tribalism makes blacks 
unfit to be stewards of peace and 
democracy.
One other case in which security 
forces are alleged to have aided 
anti-progressive forces connected 
to the IFP is that of the Ermclo- 
based “Black-Cats”  gang which 
was involved in violence against 
the residents of Wessellon.
A member who defected and 
gave evidence to the Goldstone 
Commission was assassinated by 
professionals whose methods and 
pattern resembled those used by 
the faceless killers who strike at 
will in trains, taxis, shebeens and 
night vigils and then evaporate 
without trace.
It is no exaggeration to assert 
that South Africa has one of the
Jacques Pauw calls it the “ Total 
Onslaught Ideology Culture,* * con­
ceived from the days of ‘Total 
Onslaught** when everything that 
represented black political aspira­
tion was said to be communist in­
spired.
It is this culture that is responsi­
ble for police connivance at IFP 
violence and their unwillingness to 
act against Inkalha and others who 
are against progressive forces.
This culture is embedded in po­
lice training manuals that have been 
obscured from public scrutiny for 
decades.
It is not surprising that the arms 
confiscated by the police were giv­
ing back to Inkatha on the eve ofDe 
Klerk's address to the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly.
It is against this * cickground (hat 
the release of Abel Sit;! -ye, a  mem­
ber of the KwaZulu Police, should 
be viewed.
Shange was dubbed a “beast in 
a policeman’s clothing”  by the 
judge who sentenced to 27
years imprisonment
Shangeservedonl) ■ earths
t \  of his sentence before the “Vlok 
virus”  invaded the computer com­
munity and saw him released, to 
the dismay of the community in 
and around KwaMashu.
Earlier there had been strong 
demands for the removal of Mr 
Adriaan Vlok and M r Magnus 
Malan from the Cabinet 
It was argued that De Klerk was 
unable to rid himself of them.
Vlok still remains controversial: 
How does one explain the “Vlok 
virus” ? It is ironic that this “bona 
fide computer error”  favours what 
most South African academics call 
the G overnm ent’s “surrogate 
force.”
The slaughter of hundreds of 
blacks by faceless killers every 
month will not slop until this cul­
ture is changed.
We should not be fooled by the 
police propaganda of searching the 
hostels.
Madala Hostel in Alexandra, 
for example, appears to have been 
searched as a ploy to d'vert atten­
tion from the Trust Fccdjudgincnt.
If the police are rosily unbiased, 
hundred of disp'seed families in 
Alexandra would have been re­
lumed to their homes. The intrud­
ers who drove them out would not 
only be forced to vacate these 
homes but would have been ar­
rested and charged with trespass­
ing and robbery.
It is true the Alexandra commu­
nity heaved a collective sigh of 
relief when the SADF invaded the 
township.
It is against this backround that 
(he Boipatong massacre should be 
viewed. Up to the time of writing 
this article 1 had still not heard the 
security forces blaming Inkatha for 
the killings. Bui predictably. Craig 
Kotze of the Ministry o f Law and 
Or(Jsr blamed the ANC’s mass 
'"Fion for creating an atmosphere 
conducive to such violence.
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APPENDIX :
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR KEY INFORMANTS
1. NAME :
2. PROFESSION :
3 WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON 
THE REEF?
4. WHY DO YOU THINK THE POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON THE REEF 
INCREASED AFTER F.W. de KLERK’S FEBRUARY 2, 1990 SPEECH?
5. WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON THE NOTION THAT THIS VIOLENCE IS 
IMPORTED FROM NATAL?
6. TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU THINK HOSTELS ARE TO BLAME FOR THE
REEF VIOLENCE?
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE SAID TO BE A CONTRIBUTORY 
FACTOR TO THE CURRENT VIOLENCE, DO YOU AGREE?
8 . WHAT ROLE DO YOU THINK ETHNICITY PLAYS IN THE REEF VIOLENCE?
9. DO YOU THINK THE POLICE/SPECIAL FORCES ARE INVOLVED IN THE 
VIOLENCE?
10. WHAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE POLICY AS REGARDS HOSTELS IN 
THE PWV AREA: e.g. SHOULD THEY BE FENCED AND INCREASE 
POLICING OR SHOULD THEY BE ABOLISHED, UPGRADED OR CONVERTED 
INTO FAMILY ACCOMODATION?
